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Abstract
In the beginning of the Semantic Web, ontologies were usually
constructed once by a single knowledge engineer and then used
as a static conceptualization of some domain. Nowadays, knowl-
edge bases are increasingly dynamically evolving and incorpo-
rate new knowledge from different heterogeneous domains —
some of which is even contributed by casual users (i.e., non-
knowledge engineers) or even software agents. Given that on-
tologies are based on the rather strict formalism of Description
Logics and their inference procedures, conflicts are likely to oc-
cur during ontology evolution. Conflicts, in turn, may cause an
ontological knowledge base to become inconsistent and making
reasoning impossible. Hence, every formalism for ontology evo-
lution should provide a mechanism for resolving conflicts.
Ontology Repair is a way to solve contradictions. Yet, it is a
complex task that is usually performed by experts in knowledge
engineering. It requires a deep understanding of the underlying
logical formalism to be able to understand what consequences
a repair on an ontology implies. Hence, Ontology Repair is very
time-consuming.
In this thesis we provide with an intermediate solution that
allows drawing logical consequences in the presence of contra-
dictions. We use procedures of Lehmann’s Default Logics and
Lukasiewicz’ Probabilistic Description Logics putting axioms that
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cause contradictions in the TBox into different drawers. By dis-
entangling the root causes for contradictions we weaken the in-
formation present but achieve absence of contradictions —one
major reason for inconsistencies in knowledge bases that have
a Description Logic as underlying formalism for drawing logical
consequences. While we have to accept that potentially inter-
esting logical consequences are invalidated, the approach pre-
sented in this thesis allows us to keep all explicitly stated axioms,
i.e. there is no need to remove information that a user has pro-
vided.
We provide a general framework for solving contradictions in
Description Logics knowledge bases without the need for chang-
ing the knowledge representation. We define our approach as
well as classical full Ontology Repair in terms of this operator
to make both approaches comparable. Experiment on example
ontologies show that our approach can outperform full Ontology
Repair in terms of invalidated logical consequences.
Zusammenfassung
Als das Semantische Web noch in den Kinderschuhen steckte,
wurden Ontologien u¨blicherweise als Einzelarbeit eines Experten
in Wissensmodellierung erstellt und danach als unvera¨nderliche
Konzeptualisierung einer Doma¨ne betrachtet. Im Laufe der Zeit
wurden aber aus solch statischen Wissensbasen mehr und mehr
als dynamische und somit vera¨nderliche Systeme, insbesondere
durch hinzufu¨gen von Information aus anderen, heterogenen
Doma¨nen. Neues Wissen wird mehr und mehr durch Laien
hinzugefu¨gt oder sogar durch maschinelle Agenten.
Da Ontologien auf Beschreibungslogiken - also formallogis-
chen Systemen zum logischen Schlussfolgern - aufbauen, schle-
ichen sich ha¨ufig Fehler in Form von Widerspru¨chen ein, wenn
Nicht-Experten in Wissensmodellierung einer Ontologie neues
Wissen hinzufu¨gen. Solche Widerspru¨che wiederum ko¨nnen da-
zu fu¨hren, dass eine Wissensbasis logisch inkonsistent wird und
somit den Prozess der logischen Schlussfolgerung ad absurdum
fu¨hrt. Somit sollte jedweder Formalismus, der die Evolution von
Ontologien beschreibt Methoden zum Umgang mit Widerspru¨-
chen aufweisen.
Das Reparieren von Ontologien ist eine oft gewa¨hlte Mo¨g-
lichkeit, um Widerspru¨che aufzulo¨sen. Problematisch dabei ist,
dass es dazu Experten in Wissensmodellierung braucht, welche
ein tiefes Versta¨ndnis fu¨r die zugrunde liegenden Formalismen
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aufweisen. Sie mu¨ssten zudem in der Lage sein, zu verste-
hen, welche logischen Konsequenzen eine Reparatur nach sich
zieht. Aus diesem Grund ist das Reparieren von Ontologien ein
zeitaufwa¨ndiger Prozess.
In dieser Arbeit wird eine Zwischenlo¨sung erarbeitet, welche
logisches Schlussfolgern trotz Widerspru¨chen in der Ontologie
erlaubt. Angelehnt an Methoden von Lehmann’s Default-Logiken
und Lukasiewicz’ Probabilistischen Beschreibungslogiken werden
die Axiome der TBox in verschiedene Schubladen gesteckt. Somit
werden die eigentlichen Ursachen fu¨r die Widerspru¨che auseinan-
derdividiert. Wenn auch die Aussagekraft der vorhandenen Ax-
iome geschwa¨cht wird, so werden Widerspru¨che in jedem Fall
aufgelo¨st und somit wiederum eine wichtige Ursache fu¨r Inkon-
sistenzen auf Wissensbasen, deren Semantik auf Beschreibungs-
logiken basieren, beseitigt. Auf der einen Seite werden damit
auch potentiell interessante implizite Schlussfolgerungen beseit-
igt; auf der anderen Seite erlaubt der in dieser Arbeit erarbeitete
Ansatz, alle explizit spezifizierten Axiome zu behalten. Mit an-
deren Worten: Sa¨mtliche Information, welche explizit durch einen
Benutzer hinzugefu¨gt wurde, bleibt stets erhalten.
In dieser Arbeit wird ein genereller Operator zum Auflo¨sen
von Widerspru¨chen in Wissensbasen, welche auf Beschreibungs-
logiken basieren, vorgestellt. Dieser la¨sst den Formalismus zur
Wissensrepra¨sentation unvera¨ndert und erlaubt den direkten Ver-
gleich des Reparierens von Ontologien mit dem im Rahmen dieser
Dissertation erarbeiteten Ansatz, wozu beide Verfahren mittels
des Operators definiert werden. Experimente mit Beispiel-Onto-
logien zeigen, dass der vorgestellte Ansatz beim Auflo¨sen von
Widerspru¨chen potentiell weniger Schlussfolgerungen beseitigt
als der Reparatur-Ansatz.
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Part I
Introduction and
Preliminaries

1
Introduction
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity,
nor the lack of contradiction a sign of truth
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662)
French mathematician and philosopher
Knowledge in the Semantic Web is represented by ontolo-
gies expressed in the Web Ontology Language OWL. The current
standard, OWL 2 [W3C OWL Working Group, 2009], defines dif-
ferent profiles that, in turn, allow to different levels of expres-
sivity. All of these profiles have some Description Logics as a
rough syntactic variant. Description Logics (DL) are decidable
fragments of first-order logics (FOL) where explicit knowledge is
expressed in axioms and assertions.1 DL knowledge bases have
well-defined model-theoretic semantics that allows drawing new
conclusions from existing knowledge.
When ontologies evolve, knowledge is removed or new Evolution may
lead to conflictsknowledge is added. By adding new axioms and/or new asser-
tions, contradictions may be introduced that cause the knowl-
edge base as a whole to be inconsistent. For example, adding
axioms that express disjointness the ontology may infer some
1There indeed exist undecidable DL but these are usually not used within the
scope of the Semantic Web.
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concept U unsatisfiable. When there exists an assertion of some
individual or instance u to that concept, the whole knowledge
base is inferred inconsistent. Yet, for an inconsistent knowledge
base any conclusion—even meaningless ones—becomes trivially
true. It is hence desirable to prevent concepts from being inferred
unsatisfiable. There indeed exist more reasons for why a knowl-
edge base can become inconsistent, but we propose to start off with
conflict-free conceptualizations and present a method that never infers
any concept to be unsatisfiable.
Hide the Complexity
A central challenge for ontology evolution is that there can be
two parties involved: Knowledge engineers, on the one hand, are
trained to construct conflict-free knowledge bases, but they usu-
ally lack domain knowledge. On the other hand, there are theDomain experts
vs Knowledge
Engineers
domain experts who have the knowledge that shall be formal-
ized by an ontology. Unfortunately, they are usually not expe-
rienced knowledge engineers. Studies in cognitive psychology,
like done by Ceraso and Provitera [1971], found out that human
agents make systematic errors while formulating or interpreting
logical descriptions. Similar results were observed for the task
of developing of OWL-ontologies, too [Rector et al., 2004; Doran
et al., 2009]. This makes us assume that the following proposition
is true:
Proposition 1. Evolving OWL-ontologies are very likely to be erro-
neous.
In the scope of this thesis we consider the case that OWL-
ontologies are developed by domain experts, i.e. non-experts in
knowledge engineering. Knowledge engineers are highly skilled
specialists. Yet, they lack domain knowledge, and it is not always
possible to get such an expert for developing an OWL-ontology.
We hence assume the following Proposition 2 to be true in the
scope of this thesis:
5Proposition 2. OWL-ontologies are developed by non-experts in knowl-
edge engineering.
Ontologies can be developed in an explicit or in an implicit
way. In the first case, agents directly add statements to an on-
tology. This can be done by editing the XML-serialization of an
ontology, but there exist a variety of specialized editors for build-
ing ontologies like Prote´ge´,2 or the TopBraid-Composer.3 A de-
tailed overview over different ontology editors can be found on
Wikipedia.4
In the second case, ontologies transparently integrate into a
system. Examples are social software systems like (semantic)
wikis or social networks. When, for example, users add content
to a semantic wiki [Kro¨tzsch et al., 2007], statements are added
to the ontology without noticing it, and consequently, without
being able to take control over the implied logical consequences.
Letting non-experts in knowledge-engineering develop an
OWL-ontology explicitly bears the risk of severe problems. The Editing
ontologies
requires
expertise.
development of OWL-ontologies is already a hard task for them.
Since removing conflicts requires a more detailed understanding
of the underlying Description Logics, non-experts in knowledge en-
gineering are expected to introduce logical conflicts but they cannot
be expected to be able to solve them. To avoid possible problems
with the acceptance of OWL-ontologies as a way of formalizing
knowledge and/or motivation to develop such ontologies, the
ontology development process must keep away the complexity
of the underlying formal logics from the developing agent. We
hence assume the following Proposition to hold:
Proposition 3. If non-experts in knowledge engineering shall evolve
a DL knowledge base, the complexity of the underlying logics must be
transparent to them.
2http://protege.stanford.edu/
3http://www.topbraidcomposer.com/
4http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology Editor
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Transparency is not to be mixed up with hiding the complex-
ity. If we just hide the complexity, the users will still have to
live with the consequences of contradictions. In case of trans-
parency, those conflicts and their consequences are not exposed
to the users. This becomes even more important when agents im-
plicitly evolve an ontology, i.e. when there is little or no control
over the logical consequences that are introduced when interact-
ing with the system.
Solving Conflicts
Contradictions may be caused by agents that automatically as-
semble new information from different heterogeneous sources.
This is likely to happen when combining different ontologies,
modeled by different agents. But even ontologies created by
knowledge engineers may contain conflicting pieces of knowl-
edge.
We stated in Proposition 3 the need for removing the com-
plexity of the underlying logical formalism for the user. As a con-
sequence, conflicts and their consequences shall not be exposed
to the agents working with an ontology.
As such, we make the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Any framework for ontology evolution has to provide
a way for resolving conflicts.
Resolving conflicts is usually referred to as Ontology Repair.
In that sense, this thesis provides a solution for Ontology Re-Ontology Repair
pair, too. In order not to mix up terms, we will rather refer to
”solving conflicts”. For ontology evolution we require more than
the absence of conflicts. Agents querying (or interacting with)
an ontology in the Semantic Web assume that answers to queries
are expressible in OWL 2. Furthermore, the answer should have
meaningful semantics and should not contain conflicts.
A popular method for ontology repair is removing and/or re-
writing axioms [Kalyanpur et al., 2005]. This method only par-
7tially satisfies the desired properties listed above. Indeed, the
knowledge representation remains the same. Axiom rewriting,
in contrast, requires manual effort. Whilst axiom removal can be
done automatically, both original as well as some inferred knowl-
edge will be lost. Methods extending the formalism for reasoning
usually require changing the knowledge representation. Finally,
approaches to only perform reasoning on non-conflicting parts
of the knowledge base invalidate given knowledge [Huang et al.,
2005].
The notion of what is a conflict depends on the formalism
used for drawing logical consequences. In the case of OWL (and The nature of
conflictsconsequently, DL) conflicts refer to axioms that lead to contra-
dictions under classical Aristotelean logics: A statement and its
complement cannot be true at the same time. If we require that
the underlying logical formalism must not change, only remov-
ing and/or rewriting axioms can resolve such contradictions.
If we do not change the formalism for drawing logical consequences, we
can resolve contradictions only by removing and/or changing explic-
itly stated knowledge. While preserving coherency and/or consis-
tency, we consider the need for removing explicitly stated infor-
mation as a flaw for knowledge systems to which non-experts in
knowledge engineering contribute their knowledge.
Instead of removing axioms (i.e. explicit knowledge), we pro-
pose to invalidate those inferences (i.e. implicit knowledge) that
cause concepts to be inferred unsatisfiable. This can have severe
consequences for the underlying formalism for drawing logical
consequences, one of which is the need for giving up monotonic-
ity. As we will investigate in more detail later on, other conse-
quences can be changing the formalism for knowledge represen-
tation, for example by changing to multi-valued logics.
Resolving conflicts in OWL 2 knowledge bases is a compro-
mise between giving up certain properties of the statements in
the knowledge base. As stated before, we consider removing ex- The price of
solving conflictsplicitly given statements as undesirable, but accept not to be able
to draw certain (implicit) logical consequences anymore. Chang-
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ing the formalism for knowledge representation is considered a
faux pas, because we risk agents to lose the ability to communi-
cate with each other.5 Hence, we require every method for solv-
ing conflicts in OWL 2 knowledge bases to fulfill the following
properties:
Proposition 5. Any formalism for ontology repair has to fulfill the
following properties:
P1 Preservation of expressive power: The formalism for knowledge rep-
resentation is not changed.
P2 Coherency: No concept is inferred unsatisfiable6.
P3 Autonomy: The procedure shall work automatically.
P4 Conservation of explicit information: The original explicitly sta-
ted information should be kept.
P5 Conservation of implicit information: As little inferred information
as possible shall be lost.
We should note that Proposition 5 can neither be proved or
disproved. Nevertheless, we think that these properties reflect
a good compromise between rigid proper repair and disabling
the ability to draw logical consequences at all. We think that the
ability for drawing logical consequences in the presence of con-
tradictions is higgley desirable but should not be too different
from what classical entailment does. We will pick up this issue
again in the discussion in Chapter 9.
5Indeed, a central idea behind OWL 2 is to have a standard format for knowl-
edge exchange in the Semantic Web.
6For the current work we concentrate on resolving unsatisfiable concepts. The
procedure may, in principle, be extended to resolve unsatisfiable roles and—to a
certain extent—assertions.
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We present an approach for solving contradictions for the termi-
nological part of an OWL 2 knowledge base. Solving the contra-
dictions satisfies property P2. Furthermore, we keep all original
statements while having to remove certain (implicit) logical con-
sequences. We hence fulfill property P4.
We show that we lose fewer inferences than in the case of ax-
iom removal meeting the requirements of property P5. Finally,
we are able to keep the formalism for knowledge representation
when invalidating inferences but not axioms. Namely, we con-
sider DL knowledge bases so that the first desired property P1 is
satisfied, and apply the following reasoning approach.
Based on Lehmann’s Default Logics [Lehmann, 1995] and Prob-
abilistic Description Logics [Lukasiewicz, 2008] our approach sep-
arates axioms responsible for a conflict into different partitions Solving conflicts
by separating
axioms
and collects axioms not involved in a conflict in its separate set.
Due to the separate treatment of conflict-causing axioms, infer-
ences for unsatisfiable concepts are invalidated but the formalism
for knowledge representation remains unchanged. To limit the
number of inferences lost when reasoning the single partitions
are considered alongside with the set of non-conflict axioms. We
call the pair of the partition and the set of non-conflicting axioms
a Multi-View TBox. We introduce the ∆-operator that maps any
TBox T to a Multi-View TBox DT such that DT contains exactly
those axioms of the original TBox T .
While this method, unfortunately, cannot prevent that
some potentially interesting inferences are lost, it limits the loss
to a minimum. It can, furthermore, be shown that potentially
fewer inferences are lost than in the case of full axiom removal—
while still working fully automatically and hence meeting re-
quirement P3
Any formalism for ontology evolution must strictly fulfill the
hard properties P1, P2 and P3, whereas we require the soft prop-
erties P4 and P5 only to be satisfied as much as possible. Since
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axiom removal is the only formalism known to fulfill the strict
properties—besides the procedure proposed in this work—we
use it as the baseline for comparing it to our approach w.r.t. the
soft properties.
Optimal Procedures
As the case of ontology repair by axiom removal, the investigated
approach is non-deterministic. In addition to that, the result-Optimal
procedures are
non-deterministic
ing Multi-View TBox can still contain certain types of conflicts.7
Although these conflicts do not cause any (meaningless) infer-
ence to become valid—as it can be the case using classical DL
reasoning—they can provide confusing information. It is hence
desirable to reduce these to a minimum. However, solutions that
minimize the number of inferences invalidated do not necessarily min-
imize the number of conflicts. Finding optimal solutions hence re-
quires an evaluation measure that assesses solutions, i.e. Multi-
View TBoxes not only by the size of their deductive closure. In-
stead, minimizing conflicts requires a more qualitative measure.
We show that our approach outperforms Ontology Repair by
the number of lost inferences. Yet, finding optimal solutions for
either task requires to compute the causes or justifications. Hence
both procedures, our approach as well as axiom removal, rely
upon a task that is 2NEXPTIME-complete. Fortunately, efficient
procedures for finding justifications is a subject that became more
and more popular over the last years, and it could be shown that
it indeed works for many real-world OWL-ontologies.
Applications
This thesis was motivated by work done in the project Data Cen-
ter Nature and Landscape (DNL) [Frehner and Bra¨ndli, 2006] at
7As required by the coherency property, still no concept is inferred unsatisfi-
able
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the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Re-
search (WSL).8 Different heterogeneous distributed data sources A motivating use
caseshould be made commonly accessible. Since most of the data
was collected by or on the behalf of public authorities in Switzer-
land, the problem turned out to be even multi-lingual. Ontolo-
gies were designed to allow non-expert users an open and in-
tuitive multi-lingual search on the various data sources [Bauer-
Messmer and Gru¨tter, 2007]. One of the challenges was the lack
of knowledge engineers, which lead to the idea of letting domain
experts that created and/or work with the data regularly create
and/or evolve the ontologies [Bauer-Messmer et al., 2008]. The
rationale was that they know best what the data is actually about.
We experienced in the scope of the DNL project that domain ex-
perts are not very enthusiastic about getting into the details of
formal logics. An observation we also made when letting people
from the street evolving a small-scale DL knowledge base at a
public science event ”Nacht der Forschung 2009”.9
We see the main application for this approach in the context
of ontology evolution. Especially when human agents are in-
volved who are not experts in knowledge engineering.10 Using-
the proposed approach, they can add their information to the Use cases that
may benefit from
our approach.
knowledge base and still be able to infer meaningful results—
including their very own information. Our approach hence pro-
vides a pseudo-coherent intermediate state for the knowledge
base that undergoes proper repair by a knowledge engineer from
time to time. Since we compute the root causes for the contra-
dictions, we provide additional support for this task. While ar-
guable, we think that the properties of Proposition 5 provide the
8http://www.wsl.ch
9http://www.nachtderforschung.ethz.ch/
10Which does, in turn, not mean that only knowledge engineers are capable of
evolving an OWL ontology in a consistent way. We just assume that the risk of
introducing errors is lower for a person with a background in knowledge engi-
neering than for a person who has not.
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best compromise between correctness (i.e. performing proper re-
pairs) and usability.
Knowledge engineers who evolve ontologies can benefit from
our approach, too. Particularly, when the evolution takes place
in a distributed environment, and agreement on the actual repair
can only be achieved from time to time.
While repair is one aspect, there exist also situations where
it is indeed desirable to be able to keep contradictory pieces of
information in the knowledge base. In particular, when excep-
tional information is to be modeled but the formalism for knowl-
edge representation does not directly allow for it — which is the
case when using OWL.
Another area where we can apply our methods is Ontology
Matching. In that case, two ontologies are mapped onto each
other. This can easily lead to conflicts, because the two concep-
tualizations which underly the ontologies can be contradictory.
Yet, a repair can be undesirable, when, for example, the present
axioms must not be changed. Furthermore, if a repair is desired,
it may not immediately be available. This can, as stated above,
happen when no knowledge engineer is available. Applying our
approach, it is hence possible to draw conclusions while the on-
tologies together with the mapping may be incoherent.
To sum up, our approach can be useful, whenever ontologies
have to remain incoherent for a while before they can be repaired.
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1.1 Contribution and Hypotheses
This work makes two contributions:
1. We show how Lehmann’s Default Logics can be used for
consistent ontology evolution without the need of remov-
ing axioms.
2. We introduce an entropy-based measure for finding opti-
mal solutions, since finding solutions is a non-deterministic
process.
The first is the main contribution of this work, whereas the
latter refers to optimization. We give a formal proof for the main
contribution and show how the approach can be further extended.
The usefulness of these contributions can be summarized in
the following working hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. Using our approach fewer inferences are lost than in
the case of axiom removal.
Hypothesis 2. Minimizing the number of conflicts does not result in
maximizing the number of invalidated inferences.
Hypothesis 3. The entropy-based measure minimizes the number of
conflicts and the number of invalidated inferences.
We do not provide a formal proof but provide an empirical
evaluation in Chapter 7. We will see from the results that Hy-
potheses 1 and 2 can be accepted whereas we have to reject Hy-
pothesis 3.
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1.2 Referenced Own Publications
First ideas about consistent ontology evolution were pub-
lished at the 22nd International Conference on Environmental Infor-
matics (EnviroInfo 2008) [Bauer-Messmer et al., 2008]. The initialWorks of
the author proposal for this thesis was published at the Doctoral Consortium
of the 7th International Semantic Web Conference 2008 (ISWC2008)
[Scharrenbach, 2008].
The process of how to avoid unsatisfiable concepts for ontol-
ogy evolution was described at the 1st Workshop on Inductive Rea-
soning and Machine Learning for the Semantic Web (IRMLeS2009)
co-located with the European Semantic Web Conference 2009
(ESWC2009) [Scharrenbach and Bernstein, 2009].
The actual partitioning scheme was presented at the 23rd In-
ternational Workshop on Description Logics 2010 (DL2010) [Schar-
renbach et al., 2010c]. A refined version of this partitioning scheme
was presented at the 4th International Workshop on Ontology Dy-
namics (IWOD2010) [Scharrenbach et al., 2010b] whereas the prin-
ciples of the optimization using TBox entropy was published at
the 6th International Workshop on Uncertainty Reasoning for the Se-
mantic Web (URSW 2010) [Scharrenbach et al., 2010a]. Both events
were co-located with the 9th International Semantic Web Conference
2010 (ISWC2010).
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1.3 Plan of this Thesis
This work is divided into five parts: After a motivation we give
an introduction to the fundamental concepts in Part I. In the sub-
sequent Part II we describe the methods used in this thesis which
are evaluated in Part III. We reflect the work alongside with its re-
lation to other work in Part IV. For better readability we put long
proofs in the Appendix or Part V.
Part I: Introduction
In particular, the remainder of the first part provides an over-
view over OWL, Description Logics and justifications in Chap-
ter 2. In that chapter we also introduce the basic notion of Default
Logics.
Part II: Methods
The methods part starts with basic notions and the fundamentals
of our approach towards invalidating inferences in Chapter 3.
There we introduce the general ∆-operator for invalidating in-
ferences and show how classical ontology repair as well as our
methods can be formalized in term of a ∆-operator. Using these
formal structures for the ∆-operator as a basis, we show how
Default Logics, in particular, can be used for solving conflicts.
The core of our procedure is the so-called Unsat-Splitting which
we introduce in Chapter 4. We there provide certain restrictions
on the TBox needed for consistent solutions and introduce some
Lemmas that will be important for the consistency proofs later
on. Finally, each Unsat-Splitting-∆-Operator is illustrated by an
algorithmic definition in Chapter 5.
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Part III: Evaluation
The non-determinism of the Unsat-Splitting-∆-operators intro-
duced before requires optimization techniques for finding op-
timal solutions. Hence, the evaluation starts with formalizing
optimization techniques in Chapter 6. An empirical evaluation
of the ∆-operators and the optimization techniques follows in
Chapter 7.
Part IV: Reflection
In the reflection we discuss the findings of this work in Chapter 9,
and give an overview over related work in Chapter 8. In the final
Chapter 10 we conclude the thesis and give an outlook on future
work.
Part V: Appendix
The Appendix starts with a glossary for the most commonly used
terms and symbols in Appendix A. Detailed proofs that were not
presented in the text can be found in Appendix B.
2
Preliminaries
Ontologies in the Semantic Web are expressed in the Web On-
tology Language OWL.1 The current standard, OWL 2 [Hitzler
et al., 2009] defines several profiles, all of which refer to a cer-
tain Description Logic (DL) or a fragment thereof. In turn, DLs
are (decidable) fragments of first-order logics. Evolving an OWL
2 ontology effectively means evolving a first-order logics knowl-
edge base.2 Especially when non-experts in knowledge engineer-
ing perform this task they potentially introduce contradictions to
the knowledge base. Resolving those contradictions usually in-
volves finding their causes or justifications.
Plan of This Chapter
In the following, we will give a short introduction to the funda-
mental concepts that are used throughout the thesis. We give an
overview over Description Logics and its relation to OWL and
1We do not want to neglect that there exist more possibilities to define and
formalize ontologies. In the scope of this thesis we restrict out view on OWL-
ontologies.
2In the scope of this thesis we do not distinguish between ontology evolution
and ontology design.
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first-order logics in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we provide details
about lattice theory and its application to certain properties on
DL-knowledge bases. Afterwards we show in Section 2.3 how
justifications are defined in the context of DL and how to com-
pute them. Subject to Section 2.4 is that the notion of contradic-
tions depends on the underlying logical system. There we inves-
tigate how different logical systems may be used to avoid con-
tradictions. Finally, Default Logics are described in Section 2.5.
In particular, the variant using Lehmann’s Lexicographical En-
tailment as inference procedure is presented, as it serves as the
basis for the approach of conflict solving that is investigated in
this work.
2.1 Description Logics
Logic is logic. That’s all I say.
Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809-1894),
American Physicist and Writer,
The One-Hoss Shay
Description Logics (DL) are languages for knowledge repre-
sentation with a well-defined syntax and semantics. A DL al-
lows to specify concepts (also known as classes), instances thereof,
also referred to as individuals and binary relations, called roles be-
tween individuals. Operators such as negation (¬) or conjunction
(u) enable the construction of complex concepts and roles.
Concepts are used to represent abstract or general knowledge
about the world. Consider, for example, the following complex
concept that represents things that have at most two wings:
≤ 2hasWing.Wing
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Statements about concepts are called axioms. They allow to
express simple if -then rules:
Bird v≤ 2hasWing.Wing
The intended meaning of this axiom is the following: If we
learn that something is a bird, then it must not have more than
two wings. In terms of DL we thereby require all instances that
are asserted to the concept of Bird to have at most two things
that are known to be instances of the concept of Wing.
In the example above we also used the role hasWing to ex-
press that something can have wings. Indeed, the complex con-
cept hasWing.Wing restricts the range of this role: We require
that the role ranges only over instances of the concept Wing. We
will see in this section, how we can give an expressive descrip-
tion of the world by using concepts, roles, instances and axioms.
DLs are based on formal logic-based semantics and hence also
provide methods how to implicitly infer new knowledge from
the given knowledge. We refer to this as reasoning or inference.
Yet, inference must not be mixed up with entailments or logical Reasoning and
Inferenceconsequences. The latter are those pieces of knowledge that fol-
low from the formal logics whereas inferences are those pieces of
knowledge that the procedures we define on the logics find.
When using DLs to formalize and reason about knowledge,
we make a so-called Open-World Assumption (OWA)
[Reiter, 1987a]. We cannot falsify something that cannot explic-
itly be inferred false. In the example above we can entail that an
instance from which we know that it has more than two wings
cannot be a bird. Yet, we have no evidence for this inference to
be true, in case we know that this instance only had one wing.
Even if we knew that something has exactly one wing, we would
not be able to infer that it is not a bird—we would have to also
state that birds must have at least two wings. In that sense, DL
lacks so-called negation-as-failure [Clark, 1987], because if we can-
not prove a statement to be true, we implicitly assume that it is
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false. In the following we will give a formal introduction to the
basics of Description Logics. For further information, the inter-
ested reader is referred to Baader and Nutt [2007].
2.1.1 Basic Description Logics
DLs are distinguished by the set of language constructors they
provide. These, in turn, define the expressive power of a DL.3
Elementary descriptions are called atomic concepts and atomic
roles. Using constructors of a DL language we can inductively
build complex descriptions. We usually denote atomic concepts
by A,B and atomic roles by R whereas complex concepts are
usually denoted by C,D and complex roles by S.
The basic DL language is called AL and provides the follow-
ing constructors for building complex concepts:
C,D → A | atomic concept
> | top concept
⊥ | bottom concept
¬A | atomic negation
C uD | intersection
∀R.C | value restriction
∃R.> limited existential quantification
whereA is an atomic concept,C andD are (possibly complex)
concept descriptions and R is a role name. Extensions to the ba-
sic language are union of concepts (U), full existential quantifi-
cation (E), number or cardinality restrictions in unqualified (N )
as well as qualified form (Q), and the complement or negation of
arbitrary complex concepts (C). Concepts may also be defined in
terms of a closed set of instances (which will be defined later on
in this section) in the form of nominals (O).
3We refer to a DL language simply to as DL, where the meaning is clear from
the context.
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C,D → C unionsqD | concept union
∃R.C | full existential quantification
≥ nR.> | at-least (cardinality) restriction
≤ nR.> | at-most (cardinality) restriction
≥ nR.C | qualified at-least (cardinality)
restriction
≤ nR.C | qualified at-most (cardinality)
restriction
¬C | complement/negation of
complex concepts
{a, b, c} nominals, i.e. closed sets of
instances
where now a, b, c are names of concept instances.
We may also apply operators to the roles to increase the ex-
pressive power. A role may be restricted to be functional (F).
Further, we can allow for a role-hierarchy (H), transitive roles
(S), inverse roles (I), limited complex role inclusion axioms,4 as
well as reflexivity, irreflexivity(R).
Usually, a datatype theory D over concrete domains
[Schmidt-Schauss and Smolka, 1991; Lutz and Milicˇic´, 2007] (like
the natural numbers, reals, finite strings etc.) is provided for
roles, i.e. the range of a role may be restricted to certain datatypes
such as intervals of integers, strings matching a regular expres-
sion etc. The currently most expressive Web Ontology Language,
OWL 2, has the DL SROIQ(D) [Horrocks et al., 2006] as a rough
syntactic variant. More information on the naming scheme for
Description Logics can be found in Schmidt-Schauss and Smolka
[1991]; Baader and Nutt [2007].
We abbreviate axioms and assertions by lower-case Greek let-
ters as τ : D v C, ρ : S v R, and α : C(d).
4We will specify the term ”axiom” below.
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2.1.2 DL Ontologies and DL Knowledge Bases
A DL allows to define a terminology of concepts. Such a terminol-
ogy, called a TBox, is a finite set of axioms describing a hierarchy on
a set of concepts. TBox axioms are of the form Bird v AnimalTerminologies
and express, for example, that the concept Bird is a specializa-
tion (or subsumed by) of the conceptAnimal. We also refer to the
conceptBird as the left-hand-side or sub-concept of this subclass-
inclusion axiom, whereas we refer to Animal as the right-hand-
side or the super-concept. The semantics of subclass-inclusion
axioms expresses the constraint that each instance of the concept
of Bird also to be an instance of the concept Animal.
Depending on its expressive power, a DL may define role in-
clusion axioms and role assertions. The first can be used to define
a role hierarchy and/or complex roles while the latter is used to
describe properties of roles like symmetry or transitivity. A finite
set of role inclusion axioms and role assertions is called an RBox
denoted byR.
Assertions about individuals are expressed as, for example,
Bird(crow 127), livesIn(peter, switzerland) and red 6= blue and
are referred to as concept assertions, role assertions, and inequality
assertions, respectively. A finite collection of assertions about in-
dividuals is called an ABox.
We define a DL ontology O as a pair of a TBox T and an RBox
R: O = 〈T ,R〉. A DL knowledge base is defined by the pair
K = 〈O,A〉whereO = 〈T ,R〉 is an ontology andA is an ABox—
each of which is finite and possibly empty. The sets of names of
concepts, roles and instances must be mutually disjoint. It is, for
example, not allowed that an instance is a concept or a role at the
same time.
The signature identifies entities. The signature of a TBox ax-
iom τ , denoted by sig(τ) is the set of all atomic concepts that oc-
cur in this axiom. Analogously we define the signature for RBoxSignatures of
axioms axioms as the set of all simple roles in the axiom and the signature
for an ABox assertion as the set of all individuals occurring in the
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assertion. The signature of an TBox, RBox and ABox are defined
as the union of the signatures over the corresponding axioms and
assertions. The signatures for an ontology and a knowledge base
are defined analogously.
In the context of Default Logics, which will be introduced in
Section 2.5, we have to make statements about the left-hand-side
and the right-hand-side of an axiom. For expressive knowledge
bases, these are not atomic but rather complex concepts, and
similarly, complex roles. We may, for example, have an axiom
A u B v C u D. For this axiom both, the left-hand-side A u B
as well as the right-hand-side C u D are complex concepts. In
the scope of this work we are therefore not only interested in the
atomic concepts of a TBox, but also in the complex concepts. In
particular, we would like to be able to reference those complex
concepts that form the left-hand-side and/or the right-hand-side
of an axiom. We hence define the extended signature of an axiom:
Definition 1 (Extended Signature). Let τ be an axiom. The extended
signature of τ = D v C is defined as s˜ig(τ) = {C,D} where C and
D may be complex concepts.
Example 1. Consider, for example, the axiom τ = Bird v Animal u
∃hasWings.>. For this axiom we have that sig(τ) = {Bird,Animal}.
It only consists of atomic axioms. For the extended signature, on the
other hand, we have that
s˜ig(τ) = {Bird,Animal, ∃hasWings.>, Animalu∃hasWings.>}.
We define the extended signature of a TBox, respective RBox,
as the union of the extended signature of all its axioms. In the
following we omit the term extended and simply refer to the sig-
nature of a TBox, respective RBox.
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Expressive Power of a Description Logic
Not only requires Property P1 leaving the formalism for knowl-
edge representation unchanged. We must also be able to express
the same concepts, roles and axioms when evolving an ontology.
The ontology that is subject to evolution is defined according to a
certain OWL 2-profile. If we want to be able to express the same
axioms we not only require to be able to express the new ontol-
ogy according to OWL 2, but also according to that very OWL 2
profile. As OWL 2-profiles have a DL as a rough syntactic vari-
ant, we require the underlying DL to remain unchanged when evolving
an ontology. We therefore have to be able to identify that DL.
Given an ontology O = 〈T ,R〉 we would like to be able to
know of which expressive power (also called expressivity)Defining
expressive power [Baader, 1996] the underlying DL is.5 As could be seen before,
each letter of a DL language refers to a certain set of operators.
If we, for example, add the concept union operator to the basic
language AL we obtain the language ALC. Obviously, we can
express any axiom of AL also in ALC.
In order to be able to identify a particular Description Logic
L, we denote the set of all possible Description Logics by DL. For
a certain DL L we want to be able to check whether an ontology
can be expressed in terms of L:
Definition 2 (Expressive Power). We say that a TBox T , respective
an RBox R can be expressed by a DL L, if all elements of T , respective
R can be constructed according to the language constructors that L
defines. If T andR can be expressed byL, then we say that the ontology
O = 〈T ,R〉 can be expressed by L.
(Adopted from Baader [1996])
Not every ontology in a certain DL can be expressed in an-
other DL. There exist more expressive and less expressive DLs.Ordering DLs by
Expressive Power We can hence define a partial order ≤DL on DL.
5We can reformulate this as looking for the minimal expressive power of a
TBox and an RBox.
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Definition 3 (Partial Order on DLs). Let L1 and L2 be two De-
scription Logics. We say that L1 ≤DL L2, if every TBox T that can
be expressed by L1 can also be expressed by L2. If L1 ≤DL L2 and
L2 ≤DL L1, then we say that L1 and L2 are of the same expressive
power. If neither L1 ≤DL L2 nor L2 ≤DL L1, then we say that the
expressive power of L1 and L2 is not comparable.
(Adopted from Baader [1996])
When evolving an ontology the current axioms may have a
less expressive power than we would allow. For example, as-
sume we want to evolve a new, empty TBox T with axioms that
can be constructed according to the DL SRIOQ. If we add the
axiomC v AunionsqB to T the TBox can be expressed inALC—which
is of less expressive power than SROIQ.
Demanding preservation of expressive power for methods for
solving conflicts (P5 in Proposition 5) requires not changing the Leaving
expressive
power
unchanged.
formalism for knowledge representation. We must hence ensure
that the result of such a method is still able to express axioms
according to the same DL as was the original ontology. The oper-
atorL allows to assign the maximal expressive power of an ontology
by explicitly specifying a DL:
Definition 4 (Maximal Expressive Power). Let O = 〈T ,R〉 be an
ontology. The maximal expressive power of O is identified by explicitly
assigning O a DL:
L(O) = L
Conversely, if for an ontology O = 〈T ,R〉 the underlying DL
is not specified, we implicitly assume that it is determined by a
DL L such that O can be expressed by L and L is of minimal
expressive power w.r.t. ≤DL.6
6If we assumed Lmax to be the most expressive DL possible, then we could
also define Lmax as the DL that is assumed for O by default. The actual choice
depends on the application.
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2.1.3 Semantics of Description Logics
Description Logics have a well-defined semantics. Unlike in other
formalisms like frame systems or semantic networks there is no
ambiguity between the relationships for concept subsumption,
role inclusion or assertions about individuals. In the same man-
ner, the semantics for the language constructors and the inference
process is well-defined, too.
Interpretations
The formal semantics of a DL is given by an interpretation
I = (∆I , ·I). It consists of the interpretation domain ∆I , a non-
empty finite set, and the interpretation function ·I which assigns
to every atomic concept A a set AI ⊆ ∆I and to every atomic
role R a set RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I .
There exist two special cases, i.e. when the interpretation of a
concept is either empty or equal to the whole domain. The first
case applies to the so-called bottom-concept denoted by⊥whereas
the second case applies to the so-called top-concept, denoted by>.
Since we require an interpretation to be non-empty, the interpre-
tations for a ⊥I = ∅ and >I 6= ∅ can never be the same.
For complex concepts, the interpretation function can be ex-
tended inductively:
>I = ∆I
⊥I = ∅
(¬A)I = ∆ \AI
(C uD)I = CI ∩DI
(∀R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I | ∀b.(a, b) ∈ RI → b ∈ CI}
(∃R.>)I = {a ∈ ∆I | ∃b.(a, b) ∈ RI}
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We say that two concepts C and D are equivalent, if CI = DI
denoted by C ≡ D. We say that a concept C is satisfiable, if its
interpretation is not empty, i.e. when CI 6= ∅. In contrast to that, Unsatisfiable
conceptswe say that C is unsatisfiable, if C ≡ ⊥, i.e. CI = ∅. We usually
denote unsatisfiable concepts by U .
Further extensions of the interpretation function for complex
concepts and roles can be found in the DL Handbook [Baader
and Nutt, 2007].
Satisfiability and Consistency
In order to find out whether there exist contradictions in a DL
knowledge base K = 〈〈T ,R〉,A〉, we have to find out whether
there exists an interpretation that satisfies K. An interpretation
I is said to satisfy a concept C or a role R, if the result of the
interpretation function is not empty. We denote this by I |= C, if
CI 6= ∅ and I |= R, if RI 6= ∅, respectively.
For concept subsumption and role inclusion, satisfiability is
defined w.r.t. set inclusion. An interpretation I is said to satisfy
an inclusion axiom I |= D v C, if DI ⊆ CI . A TBox T is said
to be satisfiable, if there exists an interpretation I such that I
satisfies every axiom in T . In this case, we say that I is a model
of T , denoted by I |= T . If T has a model, then we say that T is
satisfiable and else we say that T is unsatisfiable.
Satisfiability for roles w.r.t. an RBox is defined analogously.
As such, we call an ontology O = 〈T ,R〉 satisfiable, if both T
and R are satisfiable. In the following, we always assume the
RBox to be satisfiable. Hence, an ontology is satisfiable when its
TBox is satisfiable.
An ABox A is consistent with respect to an ontology O =
〈T ,R〉, if there exists an interpretation that is a model of both
A and O. An ABox A is said to be consistent, if it is consistent
w.r.t. an ontology with an empty TBox and an empty RBox. A
knowledge base K = 〈〈T ,R〉,A〉 is called consistent, if T and R
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are satisfiable andA is consistent w.r.t. T . A knowledge base that
is not consistent is called inconsistent.
If the knowledge base K is inconsistent, then, by definition,
neither the TBox nor the RBox have a model (w.r.t. the ABox).
This is particularly the case when the ABox is inconsistent w.r.t.
T but also when no concept in T is satisfiable. As we will see in
Section 2.1.6 DL correspond to first-order logics. Yet, a first-order
logics theory that has no model implies any formula. Hence, a
DL knowledge base that is inconsistent entails any axiom or as-
sertion.
Deductive Closure
An axiom D v C is a logical consequence of a TBox T , denoted by
T |= D v C, if all models of T satisfy D v C. The same holds for
RBoxes analogously. An assertion C(i) is a logical consequenceLogical
consequences of a knowledge base K = 〈〈T ,R〉,A, 〉, if A ∪ {¬C(i)} is incon-
sistent with O. We denote logical consequences for a knowledge
base by K |= C(i).
The set of all logical consequences for a TBox (resp. RBox,
ABox) is called its deductive closure denoted by (T )? (resp. (R)?,
(A)?). The deductive closure of an ontology O = 〈T ,R〉 is the
union of the deductive closure of its components:
(O)? = (T )? ∪ (R)?
The deductive closure of a knowledge base K = 〈〈T ,R〉,A, 〉 is
analogously defined as:
(K)? = (O)? ∪ (A)?
The deductive closure for a knowledge base (resp. part thereof)
is, in principle, infinite. If, for example, D v C is a logical con-
sequence of T , so are D v C u C and D v C u C u . . .. Similar
statements hold for RBoxes and ABoxes.
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Note that the logical consequence operator |= for a knowl-
edge base can also be expressed as function between sets of ax-
ioms and assertions (or sentences in its original version). This
operator, also referred to as Tarskian consequence operator [Tarski,
1983b, 2002], is denoted by Cn(K) = (K)?.
Explicit and Implicit Logical Consequences
We distinguish between explicit logical consequences and im-
plicit logical consequences. Since a model by definition satis-
fies all axioms and assertions in a knowledge base K (resp. part
thereof), any axiom of K is also a logical consequence for K. We
call any axiom or assertion that is contained in a part of K explicit
logical consequence. In turn, we call any element of (K)?\K implicit
logical consequence.
Induced Logical Consequences
There exist some logical consequences that always hold for DLs.
These refer to declaration and to negation. We consider those
induced logical consequences, which are described in the following,
as explicit and assume that they are contained in the TBox.
For any TBox T we have the declaration T |= C v > for any
conceptC in the signature of T . We can do this, becauseCI ⊆ ∆I
by definition. Since ⊥I = ∅ ⊆ CI we know that T |= ⊥ v C,
too. Furthermore, since CI ⊆ CI we have that T |= U v U .
Yet, we will only refer to concept declarations explicitly when the
concept is complex and unsatisfiable. We will see later on that we
will need these declarations when we want to solve unsatisfiable
complex concept. We will omit declarations for atomic concepts,
since they do not play a role in solving unsatisfiability.
For any concept U which is unsatisfiable w.r.t an interpreta-
tion I we know that I |= U v ⊥. In particular, T |= U v ⊥, if I is
a model for T . We hence identify concepts that are unsatisfiable
w.r.t. a TBox T , if T |= U v ⊥. The same holds for RBoxes, if the
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top role and the bottom role (the role ”counterparts” to the top
and bottom concept, respectively) are defined [Horrocks et al.,
2006].
We consider an axiom that expresses disjointness between two
concepts, i. e. D v ¬C and its counterpart C v ¬D as the same
axiom. If two conceptsC andD are stated disjoint in the presenceExplicit disjoint
axioms of the axiom D v ¬C, we also consider the counterpart C v ¬D
as explicit. From this first axiom we learn that DI ⊆ ∆I \ CI .
Assume now that there exists i such that i ∈ CI . We know
that i cannot be included in ∆I \ CI , and hence also not in DI .
As a consequence, i ∈ ∆I \ DI . This means nothing else than
T |= C v ¬D. The two disjoint axioms D v ¬C and its counter-
part C v ¬D have the same interpretations.
2.1.4 Description Logics Reasoning
A central task for DL knowledge representation system (KRS)
is to infer implicit knowledge from explicitly stated knowledge.
For a DL knowledge base, a KRS defines a reasoning problem which
usually consists of the following tasks:
1. Subsumption Test:
• determine whether a concept D is subsumed
by concept C
• determine whether a role S is included by role R.
2. Satisfiability Test:
• find out whether T |= U v ⊥ for a concept U .
• find out whetherR |= R v ⊥ for a role R.
3. Consistency Test:
• check whether a knowledge base is consistent.
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4. Instance Retrieval:
• find those concept assertions C(i) that are logical con-
sequences for K for a given concept C and an individ-
ual in the signature of K.
• find those roles assertions R(i, j) that are logical con-
sequences for K for a given role R and the individuals
i, j in the signature of K.
The subsumption test induces a hierarchy on the set of con-
cepts and the set of roles. Testing for satisfiability allows the de-
tection of possible modeling errors that may cause a knowledge Inconsistency is
problematicbase to become inconsistent. If a knowledge base is inconsis-
tent, every possible axiom is inferred satisfiable. Hence, check-
ing for consistency means checking whether it is possible to draw
meaningful conclusions from a knowledge base. Accordingly, in-
stance retrieval can be interpreted as the repeated application of
instance checking for all known individuals ofK and a given con-
cept C or role R.
DL Reasoners
A reasoner defines algorithms for solving the reasoning problem.
The implicit axioms and assertions it produces are called infer-
ences. LetK be an arbitrary DL knowledge base (or part thereof).7
and R a DL reasoner. If every inference of R is a logical conse- Soundness and
completenessquence of K, then we say that R is sound. If for K all entailments
are inferences of R then we say that R is complete. Note that
soundness does not imply completeness and vice versa. In the
following we assume that a reasoner R is sound and complete.
Most DL Reasoners are based on the tableaux calculus [Hor-
rocks et al., 1999]. The currently most used systems are Racer
[Haarslev and Mo¨ller, 1999], Pellet [Sirin et al., 2007], Fact++
[Tsarkov and Horrocks, 2005] and HermiT [Motik et al., 2009b].
7If we restrict reasoning, for example, to TBox reasoning
32 Chapter 2. Preliminaries
In contrast, in the DL reasoner KAON2 [Motik, 2004] reasoning
is implemented reducing a SHIQ(D) knowledge base to a dis-
junctive datalog program [Ullman, 1988]. All of the mentioned
DL-reasoners are sound and complete.
Tableau
Tableau-based reasoners try to build an abstract ABox Ai such
that the knowledge base K = 〈R, T ,Ai〉 has a model for a given
RBox R and a given TBox T at the same time [Schmidt-Schauss
and Smolka, 1991]. The objective is to show that the negation of a
formula is not satisfiable. Therefore, all concept descriptions are
transformed into negational normal form
(NNF), i.e. negation occurs only in front of atomic concepts.
Tableaux are data structures, in particular trees, labeled with
formulae, in our case ABox assertions. For each axiom type,
transformation rules are defined, and those rules define the con-
struction of an ABox while they preserve satisfiability of the for-
mula. Since some of the axioms, for example disjunction, require
non-deterministic choices, the current path in the tree is split into
branches. Hence, the transformation rules actually define a set of
ABoxes.
The formula for which we want to proof satisfiability is in-
deed satisfiable, if we can find an ABox that is complete and
consistent. An ABox is called complete, if none of the transfor-Tableaux: Proving
by counter-
example
mation rules applies to it, and it is called consistent, if it does not
contain any clash (we give a more detailed explanation of ABox
inconsistencies in Section 2.4.1). If one of the ABoxes is complete
and does, furthermore, not contain a clash, then it can be shown
that there exists a model for K. The tableau methods can be ex-
tended such that an existing ABox can constrain the construction
of the abstract ABox.
The subsumption problem turns out to be undecidable, if the
DL language is of too much expressive power [Schmidt-Schauß,
1989; Patel-Schneider, 1989]. On the other hand, even for inex-
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pressive DL languages there do not exist procedures that can
decide the problem in polynomial time [Levesque and Brach-
man, 1987; Nebel, 1988]. Nevertheless, several optimization tech-
niques emerged over the last years which make DL reasoning
possible in practice [Horrocks and Patel-Schneider, 1999; Haarslev
and Mo¨ller, 1999; Tsarkov et al., 2007; Motik et al., 2009c].
For a more detailed overview over tableau algorithms for DL
reasoning, we refer to Baader and Sattler [2001].
2.1.5 Description Logics and OWL
Knowledge in the Semantic Web is represented by ontologies
which are usually expressed in the Web Ontology Language (OWL).
The current standard, OWL 2 [W3C OWL Working Group, 2009],
was designed in a way such that it has the DL SROIQ as a rough
syntactic variant [Horrocks et al., 2009]. SROIQ is a very ex-
pressive language, and its reasoning problems are of high com-
putational complexity. In particular, the reasoning problem for
SROIQ is 2 NEXPTIME-complete [Horrocks et al., 2006; Hor-
rocks and Sattler, 2004; Kazakov, 2008].
Yet, this expressive power is not needed in every case. As a
consequence, so-called profiles were defined for OWL 2, each of
which correspond to a unique DL [Motik et al., 2009a]. Hence, ev-
ery OWL 2 profile has well-defined semantics, and the reasoning
problem is decidable. The profiles were defined in a way such
that the knowledge representation is unchanged but language
constructors are restricted in a way such that the corresponding
DL is less expressive.
Thanks to the general nature of the method proposed in this
thesis we may consider any DL for which the reasoning problem
is decidable. In other words: we may apply our approach to any
OWL 2 profile.
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2.1.6 Description Logics and First Order Logics
Description Logics are a family of decidable fragments of First
Order Logics (FOL). An interpretation I assigns every atomic
concept an unary relation and to every role a binary relation over
∆I . Hence, atomic concepts and roles can be considered unaryExpressing
axioms as FOL
formulas.
and binary predicates, respectively. We can hence translate a con-
cept C into a formula φC(x) with one free variable x in predicate
logic such that for every interpretation I the set of elements from
∆I that satisfy φC(x) is exactly CI .
The FOL formula, for example, that corresponds to the com-
plex concept A u B is ∀x : (A ∧B)(x). The axiom D v C can be
translated into the FOL rule ∀x : D(x) → C(x). We will make
use of this correspondence when applying Default Logics to De-
scription Logics in Section 2.5.
For further information about first-order logics including a
historical overview over its emergence in the 20th century the
interested reader is referred to Ferreiros [2001].
2.2 Posets and Lattices
Order without liberty and liberty without order are equally destructive.
Theodore Roosevelt
Graph-structures can be used to encode certain properties for
sets of entities. Monotone properties, like the consequence rela-
tion of classical Aristotelean logic, define a partial order on theLattices for
properties of
TBoxes
entities involved. Partially ordered sets—or posets—can be fur-
ther restricted. Requiring that, for example, every pair of nodes
must have a unique common ancestor and a unique common de-
scendant, a poset can be considered as an algebra. Such posets
are referred to as lattices.
For DL TBoxes, lattices can be used to define monotone prop-
erties on sets of axioms. Examples for this are the concept sub-
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sumption hierarchy (i.e. TBox classification) and concept unsat-
isfiability but also the dependency between sets of axioms that
explain a certain entailment (cf Section 2.3).
For a more detailed introduction to lattice theory, the inter-
ested reader is referred to Gra¨tzer [1998].
2.2.1 Lattices on Posets and Algebras
Lattices can be defined as special partially ordered sets (posets)
or as algebraic structures. Both definitions can be shown to be
equivalent.
Poset Definition
Let L be a finite set and let ≤ be an ordering relation on L × L
which fulfills the following three properties for all a, b, c ∈ L:
(P1) Reflexivity a ≤ a
(P2) Antisymmetry a ≤ b and b ≤ a imply that a = b
(P3) Transitivity a ≤ b and b ≤ c imply that a ≤ c
The pair 〈L;≤〉 is called a poset. If for a, b, the pair 〈a, b〉 or the
pair 〈b, a〉 is part of the binary relation ≤, then a and b are said to
be comparable w.r.t. ≤. If neither 〈a, b〉 ∈≤ nor 〈b, a〉 ∈≤, then a
and b are said to be incomparable w.r.t. ≤, denoted by a||b.
An element a ∈ L is said to be an upper bound for a subset
H ⊆ L, if h ≤ a for all h ∈ H . The element a is said to be the
least upper bound or the supremum of H , if for any b ∈ L that is Supremum and
infimum of posetsan upper bound for H we have that a ≤ b. We define the greatest
lower bound called the infimum of a subset H ⊆ L analogously.
If the supremum or the infimum exists, then they are unique. We
refer to the infimum and the supremum of two elements a, b as
sup{a, b} and inf{a, b}, respectively.
For a lattice 〈L;≤〉 there can exist two special kinds of supre-
mum and infimum. For the empty set ∅ we refer to sup ∅ as the
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zero element of L denoted by 0. Analogously, we refer to inf ∅ as
the unit element of L denoted by 1. In other words: if they exist,
the smallest and the largest element of L w.r.t. ≤ are referred to
as 0 and 1, respectively.
A poset 〈L;≤〉 is called a lattice, if sup{a, b} and inf{a, b} exist
for all a, b ∈ L. Furthermore, a poset 〈L,≤〉 is a lattice, if for all
non-empty subsets H ⊆ L we have that supH and inf H exist.
We use lattices to define properties on sets of elements—in
our case sets of axioms. We define such a property as a set of
tuples of the form (I, T ), where I is an input and T is a finite set
of axioms, e.g. a TBox. We call these tuples an axiomatized input.
Algebraic Definition
To give an algebraic definition of lattices, we can define operators
on pairs of axioms:
a⊕ b = inf{a, b}
a⊗ b = sup{a, b}
We refer to a ⊕ b as the meet and to a ⊗ b as the join of a
and b. Both are binary operations on a lattice (L,≤), i.e. they are
functions on L × L → L. Both operations can be shown to fulfill
the following properties:
(L1) Idempotency a⊗ a = a
a⊕ a = a,
(L2) Commutativity a⊗ b = b⊗ a
a⊕ b = b⊕ a
(L3) Associativity (a⊗ b)⊗ c = a⊗ (b⊗ c)
(a⊕ b)⊕ c = a⊕ (b⊕ c)
(L4) Absorption Identities a⊗ (a⊕ b) = a
a⊕ (a⊗ b) = a
An algebra 〈L;⊗,⊕〉 is called a lattice, if L is finite and non-
empty, and ⊗ and ⊕ fulfill the properties (L1)− (L4).
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Diagram Representation
Posets (and hence lattices) can be represented by so-called Hasse
diagrams as shown in Figure 2.1. For a lattice 〈L;≤〉 the elements
of L are represented as nodes. Two elements a, b are connected
by a straight line, if one covers the other. An element a ∈ L is
said to cover an element b ∈ L, if a < b and there does not exist
any element x ∈ L such that a < x < b. The binary order relation
< is defined as x ≤ y and x 6= y. If a < b, then the node for b is
presented on a higher position than the node for a.
In the scope of this work we will only use the diagram repre-
sentation for illustration purposes. There exist further methods
for representing lattices which can be found in Gra¨tzer [1998].
2.2.2 Lattices for Boolean formulas
It turns out that the set of monotone Boolean formulas B over a
finite set of propositional variables P forms a so-called distribu-
tive lattice B [Gra¨tzer, 1998].8 We uniquely assign each element
of the lattice a monotone Boolean formula over P . Monotonic-
ity ensures the partial order, i.e. if ψ → φ, then φ ≤ ψ for two
monotone Boolean formulas φ and ψ.
φi ∈ B ↔ pi ∈ B
The assignment is done using a labeling function lab : B → B.
For the sake of simplicity, we identify φi with lab(pi). For B to
be a distributive lattice means that for any formulas φ, ψ, ρ ∈ B it Distributive
latticesholds that ρ⊗ (φ⊕ψ) = (ρ⊗φ)⊕ (ρ⊗ψ). Figure 2.2 provides an
example for a lattice over the set of two propositional variables
{p1, p2}. The meet operator refers to conjunction whereas the join
operator refers to disjunction. For example, (p1∧p2)⊗(p2∧p3) =
(p2) whereas (p1 ∧ p2)⊕ (p2 ∧ p3) = (p2 ∧ (p1 ∨ p3). Special cases
8Monotone Boolean formulas can be formed by conjunction and disjunction
but not negation.
38 Chapter 2. Preliminaries
1
p3 p4
p1 p2
0
(a)
1
p3 p4
p1 p2
0
(b)
Figure 2.1: The graph in the left Figure (a) is not a lattice, be-
cause p1 and p2 have no join. The graph on the right side in
Figure (b) is indeed a lattice.
1
s3
s1 s2
s4
0
lab(s1) = φ1
lab(s2) = φ2
lab(s3) = φ1 ∨ φ2
lab(s4) = φ1 ∧ φ2
Figure 2.2: Example for lattice over the set of all Boolean formu-
las over the set of two propositional variables P = {p1, p2}
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are the global infimum 0 and the global supremum 1. For the
set {p1, p2, p3} these result, for example, from (p1)⊗ (p2) = 0 and
(p1⊕p2⊕p3) = 1. Computation on the whole latticeB is not desir-
able, because the set of all Boolean formulas over P contains 2|P |
elements. To restrict ourselves to only a certain portion of a lat-
tice, we can define sub-lattices. For a lattice (L,≤), the sub-lattice
induced by the set L′ ⊆ L is defined as the closure of L′ regard-
ing join and meet, i.e. the induced sub-lattice is
(
(L′⊕ ∪ L′⊗),≤
)
.
2.3 Justifications
Every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary
analysis and justification, is found either to be not really philosophical
at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical.
Bertrand Russell (1882-1970),
British philosopher,
mathematician and logician.
To invalidate an unwanted entailment T |= η, i.e. removing η
from (T )+ , we must first find out, which axioms are responsible
for this very entailment. We are hence looking for the minimal
sets of axioms J ⊆ T for which J |= η holds [Schlobach and
Cornet, 2003]. Minimality guarantees that the entailment is in-
validated for this justification, when at least one of the axioms
from the corresponding minimal set is not considered alongside
with the others in T when drawing inferences. Furthermore, the
entailment is invalidated w.r.t. T , when it is invalidated w.r.t. to
all its justifications.
Justifications can be looked upon in different ways. One pop- Justifications
from different
perspectives
ular method is considering them as minimal sets of axioms. Be-
sides the axiomatic view, we can also define them as monotone
property on sets of monotone Boolean functions over a finite set
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of axioms. We will cover both views in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
However, we use the axiomatic view in the remainder of this
work, because our method is not based on lattices. For solving
justifications we also have to deal with possible interdependen-
cies between them. This is described in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Justifications as Minimal Sets of Axioms
We call minimal sets of axioms from a TBox such that an inference
still holds justifications:
Definition 5 (Justification). Let T be a TBox. A justification for an
entailment T |= η is a set of axioms JT ,η ⊆ T such that JT ,η |= η and
J ′ 6|= η for every J ′ ⊂ JT ,η .
In order to be able to distinguish individual justifications, we
number them by k = 0, . . . ,K where K is the number of justifi-
cations. Consequently, we refer to the k-th justification by JkT ,η .
Justifications for unsatisfiable concepts, called JUC, are of the
form JT ,Uv⊥ where U is a (possibly complex) unsatisfiable con-Root justifications
cept. JUC may depend completely on the satisfiability of other
concepts, i.e. they are supersets of other justifications. If a JUC
does not depend on some other JUC, then we call it a root JUC
[Scharrenbach et al., 2010c; Meyer et al., 2010].9
Definition 6 (Root and Dependent Justifications). Let T be a TBox.
A justification for JT ,Uv⊥ is called a derived JUC, if there exists some
concept U ′ for which JT ,Uv⊥ ⊃ JT ,U ′v⊥. Otherwise JT ,Uv⊥ is called
a root JUC.
By invalidating a JUC JT ,Uv⊥, i.e. by performing some oper-
ation such that JT ,Uv⊥ 6|= U v ⊥, it can happen that not all de-
pendent JUC are invalidated as well. We will hence only consider
9In contrast to Kalyanpur et al. [2005] we do not define dependency and being
root on concepts but on sets of axioms.
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such operators for which invalidating a JUC JT ,Uv⊥ implies that
all JUC that depend on JT ,Uv⊥ are invalidated, too.
Hence, invalidating all root JUC for unsatisfiable concepts
will make every so far unsatisfiable concept satisfiable again. Re-
ferring to the properties we proposed in Section 1, a framework
for conflict-free ontology evolution has to provide a method for
automatically invalidating all root JUC for unsatisfiable concepts.
Example 2 (Root and derived justifications).
Assume the following TBox:
T = {B v A,C v B,C v ¬A,D v C,D v ¬A,E v D}
The concepts C, D and E are entailed unsatisfiable. The only justi-
fication for T |= C v ⊥ is
J0T ,Cv⊥ = {B v A,C v B,C v ¬A}
The concept D is also inferred unsatisfiable, but with the following
two justifications:
J1T ,Dv⊥ = {B v A,C v B,D v C,D v ¬A}
J2T ,Dv⊥ = J
0
T ,Cv⊥ ∪ {D v C}
As such, J1T ,Dv⊥ is a root JUC whereas J
2
T ,Dv⊥ is derived.
For the unsatisfiability of the concept E there exist the two justifica-
tions: JT ,Ev⊥ = J1T ,Dv⊥∪{E v D} and JT ,Ev⊥ = J2T ,Dv⊥∪{E v
D}. Both justifications for T |= E v ⊥ are derived.
2.3.2 The Pinpointing-Formula
Another view on justifications is to consider them as a minimal
set of axioms such that a certain property P is still fulfilled. For
a TBox T and a set I we speak of a monotone axiomatized input
(T , I) ∈ P , if (T , I) ∈ P ⇐ (T ′, I) ∈ P for all T ′ ⊃ T [Baader
and Pen˜aloza, 2008]. There exist various such properties and in-
puts, such as unsatisfiability of concepts and monotone Boolean
formulas over a finite set of propositional variables, respectively.
Justifications can be represented as monotone Boolean formu-
las over a finite set of propositional variables. In this case these
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monotone Boolean formulas act as an indicator function: We as-Justifications as
monotone
Boolean formulas
sign each axiom τi of a TBox T = {τ0, . . . , τI} a unique propo-
sitional variable pi. The finite set of propositional variables is
denoted by P . Valuations V of the set of monotone Boolean for-
mulas over P induce subsets TV of the TBox T :10
TV = {τi ∈ T | pi is true in V}
We consider monotone Boolean functions over P . Hence, if
for two of these formulas ψ, φ it holds that ψ → φ, then any valu-
ation that satisfies ψ must also satisfy φ. This corresponds to the
monotonicity of the standard inference operator on TBoxes: If
T1 ⊃ T2, then for all η for which T1 |= η it holds that also T2 |= η.
In the case of justifications for an entailment η, we are inter-
ested in minimal subsets of a TBox T such that T |= η. We hence
have to find a monotone Boolean formula φ over P such that forThe pinpointing
formula any valuation V that satisfies φ,11 the entailment is still valid w.r.t.
the induced TBox TV .12 This formula is called the pinpointing for-
mula for η.
It turns out that the pinpointing formula encodes all justifica-
tions for η. A justification Jη = {τi0 , . . . , τiJ} for an entailment
η is nothing but a special subset of T . It corresponds to a con-
junction of the variables pi0 , . . . , piJ that belong to the axioms
τi0 , . . . , τiJ , where J
k
η = {τi0 , . . . , τiJ}:
Jkη = {τi0 , . . . , τiJ} ∼
J∧
j=0
pij
10A valuation is a function that assigns each element of a finite set of proposi-
tional variables P a truth value.
11A valuation V satisfies a Boolean formula φ, if the result of φ is true when
assigning each variable in φ the truth value determined by V
12TV = {τ ∈ T |lab(τ) ∈ V}
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The set of all justifications for an entailment η can then be
represented as the disjunction of these conjunctions:
{
Jkη
}K
k=0
∼ φη =
K∨
k=0
 Jk∧
jk=0
pijk

For the monotone Boolean formula φη that encodes all justi-
fications for η w.r.t. T , each TBox TV ⊆ T that is induced by a
valuation V of φη entails η as a result:
V |= φη ⇐⇒ TV |= η
The pinpointing formula can then be defined according to
Baader and Pen˜aloza [2008]:
Definition 7 (Pinpointing Formula). Let T be a TBox and η an en-
tailment T |= η. For each axiom ti ∈ T let pi be a unique propositional
variable. A pinpointing formula φ for T |= η is a monotone Boolean
formula over P = {p0, . . . , pI} such that for each valuation V of P ,
V |= φ iff TV |= η.
If we set η = (U0 unionsq . . . UN ) v ⊥ for all concepts Un that are
unsatisfiable w.r.t. T , then the pinpointing formula for η corre-
sponds to the set of all root JUC for T |= Un v ⊥ for n = 0, . . . , N .
This can be seen as follows. For the entailment η0 = U0 v ⊥, the
pinpointing formula for η0 corresponds to all JUC (also the de-
pendent w.r.t. T ) for T |= U0 v ⊥.
For η1 : (U0 unionsq U1) v ⊥, the pinpointing formula corresponds The pinpointing
formula and root
JUCs
to all JUC for U0 as well as all JUC for U1. If there exists J0T ,U1v⊥
that depends on J1T ,U1v⊥, then the first JUC is not minimal w.r.t.T |= (U0 unionsq U1) v ⊥. As a consequence, the dependent JUC for
U0 and U1 have no counterpart in the pinpointing formula. We
can hence show by induction that the pinpointing formula for
η : (U0, . . . , UN ) v ⊥ corresponds to root JUC only.
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2.3.3 Representing Dependencies Between Jus-
tifications
As we saw in Section 2.3.1, justifications may depend on each
other. We also saw that solving the independent, i.e. the root JUC
can solve all conflicts. Hence, we have to define a structure on
JUC that provides the dependency information. As we could see
in Section 7, we can represent the set of root JUC by a pinpointing
formula. Indeed the set of Boolean formulas that correspond to
JUC is a sub-lattice of the (distributive) lattice B. We hence define
the justification lattice as follows:
Let T be a TBox and p0, . . . , pM be a set of unique proposi-
tional variables on the axioms τ0, . . . , τM such that
lab(pi) = τi. We define for each JUC JkUv⊥ for T the monotone
Boolean formula φk =
∧
pi such that pi ∈ φk iff τi ∈ JkUv⊥ and
JkUv⊥ =
⋃
pi∈φk lab(pi).
Let J = ⋃Kk=0 JkUv⊥ be the set of all JUC for T and let JB be
the set of all corresponding monotone Boolean formulas φk. The
pair 〈JB;⊗,⊕〉 is the lattice for all JUC w.r.t. T . It is equal to the
lattice 〈J ;≤〉 up to isomorphism, where the partial order≤ refers
to subset inclusion. The root JUC then refer to the least elements
in 〈J ;≤〉. Please note that the poset 〈J ;≤〉 neither has to have
a 0-element nor a 1-element. It can easily checked that 〈J ;≤〉 is
indeed a lattice.13
In the following, we will refer simply to J as the lattice on all
JUC w.r.t. T
13If this was not the case, there had to exist an JUC that is the union of two
justifications. It can be shown that for such a union of two justifications, one of
these justifications has to include to other.
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2.3.4 Laconic Justifications
It is possible that only parts of axioms are responsible for certain
entailments. Laconic justifications [Horridge et al., 2008] provide
a way to define justifications on parts of axioms only. There-
fore, the axioms become subject to a structural transformation
that transforms them into several, weaker but simpler axioms.
Example 3 (Laconic justifications). Let T = {B v A1 u ¬A2,
C v B,C v ¬A1}. Obviously, T |= C v ⊥ with the only JUC
J1Cv⊥ = T . However, we can transform the axiom B v A1 u A2 into
the pair of axioms B v A1 and B v ¬A2. In that case we receive a la-
conic justification J2Cv⊥ = {B v A1, C v B,
C v ¬A1}. The information that B v ¬A2 is not needed in this
case. We can hence perform a more fine-grained repair on T for solving
the unsatisfiability of C.
Laconic justifications hence consist, in general, not only of ax-
ioms from an ontologyO, but also of axioms of its deductive clo-
sure (O)∗. In the example above, the axiomB v A1 is part of a la- Laconic
justificationsconic justification for T |= C v ⊥. Yet this axiom is not contained
in T , but in (T )∗. To ensure that only meaningful axioms can be
drawn from the deductive closure for laconic justifications,14 the
choice can be restricted to a subset of the deductive closure.
There exist many more rules for making regular justifications
laconic as well as exist more approaches towards fine-grained
justifications. The interested reader may find a good overview
on the subject in Horridge et al. [2008].
14In the example above, the set {C v B u ¬B} is also a laconic justification.
However, we could not use it for resolving T |= C v ⊥.
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2.4 Contradictions
The principle that two contradictory statements are not both true
is the most certain of all.
Aristotle (384 BC-322 BC)
Greek philosopher
Quoted after Łukasiewicz [1971] Aristotle’s statement formu-
lates the logical principle of contradiction. While being the founda-
tion of many modern formal logic systems, already several an-
cient logicians, including Heraclitus of Ephesus, Antisthenes theContradictions in
classic logics Cynic, and others opposed to Aristotle’s view. Accordingly, more
current philosophers and logicians picked up on this opposing
view which resulted in the development of several new logic
systems in the 19th and 20th century. For example, in Hegel’s
dialectics co-existence of two contradictory statements is possi-
ble [Hegel, 1991]. Accordingly, with the foundation of modern
mathematical logics in the 20th century, logical systems were in-
vestigated on an increasing level of precision. More and more
contradictions were found in theories that we widely accepted
to be true. One famous example for that is Russel’s antinomy
[Russell, 1937] which proved that the naive set-theory—one of
the foundations of mathematics in that time—leads to a contra-
diction.
However, transferring Aristotle’s principle of contradiction
to modern formal logics risks a misconception. Aristotle’s logic
is based on judgments and concepts—whereas in mathematical
logic reference is made to formulas (also called sentences) and
terms. Instead of expressing Aristotle’s principle of contradic-
tion as: ”Two contradictory sentences are not both true.”, we
have namely to add: ”in the same language” or ”if the words oc-
curring in those sentences have the same meanings” [Jas´kowski,
1999]. In the case of DL, these words are concepts, roles, and
assertions and sentences are axioms and assertions.
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We refer to drawing logical consequences based on Aristotle’s
principle of contradiction as standard reasoning and to those that Non-standard
reasoningdo not as non-standard reasoning. In the following we define what
contradictions w.r.t. standard-reasoning are and what happens
to them when we apply non-standard reasoning. For further in-
formation about non-standard reasoning relevant to this work,
the reader is referred to the related work in Section 8.2.5.
2.4.1 Modeling Errors in Description Logics
Contradictions can occur in any part of a DL knowledge base.
While we present an overview over possible contradictions for
all parts of a DL knowledge base, this work focuses on solving
contradictions in the TBox solely.
Contradictions in the TBox
We learned in Section 2.1 that Description Logics are a family of
decidable fragments of first-order logics. First-order logics fulfill
Aristotle’s principle of contradiction, and hence a contradiction
in a DL TBox occurs, when, for example, a concept U is entailed
to be subsumed by a concept and its complement. That is the
case when U v A and U v ¬A are both logical consequences
from a TBox T . In this case we have that UI = ∅, i.e. U is unsat-
isfiable. Hence a concept that is unsatisfiable w.r.t a TBox refers
to a contradiction.
Definition 8 (TBox Contradictions). A TBox T is said to contain a
contradiction, if for any concept U in the signature of T it holds that
T |= U v ⊥. A TBox that does not contain a contradiction is called
coherent.
Unsatisfiable concepts may cause the concept hierarchy to be-
come inconsistent, i.e. performing the classification task might
lead to undefined results. If for a TBox T and a concept U we
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have that T |= U v ⊥, then U is equivalent to the bottom con-
cept ⊥. In particular, U v ⊥, which together with T |= ⊥ v C
for any concept C by definition, implies T |= U v C. Hence, U is
entailed to be subsumed by any concept C.
Example 4 (Concept hierarchy for unsatisfiable concepts).
Let T = {B v A,C v B,C v D,D v ¬A,G v F}. Obviously
T |= D v ⊥. Intuitively, we would like to have T |= D v B, but not
T |= D v F . Yet, both entailments are valid.
Inconsistent concept hierarchies can cause problems when we
try to determine the deductive closure of a TBox in Section 7.2.
Contradictions in the RBox
Contradictions in an RBox refer to violations of the role hierar-
chy or violations of role assertions. This happens, for example, if
we assert a role R to be reflexive and state that another role S is
irreflexive but subsumed by R.
Definition 9 (RBox Contradictions). An RBox R is said to contain
a contradiction, if for any role R in the signature of R it holds that
R |= R v ⊥. An RBox that does not contain a contradiction is called
coherent.
Although we do not explicitly cover solving RBox contradic-
tions in the scope of this thesis, we give a formal definition, since
we believe that the approach used in this work can also be ap-
plied to the case of RBox contradictions.
Contradictions in the ABox
There are several types of contradictions for ABoxes, also referred
to as clash or inconsistency. Either type can cause the entailment
relation not to deliver any useful information anymore.
The first type of inconsistency happens, when for an assertion
A(b) that is entailed by a knowledge base, also its complement
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¬A(b) is entailed. If we assert, for example, in an ABox A the Types of
inconsistenciesinstance b to the concept U , and if U is unsatisfiable w.r.t. the
TBox T , then T and A have C(b) as a logical consequence for
any concept C—also for complex concepts like ¬C. Hence we
have that T andA have C(b) and ¬C(b) as a logical consequence
for any concept C which, in turn, refers to a contradiction.
Further types of contradictions in ABoxes are related to roles.
These can be violations of cardinality restrictions and datatype
range restrictions on roles, but also violations of role assertions.
In the first case, the domain or range of a property is restricted
to a maximal cardinality but is asserted more than the admissi-
ble number of distinct individuals. In the second case, we have,
for example, restricted the range of a role R to positive integers
but assert R(a,−1) for an individual a. In the third case we vio-
late, for example, a functional role assertion (i.e. that an individ-
ual must not be asserted more than one distinct individual for
that role) for a role R, if the following two assertions R(a, b) and
R(a, c) are contained in the ABox for the distinct individuals a, b,
and c. Since we do not investigate ABox contradictions in depth
in this thesis, we omit a formal definition.
2.4.2 Exceptional Information
Human agents do not tend to think in strict consistent DL models
based on classical logics: in our mind we allow certain things to
be ambiguous. This can be, for example, exceptions to a gen-
eral case. As such, exceptions refers to contradictions in DL-
knowledge bases for standard-reasoning, because we can only
express that something is either true or not. The penguin ex-
ample below provides an excellent illustration for exceptional
knowledge.
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Example 5 (Flying penguins). Assume we know that birds are flying
animals. Assume further that we also know that penguins are birds.
However, penguins cannot fly, hence they are not flying birds. If we
express this knowledge in DL using the concepts FlyingAnimal,Bird
and Penguin, we can express out knowledge about the world as:
Tpenguins = {Bird v FlyingAnimal, Penguin v Bird,
Penguin v ¬FlyingAnimal}
It is not hard to see that Tpenguins |= Penguin v ⊥. The con-
cept Penguin is unsatisfiable, because Tpenguins entails, on the one
hand, that an instance of Penguin is also an instance of
FlyingAnimal. On the other hand, we explicitly stated that this
is not the case.15 Hence we have a conflict according to Aristotle’s
logical principle of contradiction.
Making Exception Explicit
We could solve this conflict by introducing two additional con-
cepts for birds, i.e. FlyingBird and NonFlyingBird and de-
clare them as a subclasses of the original concept Bird. Accord-
ingly, we would have to change the axiom Penguin v Bird
to the axiom Penguin v NonFlyingBird and add the axiom
NonFlyingBird v FlyingAnimal. Yet, this approach has sev-
eral disadvantages:
First, we have add additional information, as well as to re-
move existing information. Furthermore, finding a meaningful
name for the new concepts can only be performed manually. Last,
in case there are more axioms involved, the choice of the concept
to be replaced is ambiguous. Hence we violate some of the prop-
erties that a repair operator should meet: We modify original in-
formation and cannot work fully automatically.
15Note that Penguin v ¬FlyingAnimal does not have to be stated explicitly
but may also be entailed implicitly. In any case Penguin is entailed unsatisfiable
by Tpenguins.
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Besides violating these properties the solution, though being
consistent, is still not capable of expressing preference. In case
we assert some individual b to be a Bird, then we can at most b
is a FlyingBird orNonFlyingBird as an entailment—we are not
able to prefer the assertion NonFlyingBird(b) in classical logics.
Changing the Semantics
If we do not want to change the knowledge representation for excep-
tional information, we have to change the semantics. Instead of mod-
eling every case explicitly, we would like to generalize certain
pieces of information while allowing for exceptions from general
rules. The modeling error from Example 5 is not considered as How to keep the
knowledge
representation.
erroneous information but as a valid view on the world. As we
saw above, strict FOL entailment cannot be applied anymore. In
the case of exceptional information we can apply, for example,
Default Logics (Section 2.5), which were designed to enable en-
tailment on exceptional information.
Exceptional information, in turn, always refers to contradic-
tions in strict DL.16 If we want to resolve an exception in DL, we
have to explicitly state all the exceptional cases. From a Default
Logics perspective, an exception can be used to allow for a more
compact representation without having to specify all the excep-
tional cases. In Example 5, we can express the fact that there
exists an exception, i.e. the penguins, to the axiom that all birds
are flying animals by treating certain axioms separately for en-
tailment.
16But not every set of Defaults contains a contradiction. This is the case when
there exists only one partition U0 with an empty remainder setD0 (cf Section 2.5).
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Splitting the set of axioms means invalidating entailments w.r.t.
the whole knowledge base.17 We do not have to split up the con-Splitting sets of
axioms is the key. cept of Bird into FlyingBird and NonFlyingBird, but consider
entailment on the following two TBoxes separately:
T1 = {Bird v FlyingAnimal}
T2 = {Penguin v Bird, Penguin v ¬FlyingAnimal}
We learn that the axiom Penguin v ⊥ is no longer entailed,
because we invalidated Penguin v FlyingAnimal. In contrast
to axiom removal, we are able to keep all axioms but we have
to accept that certain—possibly important—entail-ments are not
valid anymore.
2.4.3 Perpendicular Views on the World
Different People can have different contradicting conceptualiza-
tions of the world. Especially when they are from different do-
mains or have a different cultural background, but also experts
within a domain may model the concept hierarchy of a domain
in such a way that such taxonomies contradict each other. In
quantum mechanics, for example, the electron is conceptualized
in two different ways: On the one hand an electron is a particle,
on the other hand it is considered a wave. Yet, waves are not par-
ticles and vice versa. The explicit nature of the axioms make it
impossible to consider both of them at the same time—they are
mutually exclusive, but nevertheless hold in a certain view on
the world. We will see in Section 5.2 how such contradictions
may be solved.
17We will give a formal definition on invalidation of entailments in Section 3.1.
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2.5 Default Logics
The need to make default assumptions is frequently encountered in
reasoning’about incompletely specified worlds. Inferences sanctioned
by default are best viewed as beliefs which may well be modified or
rejected by subsequent observations. It is this property which leads to
the non-monotonicity of any logic of defaults.
Raymond Reiter (1939-2002)
Canadian computer scientist and logician
In contrast to classical monotonic Aristotelian logics, Default
Logics are able to express that something is true by default. The
situation in Example 5 represents a situation where birds are an-
imals that can typically fly. Classical logics are not able to express
exceptions to a rule besides specifying all exceptions to this rule,
explicitly. In the example, we would have to introduce the con-
cepts of flying and non-flying animals.
Default Logics as introduced originally by Reiter [1980] ex-
press rules in the form:
P : J0, . . . , JN
C
Assume we have a set of current facts W that we belief to be
true. If we believe the so-called prerequisite P to be true and if,
furthermore, the justifications J0, . . ., JN are consistent with our
current beliefs, then we also belief that the conclusion C is true.
In our example, we could express the fact that typically, all birds
with wings fly by the default rule:
Bird(x) : HasWings(x)
Fly(x)
A Default theory is a pair 〈D,W 〉 formed by the current be-
liefs W and the default rules, called defaults, D.
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2.5.1 Lehmann’s Default Logics
However, the deductive closure of Default theories is hard to
compute and the consequence relation is not rational, i.e. does
not meet the requirements for the rational monotonicity prop-
erty [Lehmann and Magidor, 1992]. Lehmann therefore intro-Another
perspective on
Defaults
duced another perspective on the semantics of defaults which re-
stricts the definition to normal defaults [Lehmann, 1995]. Normal
defaults require that justification and conclusion are the same:
P : C
C
The inference operator is required to be rational, i.e. to fulfill
the rational monotonicity property. He further based the infer-
ence operator on lex-minimal models which will be explained
below. That way, we can stay with (the more simple) normal
defaults while being able to express knowledge like ”With the
exception of penguins, birds fly, typically”.
Lehmann proposed the following four properties that an in-
ference operator for useful Default Logics should meet:
1. the presumption of typicality,
2. the presumption of independence,
3. priority to typicality, and
4. respect for specificity.
In Lehmann’s Default Logics the axioms are not changed but
interpreted in a different way. Let K be a finite set of first-order
logics rules where each rule is of the form b → a. We call b the
presumption and a the conclusion. If we consider this axiom under
Default semantics, we refer to it as the default b : a.
The semantics of a default b : a differs from standard seman-
tics in the way that we allow contradicting defaults. Conflicts are
resolved by preferring more specific defaults over more general
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defaults [Baader and Hollunder, 1993]. In Lehmann’s Default
Logics, the set of defaults is divided into partitions U0, . . . ,UN .
The defaults in partition Un+1 model more specific information than
the defaults in the previous partition Un.
Partitions are computed as follows [Lehmann, 1995]: The first
partition U0 is the set of all rules b → a in K such that there ex-
ists a model for K for which both, b and a are true. We remove
the partition from the set of rules and obtain the remainder set
D1 = K \ U0. We proceed in the same way and compute the next
partition U1 for the remainder set D1. Starting with D0 = K we
inductively construct partitions U0, . . . ,UN .
Example 6 (Partitions). In Example 5 the only axiom for which the
concepts on both sides are satisfiable is Bird v FlyingAnimal. Con-
sequently, we have that U0 = {Bird v FlyingAnimal} and
D1 = {Penguin v Bird, Penguin v ¬FlyingAnimal}.
Regarding D1, we have for all axioms, that either side of the axiom
is a concept that is satisfiable w.r.t. D1. Hence U1 = D1 and D2 = ∅.
Since the number of axioms was finite, the procedure termi-
nates when it produces an empty partition. We hence come up
with an ordered family of subsets of K that form a partition of K:
K = U0 ⊕ . . .UN ⊕DN
The last remainder set DN does not have to be empty, i.e.
there exist rules in K for which we cannot find a model in which
both, presumption and conclusion are true—even when we re-
move all other rules. This is, for example, the case for rules of the
form b→ a∧¬a. In that case, the Default knowledge base is said
to be inconsistent.
Partitions can be computed in timeO(n2) where n is the num-
ber of axioms in K.
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2.5.2 Default Logics Entailment
The extension, i.e. the deductive closure of a Default knowl-
edge base is computed according to so-called lex-minimal models.
For each model a vector is defined, which is sorted in a lexico-
graphical order, and valid inferences correspond to lexicographi-Models for Default
Logics cal minimal models. This order corresponds to a preference rela-
tion over possible models such that models that violate the least
number of the least impacting defaults, i.e. less specific defaults,
are preferred over others. This reflects the desired properties de-
fined for Leh-mann’s Default Logics: the presumption of typical-
ity, the presumption of independence, priority to typicality, and
respect for specificity.
Let I be an interpretation. For a possible entailment η, we
count the number defaults that I violates, i.e. all (b : a) for which
b ∧ ¬a is true under I. We denote the number of violated defaults
for each partition Un by un. This results in an N -dimensional
vector of positive integers. We can now sort this vector from right
to left in lexicographical order, i.e. we first sort by dimension N ,
then by dimension N − 1 etc.
Example 7 (Lex-minimal models). Let, for example, [0, 10, 0],
[100, 0, 0] and [0, 0, 1] be the vectors of three different models for a de-
fault knowledge base that has three partitions. The lex-minimal order
on these models is
[100, 0, 0] <lex−min [0, 10, 0] <lex−min [0, 0, 1]
In Example 7 model [0, 0, 1] is the least preferred. It indeed
has the least number of defaults violated in total, but it violatesComparing
models in
lexicographical
order.
the largest number of constraints in U2, i.e. in the most specific
partition. Comparing the other two models, they violate equally
many defaults in partition U2, so we have to compare them ac-
cording to the next most specific partition, i.e. U1. Consequently,
the model [100, 0, 0] is preferred over [0, 10, 0], because it violates
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less defaults in partition U1. Because the number of defaults vi-
olated differs already in partition U1, the lex-minimal order does
not consider partition U0 in comparing the two models.
The preference relation induced by lex-minimal models does
not make preference statements about concepts but about ax-
ioms. Example 7 shows how violating more specific axioms is
considered more severe than violating more general axioms. Con-
sidering the penguins Example 5, the axiom that birds are flying
animals might fall into the first partition, whereas the axioms that
penguins are birds and penguins are not flying animals are con-
tained in the second partition. Hence a model in which there are
100 instances of birds that cannot fly (all of which violate the ax-
iom in the first partition is preferred over a model in which 10
instances of penguin are not instances of bird.
2.5.3 Default Logics and Description Logics
We can consider DL axioms under Default semantics. As we saw
in Section 2.1.6, Description Logics are a fragment of first-order
logics. Any subsumption axiom B v A can be identified with
the FOL formula ∀x : B(x) → A(x). Hence, we define (A|B)
to be the Default for the subsumption axiom B v A. Logical
consequences can then be defined according to Default Logics
entailment as defined by Lehmann’s Lexicographical Entailment
which was described in the previous section. Roughly speaking,
by checking whether a Default (A|B) is violated under some in-
terpretation I, we effectively check whether the assert (Aunionsq¬B)(i)
is a logical consequence for an individual i ∈ ∆I . More informa-
tion on entailment on DL TBoxes w.r.t. Lehmann’s Default Logics
can be found in Lukasiewicz [2008].
We will show how Default logics can be applied to Descrip-
tion Logics for solving conflicts in Chapter 4.
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2.5.4 Probabilistic Description Logics
So far, Default Logics was only capable of defining the partition
on the whole set of axioms, i.e. all axioms were considered as
Defaults. As a consequence, all Defaults (A|B) for which we can
find a model that does not violate (A|B) w.r.t. all other DefaultsExtending Default
Logics are added to the first partition U0. However, there can exist De-
faults (C|D) that are not violated by any model. We can collect
these in a separate TBox, that we refer to as the Universal TBox
T∆. For Probabilistic Description Logics, Lukasiewicz [2008] ex-
tended Lehmann’s Default Logics with such a Universal TBox.18
This separation allows to distinguish between those parts of a
knowledge base that should be considered as Defaults and those
parts that should be considered according to classical DL.
Probabilistic Description Logics provides a way how to par-
tition the TBox according to Lehmann’s Default Logics that we
described in the previous section. This partitioning is the basis
for solving contradictions with the operators that we describe in
Chapters 4 and 5.
A partition Un is inductively defined as the set of axioms
D v C from the remainder set Dn for which we can find a modelPartitions of
axioms that satisfies both C and D.19 The remainder set is, in turn, in-
ductively defined as Dn = T∆ ∪ (T \
⋃n−1
m=0 Um) where T∆ is a
TBox that holds all those axioms that have to be satisfied at any
time.20 If the last remainder set Dn is empty, then the Default
TBox 〈T∆, (U0, . . . ,UN )〉 is coherent.21
We should note that for computing the partitions we check
whether for an TBox axiom we can find a model such that both
18The term Universal TBox is introduced within the scope of this thesis to be
able to distinguish this very TBox T∆ from other TBoxes. In Lukasiewicz [2008]
T∆ is just referred to as a regular TBox.
19Lukasiewicz calls this a model that verifies the constraint (C|D).
20We will refer later on to T∆ as the Universal TBox.
21In the context of Lukasiewicz the pair 〈T∆, (U0, . . . ,UN )〉 is referred to a
probabilistic TBox which is called consistent (instead of coherent), if the parti-
tioning U0, . . . ,UN exists.
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sides of the axiom are satisfied. We hence perform satisfiabil-
ity checks w.r.t complex concepts rather than for atomic concept
names.
We omit a more detailed description of Probabilistic Descrip-
tion Logics and refer the interested reader to Lukasiewicz [2008].

Part II
Methods for Solving
Conflicts

3
Invalidating
Entailments
To resolve unsatisfiable concepts, we have to find a way how to
make entailments of the kind T |= U v ⊥ invalid for those U
that are in the signature of T . As there exist various ways how to
accomplish this, we introduce the general ∆-Operator for inval-
idating entailments. We show how the methods for invalidating
entailments can be defined by this operator whereby the different
approaches become comparable.
Plan of This Chapter
We introduce the general ∆-Operator for invalidating entailments
in Section 3.1. After defining the simplemost ∆-Operator possi-
ble in Section 3.2 we show in Section 3.3 how Ontology Repair
can be defined in terms of the ∆-Operator. Continuing with pre-
senting the data structures for those ∆-Operators that result in
so-called Multi-View TBoxes we introduce the so called Splitting-
∆-Operator for these data structures in Section 3.4. It serves as
the basis for many of the ∆-Operators we investigate later on in
Chapter 4. We close this chapter with an investigation how the
∆-Operator fits into the context of belief change in Section 3.5.
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3.1 A General Operator for Invalidating
Entailments
We want to introduce an operator such that when we apply this
operator on a TBox, the resulting structure does not contain en-
tailments of the form U v ⊥ for any U in the signature of T . We
therefore require an entailment relation for the range of this oper-
ator. Before we define the operator in more detail, we formalize
the process of invalidating entailments:
Definition 10 (Invalidating Entailments). Let T be a TBox and
η ∈ (T )?. Applying an operator ∆ to T , we say the ∆ invalidates
an entailment η ∈ (T )?, if η 6∈ (∆(T ))?.
Note that we do not require (∆(T ))? to be a subset of (T )?.
In fact, for example when we perform axiom rewriting, (∆(T ))?
may contain new axioms that are not contained in (T )?. The pur-
pose of Definition 10 is to give a formal definition for the set of
entailments we lose when applying a ∆-operator to a TBox T .
The deductive closure of ∆(T ) may not contain all elements
that the deductive closure of the original TBox T contained. ToCuriousities of the
deductive closure solve contradictions we require that at least all entailments of the
form U v ⊥ ∈ (T )? are not be contained in (∆(T ))?. Definition
10 enables us to compare different operators by the entailments
that are no more contained in the deductive closure of (∆(T )).
With the definition of invalidating entailments in hand, we
define an operator ∆ on TBoxes such that the resulting structure
meets the properties we defined in Section 1. We hence require
this operator to meet certain conditions:
1. An entailment relation |= is needed for the range of ∆.
2. The expressive power of the range of ∆ must at least be as
high as the expressive power of T .
3. For a consistent ∆-Operator, its application to any T must
not entail any concept U in the signature of T unsatisfiable.
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While the first properties define a deductive closure for ∆(T ),
only the third property causes ∆ to actually invalidate entail-
ments. In particular, no axiom of the form U v ⊥ is contained Properties of the
new operatorin (∆(T ))? for concepts U that are contained in the signature of
T . Nevertheless, we still allow for unsatisfiability for concepts.
In particular for such unsatisfiable concepts as U = A u ¬A — as
long as U is not contained in the signature of T .
Note that ∆ can invalidate other entailments as well. While
this seems a flaw at the first sight, we will see in Section 6.2 that
we have to indeed invalidate certain entailments which are not
of the type ∆(T ) |= U v ⊥ to obtain meaningful results.
Definition
The first two requirements define what a ∆-Operator is:
Definition 11 (∆-Operator). Let T be a TBox. The operator ∆ maps a
TBox to the pair 〈∆(T ); |=〉 such that |= defines an entailment relation
for axioms from L = L(T ), i.e. the DL of T .
Note that we did not specify what ∆(T ) actually is, just how
it should behave. We have to be able to define an entailment
relation |= for ∆(T ), and ensure that ∆(T ) does not increase the
expressive power compared to T .
Coherency
The definition of ∆ meets the first two requirements. In order to
formalize the third requirement, i.e. that the entailment relation
|= does not entail any concept unsatisfiable, we introduce the no-
tion of coherency for the pair 〈∆; |=〉:
Definition 12 (Coherency of a ∆-Operator). Let T be a TBox. A
∆-Operator is called coherent, if for any U that is in the signature of T
it holds that U v ⊥ 6∈ (∆(T ))?.
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3.2 The Null-∆-Operator
The simple-most solution to solving conflicts is not to draw any
logical consequence at all. The deductive closure of the result is
simply the TBox itself.1
(∆(T ))? = T
Entailment is defined by checking whether an entailment is actu-
ally contained in the TBox:
∆(T ) |= η ⇔ η ∈ T
However, we can easily show that the Null-∆-Operator is coher-
ent.
Theorem 1. The Null-∆-Operator maps a TBox to the pair 〈T , |=〉
with |= (η), if and only if η ∈ T . The Null-∆-Operator is coherent.
Proof. The conditions for being a ∆-Operator are trivially satis-
fied. Since axioms of the form U v ⊥ are not allowed to be
contained in a TBox by definition, the Null-∆-Operator is coher-
ent.
The Null-∆-Operator is introduced for theoretical considera-
tions only. In the sense of the conservation of implicit informa-
tion property (P5 in Proposition 5) the Null-∆-Operator is the
worst ∆-Operator possible, because we loose all entailments of
the original TBox T . Please note that this operator indeed fulfills
all other properties for a repair operator.
1In this special case, the deductive closure is finite.
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3.3 The Repair ∆-Operators
Conflicts in a TBox T can be resolved by changing the TBox’ ax-
ioms. This operation is usually referred to as Ontology Repair. In
the case these operations only involve removing axioms a mini-
mal repair is called diagnosis. Ontology Repair is the most com-
monly used technique for resolving unsatisfiable concepts in a
TBox T . In this section we show how Ontology Repair can be
defined in terms of the ∆-Operator.
3.3.1 The Diagnosis-∆-Operator
In order to resolve a conflict in a TBox, the according operation
should change T as well as (T )+ as little as possible. According
to Reiter [1987b] a diagnosis for a set of entities T that contain Diagnosis and
repaira conflict is a minimal subset D ⊆ T such that T \ D does not
contain a conflict anymore.2 Minimal here means that there is no
subset D′ of Dwhose removal from T would result in solving the
contradictions. In the case of unsatisfiable concepts for a TBox,
we can reformulate this definition as follows:
Definition 13 (Diagnosis). Let T be a TBox and U0, . . . , UM be a set
of concepts such that T |= Um v ⊥ for 0 ≤ m ≤ M . A diagnosis D
for T is a set of axioms from T such that (i) T \ D 6|= U v ⊥ for any
(complex) concept in sig(T ) and (ii) for each D′ that fulfills (i) we have
that D′ 6⊆ D.
In that sense, a diagnosis is the dual of the set of all root JUCs.
Reiter [1987b] proposed to compute diagnoses using a Hitting Set
2The term diagnosis is sometimes referred to as repair plan. Diagnoses must
not be mixed up with root JUCs. Finding diagnoses is the dual problem of finding
root JUCs.
68 Chapter 3. Invalidating Entailments
Tree (HST)3, which can be reformulated as computing the dual
HST for obtaining JUCs.
Using diagnoses, we can define a ∆-Operator that works on
diagnoses and provides a coherent Multi-View TBox.
Definition 14. Let T be a TBox and D be a diagnosis for T . The
mapping ∆(T ) = T \D together with the classical entailment relation
|= defines the Diagnosis-∆-Operator.
Theorem 2. The Diagnosis-∆-Operator from Definition 14 is coher-
ent.
Proof. If we remove axioms from a TBox and/or an RBox, then
the expressive power of the corresponding subsets can obviously
not increase:
Lemma 1. Let (T ,R) be a TBox and RBox4. For any subset T ′ ⊆ T ,
R′ ⊆ R it holds that
L(T ,R) ≥ L(T ′,R′)
According to Lemma 1, T \ D is expressible in the same DL
L as was T . By definition, an entailment relation |= is defined
on the range of ∆. Hence, the Diagnosis-∆-Operator fulfills all
conditions required for a ∆-Operator specified in Definition 11.
Since, by definition, T \ D does not entail any concept in the sig-
nature of T \D unsatisfiable, the Diagnosis-∆-Operator is coher-
ent.
Any repair ∆-Operator involves a change in the original knowl-
edge base and hence violates the originality property. Instead of
removing an explicitly stated axiom, we propose to split up the
TBox such that groups of axioms causing unsatisfiability are not
3It should be noted that in the original version of Reiter [1987b], diagnoses
were defined on Hitting-Set-Trees. However, although not explicitly stated in the
literature, diagnoses—and therefore also justifications—have to be computed on
Minimal HSTs.
4Note that we restrict ourselves to the case of TBox axioms. We mention the
RBox here just for the sake of completeness.
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used at the same time when drawing logical consequences. That
way, we can resolve unsatisfiable concepts. We keep the formal-
ism for knowledge representation but have to slightly change the
entailment relation. These procedures are described in detail in
Chapter 4.
3.3.2 The All-Repair-∆-Operator
For a TBox with unsatisfiable concepts, there can exist more than
one diagnosis. In the best case, all root JUCs share one axiom,
which results in a single diagnosis. In the worst case, all axioms The first approach
developed in this
thesis
in all root JUCs are pairwise distinct. We then have |J0| · . . . · |Jk|
different diagnosis. If N denotes the maximal cardinality of a
root JUC, we have at most Nk different diagnoses in the worst-
case. The choice of the diagnosis is non-deterministic, as a re-
sult. We can define a deterministic Repair-∆-Operator by setting
∆T = T \ J where J is the union of the set of all root JUCs.
Definition 15 (All-Repair-∆-Operator). Let T be a TBox and J be
the set of all root JUCs w.r.t. T . The All-Repair-∆-Operator is defined
as the pair 〈T \ (⋃Kk=0 JkT |=Uv⊥); |=〉 with the classical entailment re-
lation |=.
This repair operator is coherent:
Theorem 3. The All-Repair-∆-Operator from Definition 15 is coher-
ent.
Proof. Obviously J ⊃ D for any diagnosis for T . The Diagnosis-
∆-Operator is coherent. Since we learned that |= is
monotone, removing more axioms cannot re-introduce entailments
the form ∆(T ) |= U v ⊥ for any U in the signature of ∆(T ).
The All-Repair-∆-Operator is a coherent ∆-Operator, as a conse-
quence.
Applying the All-Repair-∆-Operator we invalidate more en-
tailments than using the Diagnosis-∆-Operator. On the other
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hand, finding a solution is deterministic. We will see the same
trade-off between deterministic and minimal invasive ∆-Oper-
ators in Chapter 4 where we investigate ∆-Operators based on
Default Logic.
3.4 A ∆-operator for Multi-View Knowl-
edge Bases
To invalidate the entailments T |= U v ⊥ we must not consider
all axioms of the root JUCs at the same time when drawing logi-The second
approach
developed in this
thesis
cal consequences. While we saw how this could be achieved for
ontology repair, we now present a method where we do not have
to remove any axioms to obtain a coherent ∆-Operator.
3.4.1 Multi-View Knowledge Bases
We split up parts of the root JUCs into non-empty sets U0, . . . , UN
and a separate (possibly empty) TBox T∆. The Un, n = 0, . . . , N
contain axioms from the root JUCs such that for each root JUC
two different axioms are contained in two different Un. What ax-
ioms actually are contained in the Un will be subject to Chapter 5.
In the separate TBox T∆ we collect the axioms that are not part of
a conflict, i.e. T \ ⋃Kk=0 JkUv⊥, as well as those axioms from the
root JUCs that are not added to any Un.
The separate TBox T∆ models a conceptualization that is al-
ways valid whereas the sets Un model certain aspects of the world.
We therefore call T∆ the Universal TBox and the TBoxes Un Aspect
TBoxes. We require both of them to be coherent. Together with T∆
every Aspect TBox defines a coherent view on the world, whereas
coherency is not guaranteed for T∆ ∪ Un ∪ Um for Un 6= Um. We
collect all the information in all views T∆ ∪ Un in a single Multi-
View-TBox:
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Definition 16. Let T∆ and U0, . . . ,UN be disjoint TBoxes. A Multi-
View-TBox DT is the finite family of non-empty TBoxes:
DT = (T∆ ∪ U0, . . . , T∆ ∪ UN )
3.4.2 Entailment Relation for a Multi-View-TBox
Since a Multi-View-TBox is a wrapper for a set of regular
TBoxes, inference services like checking axiom satisfiability and
consistency can be applied by means of the inference service de-
fined for the original TBox. We hence use the classical DL entail-
ment relation on the union of each Aspect TBox with the Univer-
sal TBox, but consider each of these unions separately. Conse-
quently, we introduce the following definitions:
A Multi-View-TBox DT is said to entail an axiom,
DT |= η, if one of its TBoxes entails η. As a result, the deductive
closure of a Multi-View-TBox DT is defined by
(DT )? = ⋃Nn=0(Tn)+. We say that DT is satisfiable if all of its
TBoxes are satisfiable.
However, because we did not remove any axioms, the contra-
diction is still in the data w.r.t. the classical entailment relation.
The entailment relation for a Multi-View-TBox just hides that by
not entailing concepts that occur in the signature of T unsatisfi-
able.
3.4.3 Invalidated Entailments
As we consider axioms separately for drawing logical consequences,
we will invalidate entailments. In the sequel, we show which en-
tailments we invalidate by separating axioms into different par-
titions,
Since partitions are mutually disjoint, the entailments that
two different Aspect TBoxes Tn, Tm of the resulting Multi-View-
TBox have in common is at least the deductive closure of T∆:
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(Tn)? ∩ (Tm)? ⊇ (T∆)?
The intersection of the deductive closures of two single As-
pect TBoxes, (Tn)? ∩ (Tm)?, may indeed contain more entail-
ments than (T∆)?. This is illustrated by the following example:
Example 8. Consider the Multi-View TBox
T0 = {> v ∀R.A,A v C}, T1 = {> v ∀R.B,B v C}, T∆ = ∅
Each T{0,1} entails > v ∀R.C, but T∆ obviously not.
Compared to the original TBox, in the Multi-View-TBox all
entailments are invalidated whose justifications share axioms that
are contained in different partitions:
(T )? \ (DT )? = { η | JT ,η ∩ Un 6= ∅ ∧ JT ,η ∩ Um 6= ∅ ∧ n 6= m}
In Table 3.1 the invalidated entailments are shown for three dif-
ferent possible Multi-View-TBox for the TBox of Example 2. In
all cases, the unwanted entailments C v ⊥ and D v ⊥ are inval-
idated. For the first two Default TBoxes, the entailments C v A
and D v A are not valid anymore whereas these entailments are
preserved in the third case.
In the first two cases, the two axioms B v A and C v B are in
different partitions. Yet, the only justification for the entailment
C v A consists of exactly these two axioms. Because we do
consider them separately for drawing logical consequences, the
entailment C v A is not valid in the first two Multi-View-TBox.
In the third case, in contrast, we have that {B v A,C v B} ⊂
T∆ ∪ U0. Hence, the entailment C v A is still valid for the third
Multi-View-TBox.
If we applied classical ontology repair, i.e. axiom removal, not
only we delete the removed axioms from the deductive closure of
the TBox, but even entailments whose justifications contain just
one of the removed axiom are invalidated. Using our method,
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DT
(T )+ \ (DT )+
T∆ U0 U1
1
D v C B v A C v B
C v ¬A
C v A
D v A
2
C v ¬A
D v C
B v A C v B C v A
D v A
3
C v B
D v C
B v A C v ¬A
Table 3.1: All possible coherent Multi-View-TBoxes DT with
DT = (T∆,U0,U1) for the TBox of Example 2 and the set of inval-
idated entailments (T )+ \ (DT )+.
in contrast, we only invalidate justifications that contain pairs of
axioms—both of which are contained in different partitions. We Repair is more
invasive than
separation.
hence claim that using our method for defining the ∆-operator,
fewer entailments are subject to invalidation and more knowl-
edge is preserved.
For Example 2 all possible minimal repair solutions are shown
in Table 3.2. In the first two cases, we remove one axiom that is
part of the single existing justification for C v A, which causes
this entailment to become invalid. In the best case, we only lose
the removed axiom itself. This happens when the removed ax-
iom is not part of any justification for a non-trivial entailment.
3.4.4 A ∆-operator for Multi-View
Knowledge Bases
We can define a ∆-operator in such a way that it produces a co-
herent Multi-View-TBox. We therefore define the aspect TBoxes
Un such that (i) for each JkUv⊥ at least two axioms are contained
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Removed Axiom (T )+ \ (DT )+
1
B v A B v A
C v A
D v A
2
C v B C v B
C v A
D v A
3 C v ¬ A C v ¬ A
Table 3.2: All possible ontology repair solutions for the TBox of
Example 2 and the set of invalidated entailments (T )? \ (DT )?.
in two different Un and Um and (ii) no root JUC is contained in
any of these aspect TBoxes.
Definition 17. Let T be a TBox with unsatisfiable concepts and JkUv⊥
with k = 0, . . . ,K the root JUCs for them. The Splitting-∆-operator
defines a finite family of subsets (T∆ ∪ Un)Nn=0 of T such that for each
root JUC JkUv⊥:
(i) there exist α, β ∈ JkUv⊥ such that α 6= β, α ∈ Un, β ∈ Um and
m 6= n.
(ii) it holds that JkUv⊥ 6⊆ T∆ ∪ Un for all n = 0, . . . , N .
Condition (i) ensures that indeed all unsatisfiable concepts
from the original TBox are resolved and (ii) ensures that none of
the original justifications is re-introduced through the back-door.
As a result, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4. The Multi-View-TBox resulting from the Splitting-∆-
Operator is coherent.
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This is an interesting result, but the question remains
whether such a Splitting-∆-operator exists. Fortunately, we can
show that, under certain conditions, such an operator indeed
exists. These conditions, in turn, appear to be nothing special: We Coherency of this
operatorrequire the justifications to be free of cycles and prohibit explicit
contradictions. We can then split up each root justification into
two sets such that we may put one axiom from each set into one
of two aspect TBoxes. This splitting, which is described in detail
in Chapter 4, defines a Splitting-∆-operator. Different variants of
the Splitting-∆-operator are investigated in Chapter 5.
3.5 Belief Revision
Belief revision (also referred to as belief change) describes the pro-
cess of whether and how to change the current beliefs of an agent
to ensure that his beliefs are consistent with the current state of
the world. This is similar to what we defined the ∆-Operator
for. Belief revision is a frequently used concept in artificial in-
telligence, and therefore we will show how we can express the
∆-Operators, that we introduced in the previous sections, within
the context of belief revision.
3.5.1 The AGM Postulates
Belief revision was given a formal definition by the AGM pos-
tulates [Alchourron et al., 1985]. This framework, which was re- Formalizing belief
revisionvised itself several times, studies idealized mathematical models
of belief revision. For a given logic language L, the beliefs of an
agent are represented by a (possibly infinite) set of axioms in L.
This set, denoted by B, is referred to as the belief set and is closed
under logical consequence.5 New evidence Ω are sets of axioms
5This requires that a logical consequence operator is defined. Furthermore, B
is a belief set if and only if B = (B)?.
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in L, too, and to incorporate this new evidence, a belief revision op-
erator is defined such that a new belief set can be obtained from
the current belief set.
Belief revision can be roughly divided into three groups: con-
traction, i.e. axioms are removed from B, expansion, i.e. axioms
are added to B, and revision which is a combination of the former
two. Applying one of these operators to a belief set is denoted by
B ◦ Ω. In any case, the result is required to be consistent.
The outcome of contracting a belief set B by new evidence
Ω = {ω0, . . . , ωP } should be a subset of B. This subset must not
entail Ω, but should be minimal w.r.t. B in order to not remove
unnecessarily many axioms from K. Consequently, it is of in-
terest to consider the inclusion-maximal subsets of B that do not
entail Ω.
Definition 18 (AGM Postulates [Alchourron et al., 1985]).
Let B be a belief set and B ◦Ω be a belief revision. The AGM postulates
are defined as follows:
AGM1 (Closure): B ◦ Ω = (B ◦ Ω)?
AGM2 (Success): If Ω is inconsistent, then Ω 6⊆ (B ◦ Ω)?
AGM3 (Inclusion): B ◦ Ω ⊆ B
AGM4 (Vacuity): If Ω 6⊆ (B)?, then B ◦ Ω = B.
AGM5 (Preservation): If (Ω1)? = (Ω2)?, then B ◦Ω1 = B ◦Ω2.
AGM6 (Recovery): B ⊆ ((B ◦ Ω) ∪ Ω)?.
3.5.2 ∆-Operators as Contraction Operators
Considered as contraction operators, all the ∆-Operators pre-
sented in the previous sections of this chapter fulfill all AGM pos-
tulates. To see this, we define the set of current beliefs B as theHow the
∆-Operators
relate to belief
revision.
deductive closure of a TBox T . We denote the entailments that
the ∆-Operator removes from (T )? by Ω. In our case B◦Ω means
(T )?\Ω with Ω ⊆ (T )?. In other words: (B◦Ω)? = (∆(T ))?. Note
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that the AGM postulates, in general, are defined on the infinite
deductive closure.
Since we remove entailments from the deductive closure of T ,
we fulfill AGM1, AGM3 and AGM6 by definition. We also fulfill
AGM4, since Ω ⊂ (T )?. As we perform axiom removal, Ω is not
included in ((T ) ◦ Ω)?, so we fulfill AGM2.
For the fulfillment of AGM5 we consider two arbitrary sub-
sets of (T )? whose deductive closures do not differ, i.e. (Ω1)? =
(Ω2)
?. Assume further (T )? \ Ω1 6= (T )? \ Ω2. Note that Ω{1,2} ⊆
(T )?, which requires the existence of ω such that ω ∈ Ω1, but
ω 6∈ Ω2 (or vice versa). The deductive closure of Ω2 is defined
according to classical entailment. Consequently, we have that
ω 6∈ (Ω2)?. From the prerequisites of AGM5 we further conclude
that ω 6∈ (Ω1)?. Finally, we have that ω 6∈ Ω1 which contradicts
our assumption. Hence AGM5 is fulfilled, too.
If we require the deductive closure (∆(T ))? to be a belief set
itself, the logical consequence operator must be defined accord-
ing to that of the ∆-Operator. For all the ∆-Operators considered
in this thesis, we can safely do so, because their logical conse-
quence operators are based on the classical one.
Note that not all ∆-Operators are also contraction operators
that fulfill the AGM postulates. This is, for example, the case
for axiom rewriting, which is indeed a belief revision operator.
The question whether or not requiring a ∆-Operator to fulfill the
AGM postulates is left open for discussion. More information on
belief revision can be found in Ga¨rdenfors [2003].

4
Default Logics for
Solving Conflicts
Default Logics can be used for solving conflicts in a Description
Logics TBox. Under certain restrictions, we can guarantee a con-
sistent Multi-View TBox whose Aspect TBoxes are constructed
according to the partitioning algorithm provided by Lehmann’s
Default Logics (cf Section 2.5). If we already computed all JUC
for the unsatisfiable concepts of a TBox we can define a split-
ting scheme that provides these partitions without the need to
perform additional reasoning. Based on this splitting scheme we
define a general algorithm that serves as the base for all Splitting-
∆-Operators, which are defined in Chapter 5.
Plan of This Chapter
We start this chapter with showing how we use Default Logics
for solving conflicts in Section 4.1. In the subsequent Section 4.2
we provide the restrictions under which our approach works.
The splitting that avoids additional reasoning is introduced in
Section 4.3 and is the basis for the transformation algorithm in
Section 4.4.
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4.1 Default Logics for Solving Conflicts
As we saw in Section 2.5, Default Logics allow to draw logical
consequences in the presence of controversial information. Using
Probabilistic Description Logics we may, furthermore, split up
our knowledge base into a crisp and a default part. We will show
in this section, how we can facilitate the Default Logics procedure
for finding partitions to find a coherent Multi-View TBox.
4.1.1 Default TBox
The partitioning algorithm of (Probabilistic) Default Logics
[Lukasiewicz, 2008] splits up the sets of default formulas D into
partitions U0, . . . ,UN such that none of these partitions entails a
concept unsatisfiable. Considering these formulas to be a set of
TBox axioms, the set of TBox axioms is split up in such a way that
none of the sets Un (which are sets of axioms and, consequently,
TBoxes) entails any concept unsatisfiable—as long as the last re-
mainder set DN is empty (cf Section 2.5). Hence, Default Logics
on TBox axioms induces a Multi-View TBox where the Aspect
TBoxes happen to be the partitions from Default Logics.
We now put the cart before the horse and show that for a
given valid partitioning of a Default Knowledge Base, solely con-Default Logics
for solving
unsatisfiable
concepts
sisting of TBox and RBox axioms, we can extend all partitions by
certain axioms and not affect satisfiability. Let therefore U0, . . . ,Un
be a partitioning of a Default Knowledge Base that was com-
puted according to Lukasiewicz [2008]. According to mono-
tonicity, we may extend each of the partitions Un by additional
axioms αi ∈ T for i = 0, . . . , I as long as this does not cause to
entail a concept in the signature of Un∪{α0, . . . , αI} unsatisfiable.
We collect α0, . . . , αI in a separate TBox T∆ and come up with a
coherent Multi-View TBox.
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Theorem 5. Let T∆ be a TBox and U0, . . . ,UN the partition of a De-
fault Knowledge Base that solely consists of TBox axioms.
If T∆ ∪ Un 6|= U v ⊥ for any n,U , then (T∆ ∪ U0, . . . , T∆ ∪ UN )
is a coherent Multi-View TBox.
We refer to Multi-View TBoxes whose Aspect TBoxes fulfill
the partition properties of Default Logics as Default TBoxes. This
allows to distinguish them from such Multi-View TBoxes for which
we are not able to apply Default Logics entailment.
4.1.2 Solving Conflicts
We now show how Default Logics can be applied to our original
problem of drawing logical consequences for an incoherent TBox
T . The only axioms that are involved in a conflict are those ax-
ioms of the root JUC for T . Hence, we only have to declare these
axioms as Defaults, whereas we may put all other axioms into the
Universal TBox T∆. We will show later on that, under certain re-
strictions, the resulting Default TBox is coherent (cf Section 5.1.1).
Coherency is one of the key requirements we defined in Sec-
tion 1, but what about the other properties? We did not change-
the knowledge representation which fulfills property P1. The Checking the
fulfillment of
the properties
partitions and T∆ can be computed solely from the TBox itself
by computing justifications and applying the partitioning proce-
dure defined in Lehmann [1995]. This meets property P3 which
requires the procedure to work automatically. By definition, the
partitions Un together with T∆ partition the original TBox, i.e.
T = T∆ ⊕ U0 ⊕ . . . ⊕ UN . Hence, we also fulfill property P4.
Hence, Default Logics allows us to define a ∆-Operator such that
the partitioning of a TBox is transformed into a Default TBox. We
will show we this can be accomplished efficiently in Section 5.1.1.
Please note that while we identify Default TBoxes with Multi-
View-TBoxes, the entailment relation for a Default TBox is not the
same as defined by Lehmann’s Lexicographical Entailment: We
borrowed the method of how to separate axioms from each other
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into partitions but we compute regular models instead of lex-
mini-mal models. While it was possible to compute lex-minimal
models, we prefer the classical entailment on the single Views of
Multi-View-TBoxes: On the one hand, we just want to invalidate
entailments, on the other hand, we do not want to introduce the
full complexity of Lehmann’s Default Logics.
4.2 Restrictions on the TBox
The main idea behind resolving conflicts by treating trouble-cau-
sing axioms separately is to split up the set of root JUC. We can
do this in a way that for each root JUC those axioms with the
unsatisfiable concept on the left-hand-side are collected in one
set, Γ. All other axioms of this root justification are collected in
a separate set Θ. Both sets are called splitting sets and both sets
partition each root JUC [Scharrenbach et al., 2010c].
Under certain conditions, we can show that neither of the
splitting sets is empty. The non-emptiness of the splitting-sets is
one of the crucial conditions for all Splitting-∆-Operators that de-
fine a consistent Multi-View-TBox. The splitting not only allows
to define Splitting-∆-Operators, we may compute them without
additional satisfiability checks.
In this section we show what restrictions have to be made on
the TBox such that the partitioning scheme produces a consistent
Multi-View TBox. We remember Definition 8 (TBox contradic-
tions) which identifies contradictions in a TBox with unsatisfiable
concepts of that TBox. The restrictions on the TBox being made
in the following exclude certain types of TBox contradictions that
must not occur in a TBox. Along with the definition of those for-
bidden contradictions, we provide ways how to solve them. We
therefore have to apply certain changes to the TBox that trans-
form those forbidden contradictions into admissible contradic-
tions, i.e. such contradictions that the method we present in this
work is able to solve.
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4.2.1 Logical Contradictions
Logical contradictions are axioms that contain the conjunction
A u ¬ A on the right-hand side of an axiom or explicitly state
U v ⊥ in the TBox. We will give a detailed description how to
handle either case.
Explicitly Stated Logical Contradictions
Contradictions that are caused by the latter case cannot be solved
except by removing the corresponding axioms or parts thereof
from the TBox. But even detecting axioms of the latter case is not
as obvious as it seems at a first glance. While we can easily detect
and remove axioms of the form U v ⊥ or, equivalently, axioms
of the form > v ¬U things become difficult when a disjunction
is involved. We illustrate this by the following example:
Example 9 (Explicitly stated logical contradictions).
Assume the TBox T = {> v ¬U unionsq (B u C),¬U unionsq (¬B) v >}.
Obviously, T |= U v ⊥ with the whole TBox as a justification. The
interpretation of the left-hand-side of both axioms is equal to the whole
interpretation domain.
Hence ∆I ⊆ ((∆I \ UI) ∪ (∆I \ BI)) ∩ ((∆I \ UI) ∪ (BI ∩ CI))
which implies that UI = ∅.
In Example 9 the problem arises from the disjunct ¬U on the
right-hand-side and the top-concept on the left-hand-side of an
axiom. We can apply DeMorgan-rules:
> v ¬¬(¬U unionsq (B u C))
Pushing the negation inwards we can consider them as a disjoint.
> v ¬(U u ¬(B u C))
As we learned in Section 2.1, we can rewrite this disjoint without
changing its semantics to
U u ¬(B u C) v ⊥
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We hence explicitly stated that the complex concept U u¬(BuC)
is unsatisfiable which we just classified as not admissible.
There exist several options how to solve this problem. First of
all, we note that we do not have to prohibit axioms of the form
> v C in general. Trouble arises when the complex concept C
contains a negated disjunct U that is unsatisfiable. We observe
that UI = ∅, and consequently (¬U)I = ∆I . Hence the disjunc-
tion¬UunionsqD cannot provide any meaningful information aboutD,
since (Uunionsq(BuC))I = ∆I no matter what (BuC) is. We therefore
propose to remove the non-informative disjunct U from C for all
occurrences of C in a root JUC.
Implicitly Stated Logical Contradictions
SinceA u¬A ≡ ⊥ for any axiom of the form U v A u ¬A u B
there exist two way of how to interpret the logical contradiction:
1. The concept U must never be instantiated, i.e. it represents
a forbidden entity.
2. A u ¬ A is a modeling error.
In the scope of this thesis we consider only case 2, because
we want the TBox not to entail any conflict. There exist several
possible ways of how to resolve the logical contradiction when
considered as modeling error:
1. Deletion: A u¬A is a modeling error, hence we completely
delete it.
2. Partial deletion: We only delete one of the concepts, either
A or ¬ A from the axiom.
3. Axiom rewriting: We split up the axiom into two axioms
U v A u B and U v ¬ A u B.
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Yet, none of these options is optimal in a general sense. The
choice depends on the current situation. While solution 1 simply
removes information, solution 2 keeps part of it. Applying solu-
tion 3, we have to rewrite the axiom, but we keep the informa- Original
information is
considered
important.
tion provided. Since we consider all information originally provided
as important, we propose solution 3 within the scope of this the-
sis. However, solution 3 results in a direct contradiction which
are described in the following section. In the sequel, we assume
every TBox T is free of logical contradictions.
The absence of logical contradictions is vital for solving con-
flicts by treating its conflicting axioms separately. If a TBox T
does not contain axioms with logical contradictions, then every
JUC w.r.t. T has at least two axioms:
Lemma 2. Let T be a TBox none of whose axioms contains a logical
contradiction. Then for all JUC JT ,Uv⊥ for T it hold that |JT ,Uv⊥| ≥
2.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix B.1.
4.2.2 Direct Contradictions
Default Logics cannot solve conflicts that are caused by two ax-
ioms whose left-hand-sides are subsumed by concepts that are
disjoint. It refers to explicitly stating that something is a subclass Explicitly stated
contradictionsof a particular concept and its complement at the same time. For
example, the TBox T = {U v A,U v ¬A} contains a direct con-
tradiction whereas the TBox T = {U v B,B v A,U v ¬A} does
not. Both TBoxes entail U v A and U v ¬A (and, obviously,
U v ⊥). The difference is that in the first case both entailments
are stated explicitly while in the latter TBox one of these entailments
implicit.
Consider another example, T = {U v (≤ 1R.>), U v (≥
2R.>)}. Obviously, the TBox entails the two concepts (≤ 1R.>)
and (≥ 2R.>) to be disjoint, but one concept is not the negation
86 Chapter 4. Default Logics for Solving Conflicts
of the other. Hence, direct contradictions require a more compli-
cated notion of disjointness for two concepts.
In the presence of a direct contradiction, the disjointness of
the two concepts involved must be an explicit logical consequence
but not an implicit one. An explicit disjointness of two concepts
A1 and A2 must result from the concepts themselves. In partic-
ular, it must not rely upon any axiom besides the declarations
A1 v > and A2 v >.1 We may express this using the notion of
justifications:
Definition 19. Let T be a TBox. The conceptsA1 andA2 are said to be
explicitly disjoint w.r.t. T , if T |= A1 uA2 v ⊥ and JT ,A1uA2 v ⊥ \
{A1 v >, A2 v >} = ∅.
Returning to Example 5, neither pair of concepts is explicitly
disjoint. The only pair of axioms that are implicitly disjoint is
Penguin and FlyingAnimal. Since these axioms are explicitly
disjoint, we have:
JT ,Penguinv¬FlyingAnimal = {Penguin v ¬FlyingAnimal} 6= ∅
In contrast to that, the two concepts A and ¬A are explicitly dis-
joint for the TBox T = {B v A,B v ¬A}.
The notion of explicit disjointness enables us to define direct
contradictions:
Definition 20. Let U v A1 and U v A2 be two axioms of a TBox
T . We say that T contains a direct contradiction for U , if A1 and A2
are explicitly disjoint. We denote a direct contradiction for a concept U
by DCU = {U v A1, U v A2}
In case a TBox contains a direct contradiction, we cannot ap-
ply the Default Logics to resolve the conflict. Assume the directDefault Logics
cannot work with
Direct Contra-
dictions.
contradiction DCU0 = {U0 v A1, U0 v A2} in a TBox T . One of
1Frankly, the declaration axioms do not have to be part of the justification. We
consider them only in case they are explicitly declared in the ontology.
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the justifications for U0 v ⊥ is the direct contradiction itself, i.e.
Jk0T ,U0 v ⊥ = {U0 v A1, U0 v A2}.
Putting the two axioms U0 v A1 and U0 v A2 into separate
partitions would solve the conflict but violate the definition of
partitions (cf Section 2.5.4). For neither of the two axioms can we
find a model that satisfies U0 and A1 or U0 and A2.
Even worse, the direct contradiction will be part of the last re-
mainder set and cause the resulting Multi-View TBox to be inco-
herent. Assume we already computed the partitions U0, . . . ,Un,
and still have to solve Jk0T ,Uj v ⊥. In other words, we have that
T∆\
⋃n
m=0 Um |= Uj v ⊥. Thanks to monotonicity, we know that
also T∆ \
⋃n
m=0 Um |= U uF v ⊥ hold for any concept F . Hence,
none of the axioms in Jk0T ,U v ⊥ is a candidate for Un+1. As a con-
sequence, no partition Um can contain any axiom of Jk0T ,U v ⊥ for
m = n+1, . . . , N . Hence Jk0T ,U v ⊥ is contained in the last remain-
der set DN . As this causes DN to be non-empty, the resulting
Default TBox is not consistent.
Philosophical Excursion
The idea behind solving conflicts by Default Logics is that we al-
low to state exceptions from a general case. The Default Logics
perspective on Example 5 assume that there there is an exception A way how to
interpret Direct
Contradictions
to the general rule that all birds are flying animals, i.e. penguins.
Assume we stated that penguins are flying animals as well. There
is no exception to a general rule anymore, because the two rules
are equally general, i.e. on the same level of generality. We may
solve this dilemma by separating the two rules when drawing
logical conclusions, i.e. by putting them into two different Aspect
TBoxes. Yet, this changes the semantics of these Aspect TBoxes.
Direct Contradictions do not express exceptions but model per-
pendicular views on the world.
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How to resolve Direct Contradictions Anyway
It seems that the existence of direct contradictions make the ap-
plication of the partitioning algorithm impossible. Indeed, there
is a way how to obtain a valid partition for a TBox T—even if
there exists a direct contradiction. Obviously, the two axioms of
a direct contradiction must not appear in the same partition. In
case A1 and A2 are both entailed satisfiable in the n-th partition-
ing step 2 then we may simply choose one of the axiom for Un
and the other for Un+1. For neither partition Un the concept U is
entailed unsatisfiable.
There exists a way how to still fulfill the definition of the par-
titioning algorithm. We therefore have to make one of the explicit
axioms implicit. To achieve this we introduce a new concept U˜
that does not appear in T and replace one of the axioms of the di-
rect contradiction, e.g. U v A1, by the set {U v U˜ , U˜ v A1}.
If we ensure always chosing U v U˜ to be part of Un and U v A2
to fall into partition Un+1 while placing U˜ v A1 into T∆, then
even the entailment U v A1 is preserved.
4.3 Unsatisfiability Splitting
For resolving a JUC, we must not consider all of its axioms at
the same time for entailment. This condition is already fulfilled
when we treat only two of its axioms separately. We therefore re-
use the splitting scheme defined in Scharrenbach et al. [2010c].
Besides it allows proving the existence of a consistent Multi-View
TBox, using the unsat splitting we can compute the Aspect
TBoxes without additional satisfiability checks. All the hard work
has already been done by computing all the JUC. The necessary
information we need lies in the splitting. We partition each JUC
JkT ,U v ⊥ into the splitting sets:
2This is the case, if T \ U0 ∪ . . . Un−1 6|= A1 unionsq A2 v ⊥.
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ΓkU v ⊥ = {U v A ∈ JkT ,U v ⊥}
ΘkU v ⊥ = J
k
T ,U v ⊥ \ ΓkU
We refer to axioms from the first as γ-axioms whereas we call
axiom from the latter θ-axioms. As we will show later on, the θ-axioms and
γ-axiomsseparation of a justification into Θ and Γ provides exactly the sep-
aration we seek for computing Aspect TBoxes: for each root JUC
JkT ,U v ⊥ one or all θ-axioms are placed into one Aspect TBox Un
and one or all γ-axioms are placed into a different Aspect TBox
Un+1. The remaining axioms are added to T∆.
Splitting Sets are Non-Empty
To be able to separate an JUC by using axioms from its splitting
sets, we demand these splitting sets to be non-empty. We can en-
sure this by requiring the TBox containing the unsatisfiable con-
cepts to fulfill one of the constraints defined in Section 4.2.2: In
the absence of direct contradictions, the justification for an unsat-
isfiable concept always consists of at least two axioms: one that
has the unsatisfiable concept on the left-hand side and one that
does not:
Lemma 3. Let T be a TBox that contains unsatisfiable concepts. If
none of the root JUC contains a direct contradiction, then for every root
JUC the splitting sets are non-empty.
The proof for Lemma 3 can be found in Appendix B.2.
4.3.1 Examples
We given an example to illustrate how JUC for a TBox are split up
into Θ- and Γ-sets. Example 10 and Figure 4.1 how the splitting
works.
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J1T ,Cv⊥ J
2
T ,DuCv⊥ J
4
T ,Ev⊥
J5T ,Ev⊥J
3
T ,DuCv⊥
J6T ,EunionsqCv⊥
J7T ,EunionsqCv⊥
Figure 4.1: Dependencies between the JUCs from Example 10.
An arrow indicates that the justification at the start depends on
the justifications at the end. Note that this dependency is a tran-
sitive relation.
Example 10 (Unsat-Splitting).
Assume the TBox T with the following axioms:
Specified Induced
τ0 : G v A
τ1 : B v G
τ2 : C v B
τ3 : C v ¬A
τ4 : D v ¬B
τ5 : E v D u C
τ6 : E unionsq C v F u C
τ9 : D u C v H
τ7 : D u C v >
τ8 : E unionsq C v >
The following concepts in the extended signature of T are unsatisfiable:
C, D u C, E, E unionsq C. The corresponding JUCs are:3
J1T ,Cv⊥ = { τ0, τ1 } ∪ { τ2, τ3 }
J2T ,DuCv⊥ = { τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3 } ∪ { τ7 }
J3T ,DuCv⊥ = { τ2, τ4 } ∪ { τ7 }
J4T ,Ev⊥ = { τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3, τ7 } ∪ { τ5 }
J5T ,Ev⊥ = { τ2, τ4, τ7 } ∪ { τ5 }
J6T ,EunionsqCv⊥ = { τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3, τ5, τ7 } ∪ { τ8 }
J7T ,EunionsqCv⊥ = { τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4, τ5, τ7 } ∪ { τ8 }
3Note that we omitted the declarations for atomic concepts, since they do not
play a vital role in the procedure.
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The dependencies between these justifications are shown in
Figure 4.1. We have that J1T ,Cv⊥ and J
3
T ,DuCv⊥ are indeed root
JUCs whereas the other JUCs are derived. It should be noted
for both root JUCs the axiom τ2 is contained in both a Γ-set (for
J1T ,Cv⊥) and in a Θ-set (for JUC J
3
T ,DuCv⊥). As we will see fur-
ther on, this is the cause why we have three instead of only two
partitions.
4.4 Algorithm
All different variants of the Splitting-∆-Operators can be com-
puted according to variants of Algorithm 1. The actual imple-
mentations differ in the choice of the axioms and the choice of
the current partition where to add axioms to. In the following, we
describe the generic algorithm for computing a consistent Multi-
View TBox. Variations of this algorithm can be, for example, al-
ways choosing all axioms or choosing a single axiom only. They
are described in detail in Chapter 5. We process all root JUCs
until all of them are resolved. We collect the candidates for re- How the
∆-Operator
works.
solving in the current step in the sets Γ and Θ, and determine
which of the JUCs are the root JUCs (Line 6). We store these in
Θroot and Γroot. A JUC JkUv⊥ is solved when its splitting sets
ΘkUv⊥ and Γ
k
Uv⊥ are both empty.
We start the main iteration (Line 8) and process all root JUCs
as long as not all their splitting sets have been resolved. The al-
gorithm considers a splitting set as solved when it is empty. We
first determine the Γ-sets (Line 12) that can be resolved. The find-
ing task is described in detail in Section 4.4.4. Having resolved
one or more Γ-sets, we resolve all dependent splitting sets (Line
17). Details on that can be found in Section 4.4.3. Afterwards, we
add all those axioms that contain unsatisfiable concepts in the ex-
tended signature to the corresponding partitions (Line 43). How
to perform this is subject to Section 4.4.6. Finally, we resolve ax-
ioms from Θ sets (Line 26), in particular those that are no more
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Algorithm 1 Compute a consistent Multi-View TBox for a
Splitting-∆-Operator.
Function:
DT ←
computeMultiV iewTBox(T ,Θ0Uv⊥,Γ0Uv⊥. . . . ,ΘKUv⊥,ΓKUv⊥)
1: test
2: // Initialization
3: Θ← ∅, Γ← ∅, n← 0
4:
5: Θroot,Γroot ← determineRootJustifications(
6: Θ0U v ⊥,Γ
0
U v ⊥, . . . ,Θ
K
U v ⊥,Γ
K
U v ⊥))
7:
8: while not all ΘkUv⊥ ∈ Θroot,ΓkUv⊥ ∈ Γroot are empty do
9: Un ← ∅
10:
11: // Determine candidate Γ-sets and solve conflicts
12: Γ← determineGammaCandidates(ΘkUv⊥,ΓkUv⊥)
13: for all ΓkUv⊥ ∈ Γ do
14: Un ← chooseGammaAxiom(U0, . . . ,Un−1,Un,ΓkU v ⊥)
15: end for
16:
17: // Remove chosen Γ-axioms from splitting sets.
18: for all ΓkU v ⊥,Θ
k
U v ⊥ do
19: ΓkU v ⊥ ← ΓkU v ⊥ \ Un ΘkU v ⊥ ← ΘkU v ⊥ \ Un
20: end for
21:
22: resolveDerivedUnsatJustifications(
23: Γ,Θ0U v ⊥,Γ
0
U v ⊥, . . . ,Θ
K
U v ⊥,Γ
K
U v ⊥)
24:
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25: // Resolve Θ-axioms that are not in any Γ-set.
26: for all ΘkU v ⊥ : Θ
k
U v ⊥ ∩ ΓkU v ⊥ = ∅ ∧ΘkU v ⊥ 6= ∅ do
27: Θn ← chooseThetaAxiom(U0, . . . ,Un,ΘkU v ⊥)
28: end for
29:
30: // Resolve derived unsat justifications.
31: resolveDerivedUnsatJustifications(
32: Θ,Θ0U v ⊥,Γ
0
U v ⊥, . . . ,Θ
K
U v ⊥,Γ
K
U v ⊥)
33:
34: // Remove chosen Θ-axioms from splitting sets.
35: for all ΓkU v ⊥,Θ
k
U v ⊥ do
36: ΓkU v ⊥ ← ΓkU v ⊥ \ Un
37: ΘkU v ⊥ ← ΘkU v ⊥ \ Un
38: end for
39: n← updateIndex(n)
40: end while
41:
42: // move axioms with complex unsatisfiable concepts to partitions
43: moveComplexUnsatConceptsToPartitions(T ,U0, . . . ,UN )
44:
45: // T∆ is the set of all axioms from T that are
46: // not contained a partition
47: T∆ = T \
⋃N
n=0 UN
contained in any Γ-set. As a result, we end up with a consistent
Multi-View TBox DT .
The subsequent sections of Section 4.4 describe in more detail
how the single steps work and why they produce sound results.
Several sub-algorithms for the function that Algorithm 1 calls are
given along with an analysis of the complexity of the main Algo-
rithm 1.
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4.4.1 Resolving JUCs
The following observation seems trivial but is nonetheless impor-
tant, since it describes the working principle why we can apply
Default Logics for solving conflicts. Whenever two axioms for
an arbitrary justification Jk0U0v⊥ for T |= U0 v ⊥ are containedWhy resolving
JUCs works. in two different partitions Un0 and Un1 , n0 6= n1, then Jk0U0v⊥ is
not a justification for U0 v ⊥ neither w.r.t. T \ Un0 nor w.r.t.
T \ Un1 . The minimality constraint of justifications and mono-
tonicity, even implies Jk0U0v⊥ is not a justification for U0 v ⊥w.r.t.
T \⋃nm=0 Um.
Lemma 4. Let T be a TBox and U0, . . . ,UN be the partitions that
result from Algorithm 1. If an axiom from an justification for an un-
satisfiable concept Jk0U0v⊥ for T |= U0 v ⊥ is contained in a partition
Un0 , then Jk0U0v⊥ is not a justification for U0 v ⊥ w.r.t. T \
⋃n
m=0 Um.
However Lemma 4 provides the principles why the partition-
ing invalidates single justifications but we cannot conclude that
T \⋃nm=0 Um 6|= U0 v ⊥. This conclusion we can draw only, if all
justifications for U0 v ⊥ are invalid w.r.t. T \
⋃n
m=0 Um.
4.4.2 Candidates for T∆
In case a justification Jk0U0v⊥ has more than two axioms, we can
even go one step further. Actually, it is not necessary that all
axioms have to occur in different partitions. Indeed, it sufficesAxioms that are
valid for all
partitions.
that only two of them occur in two different partitions Un0 and
Un1 for n0 6= n1. On the other hand, when we add the axioms
that we did not choose for Un0 and Un1 to both of these partitions,
the Jk0U0v⊥ is still invalid w.r.t. T \ Un0 and w.r.t. T \ Un1 .
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Lemma 5. Let T be a TBox and Jk0U0v⊥ be a root JUC for
T |= U0 v ⊥. If one axiom B v A from a justification Jk0U0v⊥ is
contained in a partition Un0 , and one axiom C v D is contained in
partition Un1 for n0 6= n1, then for all axioms F v E ∈ Jk0U0v⊥ \{B v
A,C v D} it holds that Jk0U0v⊥ is not valid w.r.t.(
Jk0U0v⊥ \ {B v A,C v D}
)
∪
(
T \⋃max{n0,n1}m=0 Um).
Lemma 5 describes the necessary condition for being able to
add ”surplus” axioms from an JUC to the Universal TBox T∆ in-
stead of adding them to a partition Un However, it remains to
prove that T \ ⋃Nm=0 Um |= E u F for all axioms F v E ∈ T∆.
We will give proof on that along with the proof of Theorem 6 in
Appendix B.3.
4.4.3 Resolving Derived JUCs
The following observation explains why we have to consider all
justifications, the root as well as the derived ones, when we use Why resolving the
root JUCs also
resolves the
dervied JUCs.
the sets from the unsat splitting for checking the satisfiability of
AuB w.r.t. T \⋃nm=0 Um to decide whether B v A is a candidate
for the next partition Un+1.
Lemma 6. Let the partitions U0, . . . ,Un be already computed accord-
ing to Algorithm 1. The axioms of Θk0U0v⊥ can still contain concepts
that are unsatisfiable w.r.t. T \⋃nm=0 Um.
Since Lemma 6 claims the potential existence of concepts that
are still unsatisfiable, we proof Lemma 6 by giving an example.
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Example 11 (Resolving derived JUCs).
Consider the following TBox:
T = {B v A,C v B,C v ¬A,D v C,E v D,F v E,F v ¬A}
It has the root JUC:
J0Cv⊥ =
Θ︷ ︸︸ ︷
{B v A} ∪
Γ︷ ︸︸ ︷
{C v B,C v ¬A}
J1Fv⊥ = {B v A,C v B,E v D} ∪ {F v E,F v ¬A}
Considering only the root JUC when choosing the axioms for the first
partition U0 we would, according to Algorithm 1, choose all those ax-
ioms that do occur in some Θ-set but not in any Γ-set.4 Hence, we
would choose axiom E v D for the first partition U0. Yet, T |= E v ⊥
with the justification
J2Fv⊥ = {B v A,C v B} ∪ {E v D}
Hence we must not add E v D to U0, because the condition for
Default Logics is not fulfilled: T 6|= AuB. In fact, the axiom E v D is
part of a Γ-set for a derived justification. If we had checked also the Γ-
sets of the derived justifications, we would have prevented the incorrect
addition of the axiom E v D to U0.
Example 11 makes clear why we have to include the derived
JUC when choosing axioms for a partition Un+1. As long as theIncluding the
derived JUCs
when choosing
axioms is
important.
corresponding justification is valid w.r.t. a TBox T ′, we can find
concepts that are unsatisfiable w.r.t. T ′ by checking the Γ-sets
of all JUC for T ′. If we identify T ′ by T \ ⋃nm=0 Um we can
use the Γ-sets for checking whether one of the concepts in the
signature of an axiom B v A ∈ T \ ⋃nm=0 Um is unsatisfiable
w.r.t. T \ ⋃nm=0 Um. Hence, the Θ-sets provide candidate ax-
ioms B v A for Un+1 whereas the Γ-sets, in turn, give proof
whether the candidates fulfill the condition of Default Logics, i.e.
T \⋃nm=0 Um |= A uB.
4Note that Γ is always empty in the first iteration of Algorithm 1
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Algorithm 2 gives a proposal for how to implement resolv-
ing derived justifications. Resolving a JUC is done by removing
all axioms from both of its splitting sets. This way, they cannot
contribute axioms to the partitions U0, . . . ,UN .
From the set of currently valid (i.e. not yet resolved) JUCs
all those JUCs are removed that share at least one axiom with
some already resolved Γ-sets. Both, the currently valid JUCs as
well as the already resolved Γ-sets are given as an input to the
algorithm in the form of the corresponding splitting sets. If one of
the currently valid JUCs shares an axiom with one of the already
resolved Γ-sets, it will be resolved as well.
Algorithm 2 Resolve those derived JUCs that depend on a given
set of JUCs.
Function: resolveDerivedUnsatJustifications(
Γ,Θ0Uv⊥,Γ
0
Uv⊥. . . . ,Θ
K
Uv⊥,Γ
K
Uv⊥)
Input:
Γ = {ΓkjUv⊥} candidate splitting sets that have been resolved
ΘkUv⊥,Γ
k
Uv⊥, k = 0, . . . ,K splitting sets to be resolved
1: // invalidate all derived Θ- and Γ-sets
2: // that share an axiom with a resolved root Γ-set
3: for all ΘkUv⊥,Γ
k
Uv⊥ do
4: for all ΓkjVv⊥ do
5: if JkUv⊥ is derived and Θ
k
Uv⊥ ∩
⋃
j Γ
kj
Vv⊥ 6= ∅ then
6: ΘkUv⊥,Γ
k
Uv⊥ ← ∅
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
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4.4.4 Determine Γ-sets for Resolving
Although we resolved a root JUC for some unsatisfiable concept
U0 in step n, we saw in Lemma 6 there may still exist root JUC
which state that U0 is unsatisfiable w.r.t. T \
⋃n
m=0 Um. When
resolving Γk0U0v⊥ of a root JUC, we must indeed resolve all Γ
kj
U0v⊥
for the unsatisfiable concept U0. If we do not do so, we may have
in the partition Un+1 an axiom D v C for which C is not satis-
fiable. This, in turn, contradicts the condition given by Default
Logics that (T∆ ∪ Un+1) 6|= C u D v ⊥. We illustrate this by the
following example:
Example 12. Assume the following TBox:
T = {B v A,C v B,C v ¬A,D v C,E v D,
E v ¬C,F v E,G v F,G v ¬E, I v G,
H v A, I v H, I v ¬A}
The first two partitions and the remainder set applying Algorithm
1 and choosing all axioms are
T∆ = {I v G}
U0 = {B v A,H v A}
U1 = {C v B,C v ¬A,D v C, I v H, I v ¬A}
T \ (U0 ∪ U1) = {E v D,E v ¬C,F v E,G v F,
G v ¬E, I v G}
Yet, we have that J0Iv⊥ = {F v E,G v F,G v ¬E, I v G} and
that J0Iv⊥ ⊂ T \ (U0 ∪ U1).5 This means that we have evidence for
T \ (U0 ∪ U1) |= I v ⊥. Consequently, T \ (U0 ∪ U1) 6|= I u H .
Because of monotonicity, T \ U0 6|= I u H , too. Hence, the partition
U1 contains an axiom for which the condition given by Default Logics
is not fulfilled: I v H ∈ U1, but T \ U0 6|= I uH .
5We can rewrite T \ (U0∪U1) as T∆∪
⋃N
m=2 Um We may not know the actual
value of N yet, but we know the contents of
⋃N
m=2 Um
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We may resolve in step n + 1 the Γ-sets that belong to root
JUC for a concept U0 only if all justifications, i.e. also the derived
ones, for U0 have been solved in step n. This is the case when all
root unsat ΘkU0v⊥ are empty or one axiom from a derived unsat
ΘkU0v⊥ is contained in one of the already computed partitions Um
for m ≤ n.
As a direct consequence from Lemma 6, we either resolve all
root unsat Γ-sets for U0 in step n+ 1 or none of them. This is the
case when all Θ-sets that belong to that unsatisfiable concept U0
have been resolved—this includes both Θ-sets from the root as
well as from the derived JUC for T |= U0 v ⊥.
Lemma 7. Let U0 be an unsatisfiable concept w.r.t. T that has the
j = 0, . . . , J root JUC JkjU0v⊥ w.r.t. T . In the n+ 1-th step of applying
Algorithm 1 to T either⋃Jj=0 ΓkjU0 ⊆ (T∆∪Un+1) or⋃Jj=0 ΓkjU0∩(T∆∪Un+1) = ∅.
Algorithm 3 provides a suggestion how Lemma 7 can be im-
plemented.
4.4.5 Resolving Axioms from Θ-sets
Having resolved all possible Γ-sets we resolved the derived justi-
fications that depended on these Γ-sets, as well. By removing ax-
ioms from Γ-sets of the derived justifications, it can happen that
axioms are still contained in a Θ-set of a root JUC but no more
contained in any Γ-set. If an axiom B v A is not contained in
any Γ-set w.r.t. T \⋃nm=0 Um we have no more evidence that B is
entailed unsatisfiable w.r.t. T \⋃nm=0 Un. We can hence conclude
that T \⋃nm=0 Un |= A v B.
Lemma 8. Let U0, . . . ,Un+1 and T∆ be the partitions and the Uni-
versal TBox that result from Algorithm 1 after Line 23. If for an ax-
iom B v A ∈ Θk0U0v⊥ it holds that B v A 6∈
⋃K
k=0 Γ
k
Vv⊥, then
T \⋃nm=0 Un |= B v A.
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As a direct consequence from Lemma 8 B v A is a candidate
for Un+1. Furthermore, if for some Θk0U0v⊥ more than one axiom is
no more contained neither in any Γ-set nor the dependent split-
ting sets, then the axioms from Θk0U0v⊥ are also candidates for T∆.
Algorithm 3 Determine the candidates to be resolved in the cur-
rent iteration step from Γroot, i.e. from the Γ-sets of the root JUCs.
Function: Γ←
determineGammaCandidates(Θ0Uv⊥,Γ
0
Uv⊥. . . . ,Θ
K
Uv⊥,Γ
K
Uv⊥)
Input:
Splitting sets ΘkUv⊥,Γ
k
Uv⊥ for all k = 0, . . . ,K JUCs for a
TBox T .
Output:
Candidate Γ-sets for solving
1: // collect all possible candidate sets
2: // grouped by the unsatisfiable concept
3: for all U do
4: ΓU ← {ΓkUv⊥|ΓkUv⊥ 6= ∅}
5: end for
6: // remove groups of candidates
7: // for which one member’s Θ-set is not empty
8: for all ΓkUv⊥ do
9: if ΘkUv⊥ 6= ∅ then
10: ΓU ← ∅
11: end if
12: end for
13:
14: // collect all candidates that belong to a
15: // root JUC as a result
16: Γ← {ΓkUv⊥ ∈
⋃
U ΓU |JkUv⊥ is a root JUC}
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4.4.6 Solving Axioms With Complex
Unsatisfiable Concepts
After finishing computing the partitions, it is possible that the set
T \⋃Nn=0 Un contains axioms whose extended signature contains
complex concepts that are unsatisfiable w.r.t.
(T \ ⋃Nn=0 Un) ∪ Un for some partition n.6 We must move each
of these axioms to a particular partition before we can compute
the Universal TBox as T∆ = T \
⋃N
n=0 Un. The procedure is de-
scribed by Algorithm 4. We check each partition Un for n =
N, . . . , 0 whether it contains the declaration for a complex con-
cept U . Since all of these declarations U v > must occur in Γ-
sets, we know that T |= U v ⊥. On the other hand, it is possible
that U v > is contained in some Θ-sets. This is, for example, the
case when there exists another complex unsatisfiable concept U˜
with U˜ 6= U and U v U˜ ∈ T . We have hence to start from the last
partition. If axioms with U in the extended signature are added
to partition Un we hence ensure that all such concepts U˜ are put
in a partition Um with m ≤ n. This, in turn, ensures that neither
(T∆ ∪ Un) |= U v ⊥ nor (T∆ ∪ Un) |= U˜ v ⊥.
Example 13 (Move complex unsatisfiable concepts).
Assume the TBox:
T = {B v A,C v ¬A,E v B u C,B u C u F v D}
Applying Algorithm 1 until Line 43 results into the partitions
U0 = {B v A,C v ¬A}
U1 = {B u C v >, B u C u F v >}
T \ (U0 ∪ U1) = {E v B u C,B u C u F v D})
6Note that T \⋃Nn=0 Un is the candidate set for T∆.
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Proceeding Algorithm 1 further we obtain
U0 = {B v A,C v ¬A}
U1 = {B u C v >, B u C u F v >,
E v B u C,B u C u F v D}
T \ (U0 ∪ U1) = {}
If we had not added the axioms that contain complex un-
satisfiable concepts in their extended signature, in Example 13
we would end up with T∆ = {E v B u C,B u C u F v D}.
Yet, (T∆∪U0) |= BuC uF v ⊥. Even worse we would have that
(T∆ ∪U0) |= E v ⊥. We can avoid this by executing Algorithm 4.
4.4.7 Consistency
The most important property of the Defaults-Splitting-
∆-Operator is that the resulting Default-TBox is consistent. We
therefore formalize the necessary conditions. To ensure that al-
ways two axioms of a root JUC are contained in two different
partitions, we require that in every step of Algorithm 1 we can
choose at least one axiom from a Γ-set of a root JUC. Further-
more, we require that, in the first step, we can choose at least
one Θ-axiom that is not contained in any Γ-set. Finally, the input
TBox must be acyclic but must not contain neither logical nor di-
rect contradictions.
Theorem 6. The Default TBox produced by Algorithm 1 is consistent,
if the following holds:
∣∣ chooseThetaAxiom(Un, T∆,ΘkU v ⊥)∣∣ ≥ 1 if n = 0.∣∣ chooseGammaAxiom(Un, T∆,ΓkU v ⊥)∣∣ ≥ 1 if n > 0.
updateIndex(n) = n+ 1
4.4 Algorithm 103
The index update function simply states that in the next step
we start with a new empty partition. We will see in Section 5.2
that we can indeed have only two partitions and the resulting
Multi-View-TBoxDT still be consistent but we then give up some
properties on DT .
The proof for Theorem 6 can be found in Appendix B.3. Here,
we will illustrate how the Aspect TBoxes U0, . . . ,UN are construc-
ted. The main idea behind Algorithm 1 is to successively add at
least one axiom of each ΘUv⊥ to Un and at least one axiom of
each ΓUv⊥ to Un+1. The remaining axioms are then added to T∆.
4.4.8 Uniqueness of Solutions
The choice of axioms determines which axioms are treated as De-
faults and which are treated as crisp DL axioms. It was shown
in Lukasiewicz [2008] that for a Universal TBox T∆ and a set of
Defaults (called conditional constraints there), the resulting par-
titions are unique.
Corollary 1. Each choice made in Algorithm 1 produces a unique
Multi-View-TBox.
As a consequence, Algorithm 1 produces unique solutions,
i.e. it is deterministic. Yet, the oracle for choosing which axioms
are considered as Defaults and which are considered crisp may
be non-deterministic. Although there can exist many alternatives
the oracle can choose from, Corollary 1 states that for any choice
the oracle actually makes, there exists only one possible solution
how to partition the set of Defaults. For any choice of the oracle
there exists exactly one possible Multi-View-TBox.
4.4.9 Complexity
The complexity of finding a Multi-View TBox for a TBox T is
dominated by finding all JUC which depends on the underly-
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Algorithm 4 Remove those axioms that contain an unsatisfiable
complex concept in their extended signature.
Function:
moveComplexUnsatConceptsToPartitions(T ,U0, . . . ,UN )
Input:
TBox T
Partitions U0, . . . ,UN
1: for n = N, . . . , 0 do
2: for τ ∈ Un do
3: // check whether we solved a complex unsatisfiable
4: // concept U in the current partition Un
5: if τ = U v > and U is complex then
6: // add all axioms ρ that contain the resolved complex concept
7: // U in the extended signature to the current partition Un
8: for ρ ∈ T do
9: if U ∈ s˜ig(ρ) then
10: Un ← Un ∪ {ρ}
11: end if
12: end for
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
ing expressive power of the ontology. As we saw in Section 2.1,
for expressive DLs like SROIQ this problem is 2NEXPTIME-
complete in the number of axioms in the TBox.
Finding partitions does not require any reasoning but only set
operations. For constructing these sets, we computed the Unsat-Set operations for
finding partitions Splitting. We have to perform the check whether the left-hand-
side of an axiom is an unsatisfiable concept for all axioms of each
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JUC, not only the root ones. Let us denote the number of axioms
in the JUCs by L, and the number of axioms in the root JUCs only
by L˜. In the worst case, L = |T |, i.e. all axioms of the TBox are
involved in some JUC. Let us further denote the number of JUCs
by K and the number of root JUCs by K˜.
We have to determine the dependency between the different
justifications. This can be accomplished by a dependency graph
whose root nodes are the root JUCs. Building this graph requires
K × L set comparison operations in the worst case.
For computing the first partition we have to compare each Θ-
set with each Γ-set of the root JUCs. This requires K˜2 set compar-
ison operations. In the worst case, only one root JUC contributes
an axiom to U0 leaving more axioms for comparison when com-
puting further partitions. As a result, we have to perform K˜ × K˜
set comparisons for determining U0. Hence, computing U1 re-
quires a maximum number of (K˜ − 1)2 set comparison opera-
tions.
We can end up with a maximum number of K˜ partitions Un
for n = 0, . . . , K˜. This requires K˜2 + (K˜ − 1)2 + . . . = K˜(K˜ +
1)(2K˜ + 1)/6 computations, which is bounded by O(K˜3). Note
that in the best case, we only have two partitions such that the
number of computations is bounded by O(K˜2).
The sets can be coded as hash-sets which allows for constant
time for accessing elements. As a result, the number of access
operations for performing a comparison of two sets S1 and S2 is
bounded by O(max |S1|, |S2|). In the worst case, the number of
axioms in the root JUCs correlates with the number of axioms
in the ontology, which increases the computational worst-case
complexity from O(K˜3) to O(K˜4).
We should note that in the ontologies that were used for the
experiments the number of axioms in the root JUCs was very
small compared to the number of axioms in the ontology. The Finding JUCs
dominates
complexity.
same held for the number of justifications and the number of par-
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titions. Finding a Multi-View-TBox by Algorithm 1 is dominated
by the procedure of finding JUCs.
We should also stress out that Algorithm 1 is deterministic
whenever the choice function which of the axioms go into the
single partitions and which that go into T∆ is deterministic. This
is the case for the All-Defaults-∆-Operator whereas the choice
for the Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator is irreversible but not de-
terministic. Yet, all presented variants of the ∆-Operator produce
a consistent Multi-View TBox.
5
The Unsat-Splitting-
∆-Operators
Using the Unsat-Splitting defined in Section 4.3 we define a num-
ber of Splitting-∆-Operators, all of which result in a consistent
Multi-View TBox. However, each of these operators has differ-
ent properties. Constraining the computation of Aspect TBoxes
using Default Logics, we have a guided procedure with unique
solution but risk to invalidate too many entailments. This ap-
proach can be refined in a way that fewer axioms are put into
the Aspect TBoxes. On the one hand, this results in fewer entail-
ments invalidated, on the other hand, the solution is not unique
anymore.
When ∆(T ) does not need to provide Default Logics reason-
ing, we can show that there exists a Splitting ∆-operator that pro-
duces a consistent Multi-View TBox with only exactly two Aspect
TBoxes. As the previous approach it is non-deterministic but is
expected to invalidate even fewer entailments.
We use the Example 10 to illustrate how the Multi-View TBox
is constructed for each approach. The construction, in turn, is de-
scribed by Algorithm 1 and differs for each approach only slightly.
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The differences are described in the Sections corresponding the
respective approach.
Plan of This Chapter
We start with the ∆-Operator that transforms all axioms of all
root JUCs in Section 5.1.1 and continue with its improved version
w.r.t. the number of axioms in Section 5.1.2. In the subsequent
Section 5.2 we present the optimization regarding the number
of partitions and sketch a possible iterative solution in Section
5.3. We close this chapter with an overview over alternative ap-
proaches for a Splitting-∆-Operator in Section 5.4 and how the
Splitting-∆-Operator can be defined on a lattice in Section 5.5.
Finding optimal solutions for the non-deterministic approa-
ches is subject to Chapter 6
5.1 The Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator
As we saw in Section 2.5 Default Logics provide a mechanism
for solving conflicts on a set of DL axioms without having to re-
move any axiom. These axioms are treated as Defaults, which, in
turn, provides a partitioning algorithm that, for a TBox with un-
satisfiable concepts, produces a unique Multi-View-TBox DT as
a result. We can show that when we add at least two axioms of all
root JUCs to two different Aspect TBoxes Un the resulting Multi-
View TBox DT is consistent. Furthermore, we can use the Unsat
Splitting from Section 4.3 to compute these partitions without the
need for additional satisfiability checks.
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5.1.1 All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator
The simple-most strategy for the oracle is to choose all candidates
as defaults. Since following this strategy, all axioms of all root
JUC are considered as Defaults, we refer to the induced operator
as the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator.
The oracle is defined as follows:
chooseThetaAxiom(U0, . . . ,Un, T∆,ΘkU v ⊥) = ΘkU v ⊥
chooseGammaAxiom(U0, . . . ,Un, T∆,ΓkU v ⊥) = ΓkU v ⊥
updateIndex(n) = n+ 1
For a TBox T there exists only one solution how the All-De-
faults-Splitting-∆-Operator transforms T into a Multi-View- First Approach:
All axioms are
Defaults.
TBox. The oracle chooses all axioms of all root JUC to be consid-
ered as Defaults. We know from Corollary 1 that for a given set
of defaults there exists only one solution how to partition these
according to Lehmann’s Default Logics.
The unambiguity of the solution to ∆(T ), however, comes at a
price: We risk invalidating unnecessarily many entailments. We
know from Theorem 6 that it suffices to transform only two ax-
ioms from each root JUC to obtain a consistent Multi-View-TBox.
In that case, the solution to ∆(T ) is not deterministic anymore
and requires further optimization. We will discuss this approach
in Section 5.1.2
5.1.2 Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator
Putting all axioms of all root JUCs in the Aspect TBoxes results Second
Approach:
As few axioms
as possible are
Defaults.
in a unique consistent Multi-View-TBox. Adding fewer axioms
to the Aspect TBoxes Un while leaving more axioms to T∆, the
resulting Multi-View TBox DT is expected to invalidate fewer
entailments while still being consistent (Theorem 6). This solu-
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tion, however, requires an oracle that makes a non-deterministic
choice.
Furthermore, the resulting Default-TBox can contain ABox
conflicts, i.e. an instance a can be asserted a concept A(a) and
its complement ¬A(a). This does not cause problems for the rea-
soning process but leads to ambiguous results. This issue is in-
vestigated in more detail in Section 6.2
We define the oracle for the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Oper-
ator by a random choice:∣∣ chooseThetaAxiom(U0, . . . ,Un, T∆,ΘkU v ⊥)∣∣
= rand(ΘkU v ⊥ \
⋃n
m=0 Um)∣∣ chooseGammaAxiom(U0, . . . ,Un, T∆,ΘkU v ⊥)∣∣
= rand(ΓkU v ⊥ \
⋃n
m=0 Um)
updateIndex(n) = n+ 1
Note that the actual choice depends on a random process, but
we know from Corollary 1 that each random choice determines a
unique solution.
5.1.3 Comparison
We will now explain how the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator
and the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator work accordingComparing the
first and the
second
approach.
to Example 10. We will also compare the differences between the
two when going through the single processing steps. The single
possible solution for the first operator and its processing steps is
illustrated in Table 5.1. We present two possible solutions for the
latter operator in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
Initialization
The initialization step is equal for both approaches. We compute
the dependencies between the JUCs and initialize the counter n
to 0.
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Iteration 1
In the first iteration, we have not yet resolved any conflicts. There
are no Γ-candidates that could be resolved (Line 12). We hence
skip some of the following steps and continue with resolving the
Θ-candidates (Line 26). In our case, the only axioms that are con-
tained solely in a Θ-set but not in any Γ-set are τ1 and τ0.
Here, the first difference takes place. The All-Defaults-Split-
ting-∆-Operator puts both axioms into the first partition U0. The
Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator, in contrast, only chooses
one of them. Let’s assume the oracle chooses axiom τ1 to be con-
tained in U0 and τ0 to be contained in T∆.
None of the justifications is completely empty, so we incre-
ment the counter n by one and proceed to the next iteration step.
Iteration 2
In the second iteration, we know that we removed an axiom from
Θ1Cv⊥. Now we can determine Γ-candidates (Line 12). Since we
only solved the Θ-set for exactly one root JUC we will find only
one Γ-candidate for solving, in particular Γ1Cv⊥.
The set Γ1Cv⊥ consists of two axioms, namely τ2 and τ3. Again,
the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator chooses both of them for
the partition U1. In contrast to that, the oracle of the Minimal-
Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator selects one of them for U1. It does,
however, not put the other axiom directly into T∆. This can be
seen from Table 5.2. Assume that we chose τ3 for U1 and put
τ2 into T∆. In that case we risk to empty a potential Θ-set for
the next iteration. All those axioms that we did not choose for
any partition in the following are put into the Universal TBox
T∆, anyway. Now that we processed Γ1Cv⊥, we can resolve the
derived JUCs (Line 23).
We proceed with determining the Θ-candidates. We have to
distinguish between the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator and
the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator. In the first case the
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only axiom which is contained in a Θ-set but not in a Γ-set is τ4
whereas in the latter case we can also choose from τ2. Because
we resolved Γ1Cv⊥ in the first part of the current iteration, τ2 is
not contained in any Γ-set anymore.
Again, applying the first operator we choose τ4 for U1. We as-
sume that the oracle for the second operator chooses axiom τ2.
There are no more dependent justifications to resolve, we can
proceed with the next iteration. Before we do so, let us make
a remark on the choice which the oracle of the Minimal-Defaults-
Splitting-∆-Operator made.
The choice of the oracle was not minimal. The situation is
illustrated in Table 5.3. When resolving Γ1Cv⊥, we could have
chosen either τ2 or τ3. Since τ2 is contained in Θ3DuCv⊥, we could
have solved this splitting set along with resolving Γ1Cv⊥. Hence,
the choice becomes minimal, if the oracle decides to choose τ2 to
be contained in U1 instead of choosing τ3 first and still having to
choose τ2 later.
Iteration 3
In the third iteration we resolve Γ3DuCv⊥ for which we in any
case have only one option. We add axiom τ7 to U2. Since now all
splitting sets of the root JUCs are solved, we exit the while-loop.
Post-Processing
We now have to add those axioms which contain an unsatisfi-
able complex concept in their extended signature to those parti-
tions that contain a declaration axiom (Line 43). This provides the
same results for both operators. We find that τ6 contains E unionsqC in
the signature which is a complex concept and unsatisfiable w.r.t.
T . Yet, there is no partition that contains the axiom E unionsq C v >.
For the complex concept D u C which is also unsatisfiable w.r.t.
T we have that partition U2 contains D u C v >. Furthermore,
we have that D uC ∈ s˜ig(τ9) As a consequence, we add τ9 to U2.
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Finally, we set T∆ = T∆ ∪ (T \
⋃2
n=0 Un) and add all those
axioms to T∆ that were not contained in a root JUC or not cho-
sen to be part of a partition. We obtain T∆ = {τ0, τ5, τ8} for
the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator whereas we obtain T∆ =
{τ0, τ4, τ5, τ8} and T∆ = {τ0, τ3, τ4, τ5, τ8} for the two choices of
the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator.
We can see that even non-optimal choices for the Minimal-
Defaults-∆-Operator potentially invalidate fewer entailments
than the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator.
5.2 Minimal-Partitions-Splitting-∆-Operator
Default TBoxes fulfill the properties of Lehmann’s Default Logics
(cf Section 2.5), but fulfilling these properties is not required in Third Approach:
Create as few
partitions as
possible.
every case. If we are just interested in valid entailments, we do
not care about specificity of information. In that case we define
two disjoint Aspect TBoxes U0 and U1, each of which contains
one axiom from each root JUC.
We may hence be able to solve arbitrary, for example circu-
lar, conflicts in the TBox. Yet, there is no guarantee that we can
find U0 and U1 such that the corresponding Multi-View TBox is
consistent.
We can indeed show that it is possible to construct a consis-
tent Multi-View TBox with exactly two Aspect TBoxes when us-
ing the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator or the Minimal-Defaults-
Splitting-∆-Operator.
As in the case of the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator,
the resulting Multi-View TBox can contain ABox conflicts, i.e. an
instance a can be asserted a concept A(a) and its complement
¬A(a). This does not cause problems for the reasoning process
but leads to ambiguous results. This issue is investigated in more
detail in Section 6.2
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Defaults to Minimal Partitions
Even if we were able solve conflicts using Default Logics, an en-
tailment relation like Lehmann’s Lexicographical Entailment is
not desirable or needed all the time. For example, using the
Minimal-Default Splitting ∆-Operator from Section 5.1.2 we put
the minimal number of axioms into
• the Aspect TBoxes U0 = {τ1},U1 = {τ2},U2 = {τ7, τ9} and
• the Universal TBox with T∆ = {τ0, τ3, τ4, τ5, τ6, τ8}.
Do there exist alternative consistent Multi-View TBoxes? In
Figure 5.1 we give an example for one possible consistent Multi- From the first and
second approach
towards the third
View TBox that can be obtained from the Default TBox. Effec-
tively, the Multi-View TBox U ′0 = {τ1, τ7},U ′1 = {τ2} with the
same Universal TBox T∆ is consistent well. Yet, it does not fulfill
the properties required by Default Logics 2.5.
Considering the number of invalidated entailments, we re-
member from Section 3.4.3 that the deductive closure of the Multi-
View TBox does not contain those entailments that depend on
two axioms that happen to be in two different Aspect TBoxes. For
the Default Logics solution, we have |U0| · |U1|+ |U0| · |U2|+ |U1| ·
|U2| = 5 such pairs of axioms that might cause invalidation of
entailments. For the alternative solution there exist |U ′0| · |U ′1| = 4
such invalidating axiom pairs. It is even more interesting that the
set of invalidating axiom pairs of the Default Logics solution is a
superset of those of the alternative solution. We will refer to this
again in Chapter 9.
Consistency
We will now show that any consistent Default TBox can be trans-
formed into a consistent Multi-View TBox with two partitions
only.
118 Chapter 5. The Unsat-Splitting-∆-Operators
DT 0 DT 1T
τ5
τ8
τ0
τ1
τ3
τ2
τ4
τ7
τ9
J
Θ1
τ0
τ1
Γ1
τ3
τ2
Θ3
τ2
τ4
Γ3
τ7
T∆
τ5
τ8
U0
τ0
τ1
U1
τ3
τ2
τ4
U2
τ7
τ9
T∆
τ5
τ8
τ0
τ3
τ4
U0
τ1
U1
τ2
U2
τ7
τ9
DT 2
T∆
τ5
τ8
τ0
τ3
τ4
U0
τ1
τ7
τ9
U1
τ2
Figure 5.1: Comparison of the Splitting-∆-Operators.
Transformation of the TBox of Example 10 into a Multi-View-TBox DT 0 using the
All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator. Furthermore how DT 0 compares to a possible
solution for the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator DT 1 and transformation of
DT 1 into the Multi-View-TBox DT 2 according to the Minimal-Partitions-Splitting-
∆-Operator. The actual choice is performed according to the results presented in
Table 5.3. On the left-most column, the axioms of the TBox T are shown. Their
relation to other sets are indicated by arrows. They are connected to the second
column stating the contents of the root JUCs. The remaining columns show the
contents of the parts of the Multi-View-TBoxes DT 0, DT 1, and DT 2. Note that
the transition arrows could also go directly from T and the root JUCs to DT 1 and
DT 2.
5.2 Minimal-Partitions-Splitting-∆-Operator 119
Theorem 7. LetDT = (T∆∪U0, . . . , T∆∪UN ) be a consistent Default
TBox. Let U ′0 =
⋃
(n mod 2)=0 Un and U ′1 =
⋃
(n mod 2)=1 Un. The
Multi-View TBox DT = (T∆ ∪ U ′0, T∆ ∪ U ′1) is consistent.
Proof. We know from Lemma 2 that for a TBox T that does not
contain axioms with logical contradictions, every JUC w.r.t. T
has at least two axioms.
Example
The oracle for the Minimal-Partitions-∆-Operator can be defined
similar to the oracle of the Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator from
Section 5.1.2.∣∣ chooseThetaAxiom(Un, T∆,ΘkU v ⊥)∣∣
=
{
rand(ΘkU v ⊥) if n = 0
∅ else∣∣ chooseGammaAxiom(Un, T∆,ΓkU v ⊥)∣∣
=
{
rand(ΓkU v ⊥) if n > 0
∅ else
updateIndex(n) = (n+ 1) mod 2
The only difference lies in the update of the index function.
Instead of always creating a fresh partition, we only use the two
partitions U0 and U1 alternately. We can hence re-use the example
from Section 5.1.2, but now with a predefined number of two
partitions. The results are given in Table 5.4.
5.2.1 Arbitrary Minimal-Partitions
Giving up the semantics of Default Logics, we can give up the
strict requirements (no direct contradictions, acyclic justifications)
and, even more, obtain a consistent Multi-View TBox in any case.
Furthermore, this Multi-View TBox can be shown to only have
exactly two Aspect TBoxes:
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Theorem 8. Let T be a TBox that contains unsatisfiable concepts.
There exists a splitting-∆-operator for two aspect TBoxes U0, U1 such
that the resulting Multi-View-TBox is consistent.
The proof for Theorem 8 can be found in Appendix B.4. Here,
we will illustrate how the two Aspect TBoxes are constructed.
The main idea is to successively add exactly one axiom of each
ΘUv⊥ to U0 and exactly one axiom of each ΓUv⊥ to U1. The re-
maining axioms are then added to T∆.
5.3 Iterative Splitting-∆-Operator
Computing all root JUCs for all concepts U that are unsatisfiable
w.r.t. a TBox T is a very expensive task. In contrast to that, com-
puting just one justification for each entailment T |= U v ⊥ can
be done alongside computing the entailment. We can hence ap-Computing JUCs
on demand. ply the splitting ∆-operator to the set of the single JUC we found
so far. For a Default TBox DT ν that results from this procedure,
we bear the risk to not have resolved all root JUCs. As a conse-
quence, we have to refine the solution DT ν by computing addi-
tional justifications for the concepts that are still unsatisfiable.
5.3.1 Initial Solution
To obtain an initial solution for the Splitting ∆-operator applied
to a TBox T , we compute exactly one JUC for each concept U that
is unsatisfiable w.r.t. T . We define root JUCs as before, but on a
subset J0 of the set of all possible JUCs J0 ⊆ J . However, we
should be aware of the fact that a concept whose unsatisfiability
was derived w.r.t. J may become a root JUC w.r.t. the reduced
set of JUCs J0. This is illustrated in Example 14.
If we now apply the Splitting ∆-operator to J0 we obtain an
initial solution DT 0 = (T∆ ∪ U0, . . . , T∆ ∪ UN ). Yet, there may
exist concepts U˜ that are still unsatisfiable w.r.t. T∆ alone or w.r.t.
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T∆ ∪ Un for at least one 0 ≤ n ≤ N 1. For each of these U˜ we have
to compute one new JUC Jk1
U˜v⊥ that does not occur in J0. We add
these new k1, . . . ,K1 JUCs to J0 and perform the splitting again
on J1 = J0
⋃K1
k1
{Jk1
U˜v⊥}.
5.3.2 General Procedure
In general, we have to compute the set of concepts U˜ν that are
unsatisfiable w.r.t. DT ν−12. For each of these U˜ν , we compute
one JUC such that Jkν
U˜νv⊥ ∩ Jν−1 = ∅.
We set Jν = Jν−1
⋃Kν
kν=0
Jkν
U˜νv⊥ and determine DT ν w.r.t. Jν .
Since the number of JUCs is finite, the procedure terminates even-
tually.
5.3.3 Complexity
The number of iterations is bounded by the maximum number
of root JUCs for an non-purely derived unsatisfiable concept. We
denote this number by rmax. In the best case, the procedure finds
a solution after the first step. This is the case when for each non
purely derived unsatisfiable concept we can find a root JUC and
these cover the set of all root JUCs.
We do not have to compute all the dependent JUCs. In the
best case, we have to compute as many dependent JUCs as there
exist purely derived unsatisfiable concepts. We denote the num-
ber of partially derived unsatisfiable concepts by cpart and the
number of purely derived unsatisfiable concepts by cpure. In the
worst case, we have to compute rmax · (cpart + cpure) derived
JUCs. Computing the iterative solution, we may benefit from not
having to compute all JUCs, as a result.
1There may exist m 6= n such that both T∆ ∪ Un |= U v ⊥ and
T∆ ∪ Um |= U v ⊥, as well as T∆ |= U v ⊥ at the same time.
2We start with DT 0 = T
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5.3.4 Dependencies
Adding new JUCs to J ′ may change the dependencies of the
JUCs within J ′. Assume we add some JUC JUiv⊥ to J ′ that are
root JUCs w.r.t J . Consider all JUCs JUjv⊥ that were root JUCs
w.r.t. J ′ before adding new JUCs to J ′. If for some JUjv⊥ we
have that JUjv⊥ ⊃ JUiv⊥, then those JUjv⊥ become dependent
JUCs w.r.t. J ′ after adding new JUCs.
Assume we add some JUC JUiv⊥ to J ′ that is not a root JUC
w.r.t J . Then all JUCs that were root JUCs w.r.t. J ′ before the
adding remain to be a root unsat JUC (and not a non-root JUC)
w.r.t. J ′ after the adding.
Example 14. Assume the TBox T = {B v A,C v B,D v C,D v
¬A,B v ¬F,D v F,E v D}. Obviously, the concepts D and E are
unsatisfiable w.r.t. T with the justifications:
Θ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Γ︷ ︸︸ ︷
J1T ,Dv⊥ = { B v A,C v B } ∪ {D v C,D v ¬A}
J2T ,Dv⊥ = {B v ¬F,C v B} ∪ { D v C,D v F }
J3T ,Ev⊥ = J
1
T ,Dv⊥ ∪ { E v D }
The only root JUCs are J1T ,Dv⊥ and J
2
T ,Dv⊥. Assume we find J0 =
{J2T ,Dv⊥, J3T ,Ev⊥} as the first JUCs for C and D. So assume that
DT 1 results from applying some Splitting-∆-Operator. Depending on
the Splitting-∆-Operator, the resulting Default TBox DT 0 can entail
D v ⊥, but does not have to.
Assume that applying a Splitting-∆-Operator U0 contains the axiom
C v B and U1 contains D v C. This is, for example, the case for the
All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator. Then for each root JUC one axiom
is already contained in one of the partitions. Hence DT 0 is consistent.
Both root JUCs mask each other, so we are able to solve both by solving
just one. Note that we do not even compute J1T ,Dv⊥ in that case.
Assume now that we applied a Splitting-∆-Operator such that neither
U0 contains the axiom C v B nor U1 contains D v C. This can be,
for example, the case when applying the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-
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∆-Operator to T . We find that none of the axioms of J1T ,Dv⊥ is con-
tained in any partition. Hence, J1T ,Dv⊥ ⊆ T∆ and T∆ |= D v ⊥.
SinceDT 0 6|= E v ⊥, we just have to compute another JUC for D. We
obtain J1 = J0 ∪ {J1T ,Cv⊥}. We now update the partitions and get a
consistent DT 1.
Since we compute possibly not all JUCs, the Unsat-Splitting
cannot be used to determine the candidates for the n-th parti-
tion Un. We might not be able to determine concepts that are
unsatisfiable w.r.t T \ ⋃n−1m=0 Um anymore. This is illustrated by
Example 15.
Example 15. Assume that we extended the TBox of Example 14 by the
following axioms: T = T ∪ {E v B,E v F,G v E}. Obviously, the
concept G is unsatisfiable w.r.t. T . Besides the JUCs from Example 14
we have some additional JUCs:
Θ︷ ︸︸ ︷ Γ︷ ︸︸ ︷
J4T ,Ev⊥ = {B v ¬F,C v B,D v C} ∪ {E v D,E v F}
J5T ,Ev⊥ = { B v ¬F } ∪ {E v B,E v F }
J6T ,Gv⊥ = J
3
T ,Ev⊥ ∪ { G v E }
J7T ,Gv⊥ = J
4
T ,Ev⊥ ∪ { G v E }
J8T ,Gv⊥ = J
5
T ,Ev⊥ ∪ { G v E }
The root JUCs are J1T ,Dv⊥, J
2
T ,Dv⊥, J
4
T ,Ev⊥, and J
5
T ,Ev⊥.
Assume we find J0 = {J2T ,Dv⊥, J3T ,Ev⊥, J5T ,Ev⊥, J6T ,Gv⊥} as
the first JUCs for D, E and G. We further assume that DT 1 results
from applying some Splitting-∆-Operator. The splitting operator does
not determine the unsatisfiability of concepts correctly w.r.t. J0
Axiom E v D is not contained in any justification in J0. It is
contained in Θ6T ,Gv⊥, but not part of any Γ-set w.r.t. J0. Hence, it
can be contained in U0. On the other hand, E v D is contained in a
Γ-set w.r.t. J . Indeed, E v D ∈ Γ3T ,Ev⊥, but we have not yet even
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computed the corresponding JUC J3T ,Ev⊥. Furthermore, it is possible
that DT 0 |= E v ⊥, because we may have not solved the root JUC
J4T ,Ev⊥.
Example 15 shows that the iterative procedure can provide
us with partitions whose contents must be changed in the iter-
ations that follow. As a consequence, we have to possibly re-
compute the partitions in each iteration. The whole procedure
is illustrated by Algorithm 5. We have to determine and man-
age information for those concepts that are unsatisfiable w.r.t.
T \⋃n−1m=0 Um when computing the partitions. The Unsat-Splitting
on the incomplete set of JUC J cannot provide this information
anymore.
5.4 Solutions In Between
Instead of going to the extremes, i.e. either adding all or just
one axiom from each of the splitting sets to the Aspect TBoxes,
other choices are possible as well. Even cyclic justifications can
be solved by transforming the incoherent TBox T to a Multi-View
TBox DT . Yet, it cannot be guaranteed that DT is consistent.
What makes the approach attractive then?
In the case of acyclic incoherent TBoxes it may be desirable to
prevent certain entailments from being invalidated. We can start
with a solution from one of the approaches above and refine it to
meet some pre-defined constraints. Assume that, in Example 2,
we had the constraint to preserve the entailment that penguins
are flying animals, i. e. Penguin v FlyingAnimal. We cannot
add this as an axiom, because this would lead to a direct con-
tradiction. However, the Multi-View TBox with the following
Aspect TBoxes is consistent:
U0 = {Penguin v Bird,Bird v FlyingAnimal}
U1 = {Penguin v ¬FlyingAnimal}
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Algorithm 5 Iterative Splitting-∆-Operator.
Function:
DT ← computeMultiV iewTBoxIterative(
T ,Θ0Uv⊥,Γ0Uv⊥. . . . ,ΘKUv⊥,ΓKUv⊥,∆)
Input:
1. TBox T
2. Splitting sets Θ0Uv⊥,Γ
0
Uv⊥. . . . ,Θ
K
Uv⊥,Γ
K
Uv⊥)
3. ∆-Operator
Output:
DT : Consistent Default TBox ,
J : Dependency graph for JUCs
1: DT 0 ← 〈T 〉 J−1 ← ∅ ν = 0
2:
3: while DT ν is not consistent do
4: // Take all JUCs computed so far.
5: Jν+1 ← Jν
6: // Compute all concepts that are unsatisfiable
7: // w.r.t. the current Default TBox.
8: Ω← {U | U ∈ sig(DT ν) ∧ DT ν |= U v ⊥}
9:
10: for U ∈ Ω do
11: // Compute one new justification for each concept
12: // that is unsatisfiable w.r.t. the current Default TBox.
13: Jν ← Jν ∪ {JDT |=Uv⊥} such that
14: Jν−1 ∩ {JDT |=Uv⊥} = ∅
15: end for
16:
17: // Compute new Default TBox by applying the ∆-operator to
18: // all the already computed JUCs.
19: DT ν+1 ← ∆(
⋃
JDT ν |=Uv⊥∈Jν JDT ν |=Uv⊥)
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20: // Update new Default TBox by adding all those axioms to T∆
21: // that do not occur in any of the already computed JUCs.
22: T∆ν+1 ← T∆ν+1 ∪
(
T \ ⋃JDT ν |=Uv⊥∈Jν JDT ν |=Uv⊥)
23:
24: ν ← ν + 1
25: end while
26:
27: // Set the last Default TBox and all the computed
28: // JUCs as the result.
29: DT ← DT ν−1 J ← Jν−1
It is interesting to note that we, indeed, transformed all ax-
ioms of the root JUCs, yet we cannot apply Default Logics entail-
ment.
A proposal for an implementation of this approach is made
by Algorithm 6. It makes non-deterministic choices that might
result in inconsistent Multi-View TBoxes. Nevertheless, once the
root JUCs are known this can be done by a series of set opera-
tions, i.e. checking that at least two axioms of each root JUC are
contained in either U0 or U1. Because it is unclear what strategy
the choice shall follow, we did, however, not investigate this al-
gorithm further and leave it for future work.
5.5 The Splitting-∆-operator on Lattices
For DL TBoxes, lattices can be used to define monotone prop-
erties on sets of axioms such as concept subsumption hierarchy
(i.e. TBox classification) or concept unsatisfiability. In the follow-
ing we show how lattices can be used to encode solutions to the
Unsat-Splitting ∆-Operator.
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5.5.1 Default TBox Lattice
We can use lattices to encode the partitions of a Default TBox T .
We know from Section 2.2 that the set of all monotone Boolean
functions over a finite set of propositional variables P encodes
a distributive lattice BT . According to [Pen˜aloza, 2009] we can
build a homomorphism that transforms BT to another lattice L
where we can define weights α on axioms. Those weights are
specified by a labeling function lab : T → Z. The homomorphism
can be defined in such a way that the property for the pinpointing
formula is preserved on the lattice L. Furthermore, we can define
a border on the lattice such that certain properties follow only
from axioms that have a weight greater or than a given value for
these properties.
Assume the Default TBoxDT that originates from T and con-
sists of the partitions U0, . . . ,UN and the Universal TBox T∆. We
can define the following set of properties:
Pn =
{
B v A ∈ T \
n−1⋃
m=0
Um |
(
T∆ ∪
N⋃
m=n
Um
)
|= A uB
}
In that sense, Pn encodes all those axioms which belong to a
partition Un. We label all axioms in Pn by n. All axioms t ∈ T∆
are assigned the label lab(t) = −1. By considering only axioms of
level n, we effectively have to restrict ourselves to the sub-lattice
formed by the axioms from T \⋃n−1m=0 Um. According to the defini-
tion of partitions in Lehmann’s Default Logics (cf Section 2.5), the
minimal set of axioms that satisfy this property are the axioms in
Un ∪ T∆. Furthermore, this property is still satisfied by adding
axioms t>n with a label greater than n, although the axioms t>n
do not fulfill the property:
(T1, I) ∈ Pn ⇒ ∀T2 ⊃ T1 : (T2, I) ∈ Pn
Hence each property Pn is a monotone property w.r.t.
(T \ ⋃n−1m=0 Um, I). As stated in Pen˜aloza [2009], once we com-
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puted the pinpointing formula for all unsatisfiable concepts, then
computing different partitions can be restricted to finding an-
other labeling function lab for the axioms in T .
As a result, we can consider the problem of finding a solution
for the Minimal Unsat-Splitting ∆-operator for a TBox T as find-
ing a homomorphism from the lattice BT of monotone Boolean
formulas over P to a weighed lattice L. Yet, the central challenge
is still finding the pinpointing formula—or in other words find-
ing the set of all JUCs.
Algorithm 6 Computing an alternative solution.
Input:
1. Minimal-Split Multi-View TBox DT = (U0 ∪ T∆,U1 ∪ T∆),
2. K Root JUCs JkUv⊥ for k = 0, . . . ,K
Output:
Transformed Default TBox DT ′
1: repeat
2: // Choose Aspect TBox to change
3: choose Uchange ∈ {U0,U1}
4:
5: // Pick up axiom at random
6: choose α ∈ Uchange
7:
8: // Determine root JUCs that contain α
9: J ← {JkUv⊥|α ∈ JkUv⊥}
10:
11: // choose one root JUC to change
12: choose Jk0U0v⊥ ∈ J
13:
14: // choose axiom to exchange ( transforms DT → DT ′)
15: choose α from Jk0U0v⊥
16:
17: until DT ′ is consistent or no more choices possible

Part III
Evaluation

6
Finding Optimal
Solutions
The Splitting-∆-Operators with potential minimal loss of implicit
information are non-deterministic. Depending on the perfor-
mance measure there may exist a single global optimum. Yet,
there does not exist a general rule for computing such a global
optimum—besides the brute-force approach of computing all pos-
sible solutions, which is not feasible for large ontologies. Com-
puting some solution is, in contrast, relatively cheap. Hence, we
propose to approximate the global optimum by starting with a
initial solution which is successively improved.
Note that we do not provide an actual implementation of an
optimization strategy such as Simulated Annealing or genetic
algorithms. Instead, we investigate whether it would actually
make sense to apply such an optimization strategy, in general.
Plan of This Chapter
The formal foundations for choices and solutions are introduced
in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2 we introduce an entropy measure
for judging the quality of solutions.
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6.1 Choices and Solutions
According to Theorem 4, a Splitting-∆-operator produces a co-
herent Multi-View-TBox as a result. In Chapter 5 we defined twoFormalizing the
way axioms are
chosen.
of those operators, each of which relies upon a non-deterministic
choice function. We have to specify this choice function in order
to obtain a solution for those Splitting-∆-Operators.
6.1.1 Unique Choices for Minimal-Defaults-
Splitting-∆-operator
As can be seen from Algorithm 1, the choices being made locally
influence the overall or global choice. We hence define the choice
function locally and globally.
Definition 21. Let T be a TBox and DT = (T∆ ∪ U0, . . . , T∆ ∪ UN )
be a Multi-View TBox. Let JkUv⊥ be the k = 0, . . . ,K JUCs for T .
Then the function ck : JkUv⊥ → {T∆,U0, . . . ,UN} is called the local
choice for DT w.r.t. the JUC JkUv⊥.
The family of local choices (ck)Kk=0 defines the global choice for DT
w.r.t all JUCs for T .
Neither a local choice nor a global choice happens to be an in-
jective function. Two axioms from JkUv⊥ may be mapped to the
same set, either T∆ or one of Un. There do not have to exist map-
pings to all of these sets for a local choice. Hence local choices are
not even surjective. In contrast to that, the global choice indeed
is surjective, because neither T∆ nor one of Un is allowed to be
empty but all of them have to contain elements from JUCs. We
may define the inverse local choice c¯k (and similarly also the in-
verse global choice) which tells us from what JUCs some axiom
was chosen from. in the sequel, we refer to global choices simply
as choices.
The following lemma states that not only a choice is defined
by a Multi-View TBox but that, for the Splitting-∆-Operator, each
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choice defines a unique solution. This is an important property
when we want to apply optimization techniques that require to
be able to slightly change the current solution. Solutions are com- Unique solutions
puted by computing choices. If we change the choice a bit, then
we require the corresponding solution to be unique.
Lemma 9. Let T be a TBox and JkUv⊥ be the k = 0, . . . ,K JUCs
for T . Each Multi-View TBox DT that is a solution for the Minimal-
Splitting ∆-operator corresponds to exactly one choice.
Proof. Assume there existed two different global choices
(ck)
K
k=0 and (dk)
K
k=0 for a Multi-View TBoxDT resulting from the
Minimal-Splitting ∆-Operator applied to some TBox T . Since the
choices are different, they must differ in one of their local choices.
Let ck and dk be one of the local choices in which (ck)Kk=0 and
(dk)
K
k=0 differ. By definition, ck maps all axioms of the JUC J
k
Uv⊥
to either T∆ or one of Un. Since ck and dk differ, there must exist
one axiom α such that ck(α) 6= dk(α). By definition T∆ ∪ Un = ∅
for all Un.
The only possibility for which ck(α) 6= dk(α) is ck(α) = Um
and dk(α) = Un or vice versa for m 6= n. By definition Un 6= Um
for m 6= n, but α ∈ Um and α ∈ Un leading to a contradiction.
Hence, every solution for the Minimal-Splitting-∆-Operator uniquely
corresponds to exactly one choice and vice versa.
6.1.2 Mutating Choices for the Minimal-Defaults-
Splitting-∆-operator
If we computed one solution DT 0, is it possible to change this
solution a little bit such that the result DT 1 is a valid solution,
as well? In other words, given choice (ck)Kk=0, and changing the
local choice ck, what is the resulting global choice (dk)Kk=0?
For considering this question, it is helpful to think of the space
of all possible choices as a tree with edges e and nodes v. Every
edge ei stands for a set of choices ck and no choice must occur
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more than once on a path. The collection of choices on any path
from the root to a leaf node must contain all local choices for
k = 0, . . . ,K. A node v can be interpreted in two different ways:
(i) If v is the starting node of an edge e, then v consists of the
Θ-sets of the root JUCs JkUv⊥ that correspond the to choices
ck that are aligned to the edge.
(ii) If v is the ending node of an edge e, then v consists of the
Γ-sets of the root JUCs JkUv⊥ that correspond the to choices
ck that are aligned to the edge.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the possible choices for Example 10.
For mutating a local choice cki for a global choice (ck)Kk=0 we
first determine the starting node of the edge ck occurs in. From
this node we backtrack towards the root until we find a nodeHow to compute
new states from
old ones.
v which has more than one child node, i.e. more than one pos-
sibility for making local choices. In case v is the root node, we
cannot make another choice. Otherwise, we choose one of the
child nodes of v and choose a path to a leaf node. We, thereby,
must take into account that we change more local choices than
only the local choice ck. The procedure is, however, also non-
deterministic but leads to a valid solution.
6.1.3 Mutating Arbitrary Choices
As could be seen in Section 5.4, there exist valid solutions be-
sides the ones produced by the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-
Operator. We may mutate any global choice (ck)Kk=0 that refers to
a valid solution to another global choice (dk)Kk=0. However, if we
do not enforce the new choice to meet the criteria of the Minimal-
Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator or the Default ∆-Operator, then
we must perform a validity-check for the new global choice. In
particular, we have to check whether the requirements for an ar-
bitrary ∆-Operator are still fulfilled (cf Definition 17):
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Figure 6.1: The two possible choices for Example 10 repre-
sented as tree. The edges are labeled by the set of root JUCs
whose local choices are represented by this edge.
ROOT τ1
τ2
τ3 τ2
τ7 τ9
{J1Cv⊥}
{J1Cv⊥}
{J3DuCv⊥}
For each root JUC two axioms have to be contained in two dif-
ferent Aspect TBoxes, and no root JUC is contained in any of the
Aspect TBoxes.
6.2 Qualitative (Default) TBox Assessment
So far we took the number of axioms in the finite deductive clo-
sure of a Default TBox for comparing its quality w.r.t. the TBox is
was created from. In the presence of an ABox, choosing the De-
fault TBox with the finite deductive closure that preserves most
entailments w.r.t. original TBox may be a false friend. Simply
counting the number of entailments we do not take into account
the impact of the preserved and lost entailments.
6.2.1 Conflicts for ∆(T )
Even though we invalidated entailments of the form
U v ⊥, the axioms that caused the contradiction in the origi-
nal TBox T are still present in ∆(T ). Yet, one possible reason
for concepts to be entailed unsatisfiable is when T entails both
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U v D and U v ¬D. For classical entailment these axioms are
semantically equivalent to U v D u ¬D, and hence U v ⊥ is a
logical consequence for T .
This semantic equivalence is not valid w.r.t. a Splitting-Semantic
equivalence
under the Splitting
∆-Operator ∆(T ) and its entailment relationship |=. In general,
the axioms D v C and D v E are not semantically equivalent to
D v C u E. We give an example for this:
Example 16 (Disjunction of axioms in a Multi-View TBox).
Consider the TBox T = {B v A,C v B,D v C,D v ¬A}. Apply-
ing the Minimal-Defaults ∆-Operator we obtain four possible Default
TBoxes:
T 0∆ U00 U01
DT 0 D v C,B v A C v B D v ¬A
DT 1 D v ¬A,B v A C v B D v C
DT 2 D v C,C v B B v A D v ¬A
DT 3 D v ¬A,C v B B v A D v C
According to |=, each of these Multi-View TBoxes entails ax-
ioms that would refer to a contradiction under classical entail-
ment |=. We have that DT 0 |= both axioms D v A and D v ¬A.
The first is a logical consequence of T 0∆ ∪U00 , the latter is a logical
consequence of T 0∆ ∪ U01 .1 For each of the solutions there exists
at least one such conflict, yet there exist solutions with even two
conflicts:
DT 0 |= {D v A,D v ¬A,D v B,D v ¬B}
DT 1 |= {D v A,D v ¬A}
DT 2 |= {D v C,D v ¬C}
DT 3 |= {D v B,D v ¬B,D v C,D v ¬C}
1Note that for a View we defined classical entailment.
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Definition 22 (Conflicts). Let DT be a consistent Multi-View TBox
and U,D be concepts in the signature ofDT . We say thatDT contains
the conflict C = {U v D,U v ¬D}, if DT |= C.
Minimizing the number of invalidated entailments may be
suboptimal w.r.t. the conflicts that are contained in a solution to
the Splitting-∆-Operator. In Example 16, the finite deductive clo- Minimizing
conflictssure of the Multi-View TBoxesDT 0 andDT 3 contains one axiom
(in particular eight axioms for each closure) more than the clo-
sures of DT 1 and DT 2 (seven axioms each). On the other hand,
each of them contains one conflict more than the other two.
In Example 16, each conflict refers to a concept that is unsat-
isfiable w.r.t. the original TBox T . While we leave a proof for the
general case for future work, we assume that this is the case for
any conflict when we apply a Splitting-∆-Operator ∆(T ).
Since conflicts may confuse agents communicating with a
Multi-View TBox, we propose to prefer solutions with a mini-
mal number of conflicts. We just learned that even for a simple
Multi-View TBox like in Example 16, the choice might be non-
deterministic when we only have TBox axioms at hand. In real-
life applications, data exists in the form of instances.
In the presence of data, choosing the appropriate solution
depends on the data. Instance-conflicts hence occur when the
sub-concept of the axioms involved in a conflict are asserted in-
stances. We hence need a qualitative measure that takes into ac-
count the instance-conflicts as well as the amount of information
that is lost when certain entailments are not valid anymore.
6.2.2 Shannon Entropy
In computer science, information content is measured in terms
of the Shannon entropy [Shannon, 1948]. More precisely, it is a
measure of the average information content of a random vari-
able we are missing when the value of the random variable is
not known. The entropyH of a discrete random variable X with
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possible values x0, . . . , xN is defined as the expected value E of
the information content I of X : H = E(I(X)). The information
content I is a random variable as well. If we know the probabil-
ity mass function p of the random variable X , we may explicitly
denote the entropy by:
H(X) = −
N∑
n=0
p(xn) logb p(xn)
In case p(xn) = 0, we have that p(xn) logb p(xn) = 0. The base
b of the logarithm determines the unit in which the information
content is measured. In computer science the information con-
tent is measured in in bits, so we use b = 2, as a result. We omit
the subscript and simply write log p(xn).
6.2.3 Entropy for Sets of Axioms
Existing approaches evaluating the information content of a TBox
using entropy-based measures are not suitable for our case. These
approaches want to evaluate a modularized ontology, i.e. they
assess how well the modules are independent sub-units of the
original ontology. Furthermore, they work on the axioms of the
TBox rather than on the deductive closure. Both does not hold
for our case.
Structural Entropy
Structural entropy measures like presented in Doran et al. [2009]
define the probability mass function w.r.t. the RDF-graph rep-
resentation of an OWL-ontology. While these measures can be
computed without having to perform reasoning, they may fail
in preferring solutions with less conflicts and, even more signifi-
cant, with fewer invalidated entailments.
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Example 17 (Entropy). Assume the simple TBox from Example 16.
According to [Doran et al., 2009], the probability mass function for the
entropy is the normalized count of the number of outgoing edges from
a node. This is equal to all elements of both DT 0 and DT 1. As a result
the solutions do not differ w.r.t. the language level entropy.
The structural entropy measure fails to prefer solutions with
fewer conflicts, because detecting the conflict relies upon at least
one implicit entailment. The entailment is implicit, because we
required to not have direct contradictions. As as result, any pro-
cedure that prefers solutions with fewer conflicts has to perform
inference on potential solutions for ∆(T ), i.e. on Multi-View
TBoxes.
ABox Entropy
Different from the approach that defines entropy on concept level,
we define the entropy on axiom level directly. In our case, the
random variables are TBox axioms whose information content is An entropy
measure for
assessing
solutions.
determined by the number of ABox instances that satisfy the ax-
iom. In our view, the entropy of a TBox is always to be seen in
the context of a non-empty ABox.
Before we can define the entropy of a TBox we have to first de-
fine how axioms can be treated as random variables. In the con-
text of an ABox A, we want to assign an axiom B v A a higher
probability the more individuals from A satisfy it. We remember
from Section 2.1 that axiom satisfiability, i.e. T |= B v A, can be
rewritten as T |= > v ¬B unionsq A. Hence, we define the probability
of an axiom by counting the number of individuals occurring in
an ABoxA that can be asserted to the complex concept (¬BunionsqA).
For a TBox T let C be the set of all left-hand-sides and all right-
hand-sides of all axioms of T as well as their complement. We
introduce the auxiliary indicator function IA : C × AI → {0, 1}
such that for C ∈ C and x ∈ AI it holds that I(C, x) = 1, if
A |= C(x) w.r.t. T and 0 else. The indicator function states
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whether a concept assertion is in the deductive closure of an
ABox A or not. It helps us defining the probability mass func-
tion for TBox axioms:
Definition 23. Let T be a TBox and A be an ABox. The probability
mass function for an axiom B v A ∈ T w.r.t. A is defined as
pA(B v A) =
∑
x∈AI I(¬B unionsqA;x)∑
DvC∈T
∑
y∈AI I(¬D unionsq C; y)
To determine this probability mass function, we have to com-
pute for all axioms B v A ∈ T the number of assertions to A
and ¬B that are logical consequences w.r.t. T and A. We denote
these numbers by nA and n¬B and observe that we can compute∑
x∈(A)I I(¬B unionsqA;x) = max{nA, n¬B}.
The entropy of a TBox T w.r.t. an ABox A is then defined as
HA(T ) = −
∑
BvA∈(T )
pA(B v A) log pA(B v A)
Our notion of entropy does not have to be restricted to TBoxes.
Indeed we require that deterministic ABox reasoning is possible
w.r.t. the set of axioms on which the entropy is defined. We can
define the entropy for Multi-View TBoxes in the same way. This,
in turn, allows us to assess Multi-View TBoxes DT by a qualita-
tive measure that takes into account its information content w.r.t.
an instantiation in the form of an ABox A.
For the Multi-View TBoxes of Example 16 we obtain the fol-
lowing entropies for an ABox that asserts each concept a different
individual:
HA(DT 0) = 23.23
HA(DT 1) = 25.48
HA(DT 2) = 19.07
HA(DT 3) = 25.48
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The result with minimal entropy has a minimal number of con-
flicts. However, we should note that the other solution with mini-
mal conflicts has a relatively high entropy value. The disjointness
axioms D v ¬C and D v ¬B are logical consequences of DT 1
but not of DT 2. Similarly, the subclass-inclusion axioms D v B
and D v A are logical consequences for DT 2 but not for DT 1.
The more disjoint axioms the more assertions to the comple-
ment of a concept are logical consequences of a TBox. Since nega-
tion is necessary (but not sufficient) for conflicts we, in general,
assume that solutions with fewer disjoints are preferable. We fur-
ther assume that the entropy increases when asserting individu-
als both a concept and its complement are valid logical conse-
quences.
6.2.4 Complexity
The overall complexity of computing the entropy for a single
solution requires checking satisfiability of assertions to the sub-
concept and the super-concept for each axiom in the TBox. This
number is bounded by 2 · |T |. In real-world ontologies, this num-
ber is expected to be significantly lower, because a concept, re-
spective its complement, usually occur in more than one axiom
either as sub-concept or as super-concept. Anyway, we have to
perform a number of concept memberships that is linear in the
number of axioms in the TBox.
6.2.5 Compromise Solutions
If we accept to potentially invalidate more entailments we can get
rid of conflicts as defined in Definition 22. We therefore limit the
non-deterministic choice of the Minimal-Splitting-∆-Operator to
Θ-axioms whereas we always choose all Γ-axioms.
If we change the choice accordingly, then the resulting
Multi-View TBox contains no conflicts. Let DT be a consistent
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Default Multi-View TBox and C = {U v D,U v ¬D} be a con-
flict w.r.t. DT . We can assume without loss of generality that
there exists a root JUC JkT ,Uv⊥ for U v ⊥ w.r.t. T ,2 such thatInvalidation vs
conflicts JkT ,Uv⊥ |= C. Since all Γ-axioms for JkT ,Uv⊥ are chosen for a par-
tition Un and at least one corresponding Θ-axiom is part of a par-
tition Um with m < n, we invalidate JkT ,Uv⊥. As a consequence,
we invalidate a justification for U v D or U v ¬D w.r.t. DT .
There may indeed exist more than one justification that corre-
sponds to the conflict. Invalidating these by the Unsat-Splitting
we do so for all justifications for U v D or U v ¬D (or both)
w.r.t. the Views of DT . Hence, at most one of the axioms of a po-
tential conflict can be a logical consequence of DT . As a result,
DT cannot contain any conflict as defined by Definition 22. The
drawback is that we potentially invalidate more entailments.
2If this was not the case, then there would exist a root JUC for a super-concept
of U .
7
Experimental Results
In order to empirically evaluate the Splitting-∆-Operator we per-
formed tests on several publicly available ontologies. One of the
performance measures for the evaluations is the number of in-
ferences that are lost w.r.t. the original TBox. In Section 7.2 we
show how to approximate the deductive closure of a TBox that
has unsatisfiable concepts.
Plan of This Chapter
The first evaluation in Section 7.3 aims towards a principal as-
sessment of the two Splitting-∆-Operators compared to the Diag-
nosis-∆-Operators w.r.t. the number of inferences that we will
loose in the best and in the worst case. The second evaluation,
subject to Section 7.4, was performed according to the optimiza-
tion strategy presented in Section 6.2.
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7.1 Specifications
We will now provide information about the ontologies used for
the experiments, as well as about the software that we used and
the software that we implemented. Finally, we give information
about the hardware on which we ran the experiments.
Ontologies
For the experiments, we used a set of ontologies that have been
and still are widely used in the literature for Ontology Repair
[Kalyanpur et al., 2005; Horridge et al., 2008; Shchekotykhin and
Friedrich, 2010].1 Some Statistics about these ontologies can be
found in Table 7.1. Statistics about the number of unsatisfiable
concepts and justifications can be found in Table 7.2.
Software
For computing justifications we used the black-box approach de-
scribed in Kalyanpur et al. [2005]. All experiments were per-
formed using the Pellet OWL 2 reasoner [Sirin et al., 2007], ver-
sion 2.2.0, and the Manchester OWL API [Horridge and Bech-
hofer, 2008], version 3.0.
We implemented the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator as
well as the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator and full On-
tology Repair. For computing all possible solutions to the latter
two approaches we used a stack based approach that performs a
depth-first search.
The software is available at WSL 2 and licensed under the
GNU Public License (GPL) version 3.0.3
1http://www.mindswap.org/ontologies/debugging/
2http://www.wsl.ch/info/mitarbeitende/scharren/owl-defaults/
3http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.txt
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Ontology Chemical Economy MiniTambis SWEET
Expr. ALCHF(D) ALCH(D) ALCN ALCHOF(D)
Profile OWL 2 DL OWL 2 OWL2 —
RBox 4 3 0 10
TBox 110 577 173 2216
ABox 0 1045 0 353
GCI 0 0 0 1
Concepts 48 339 183 1537
Obj. Prop. 45 44 102
Data Prop. 8 0 19
Ann. Prop. 2 0 2
Indiv. 0 482 0 150
Ontology Terrorism Transport Travel
Expr. ALCHI(D) ALCH(D) SOIN (D)
Profile OWL 2 OWL 2 DL OWL 2 DL
RBox 52 5 1
TBox 449 926 73
ABox 424 226 20
GCI 0 0 0
Concepts 100 445 35
Obj. Prop. 132 89 6
Data Prop. 91 4 4
Ann. Prop. 2 2 2
Indiv. 86 183 14
Table 7.1: Ontologies used for the experiments. For each on-
tology, we list its expressive power and—if matching—the corre-
sponding OWL 2 profile. We also provide the number of axioms
and assertions in the RBox, in the TBox and in the ABox. In addi-
tion to that we state how many axioms of these are GCIs. Besides
the axiomatic information, we show the number of atomic con-
cepts, the number of object and data properties, and the number
of named individuals.
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Ontology Chemical Economy MiniTambis SWEET
# JUC 282 67 46 1
max size 11 6 13 13
med size 8 4 8 13
min size 5 3 2 13
# root JUC 7 48 6 1
(2%) (70%) (13%) (100%)
max size 6 5 6 13
med size 5 3 5 13
min size 5 3 2 13
Ontology Terrorism Transport Travel
# JUC 24 127 1
max size 6 9 3
med size 4 5 3
min size 3 3 3
# root JUC 6 38 1
(25%) (30%) (100%)
max size 4 9 3
med size 3 4 3
min size 3 3 3
Table 7.2: Results for the justifications and the root justifications
for the unsatisfiable concepts of the ontologies of Table 7.1.
Hardware
All experiments were performed on a machine with eight
Intel R©Xeon R©cores X5570 with 2.93GHz with 80GB RAM. Since
we did not optimize for runtime, these numbers are solely pre-
sented for the sake of completeness.
7.2 Finite Deductive Closure
We learned in Section 2.1 that the deductive closure for a TBox
is infinite. Since we are able to only compute a finite set of ax-
ioms, we define the finite deductive closure (T )+ for a TBox T
7.2 Finite Deductive Closure 149
as the union of certain logical consequences for concepts in the
signature of T :
Added condition that D must also be in the signature.
Definition 24 (Finite Deductive Closure). Let T be a TBox. The
finite deductive closure of T , denoted by T + is defined as follows:
(T )+ = (SCT )+ ∪ (EQT )+ ∪ (DCT )+
(SCT )+ =
⋃
D∈sig(T )
{D v C | T |= D v C ∧ C,D ∈ sig(T )}
(EQT )+=
⋃
D∈sig(T )
{D ≡ C | T |= D ≡ C ∧ C,D ∈ sig(T )}
(DCT )+=
⋃
D∈sig(T )
{D v ¬C|T |= D v ¬C ∧ C,D ∈ sig(T )}
Computing the above logical consequences for concepts in
the signature of T only causes (T )+ to be finite. Since a TBox Interesting
entailmentsis a finite set of axioms, its signature must be finite, too. Let C
be an arbitrary concept. Hence, the number of concepts from
sig(T ) that do or do not subsume Cor are equivalent to C is fi-
nite. Hence (SCT )+, (DCT )+, and (EQT )+ are finite, and so
must be (T )+. As a result, we have that T ⊆ (T )+ ⊂ (T )?.
The concept subsumption hierarchy for an unsatisfiable con-
cept U w.r.t. a TBox T might not be determinable. According to
the OWL 2 Direct Semantics [Horrocks et al., 2009], for each con-
cept C in the signature of a TBox T it is implicitly assumed that
T |= ⊥ v C. In case of an unsatisfiable concept U we have that
T |= U v ⊥, and hence T |= U ≡ ⊥. This, in turn, implies that
T |= U v C for any concept C in the signature of T .
Although the above axioms are valid entailments for T , we
are rather interested in those parts of the concept hierarchy that
are not inferred because of the contradiction. This issue is illus-
trated by Example 4 (cf Section 2.1). We admit that this position
is arguable, but we think that the intention behind a concept hier-
archy is not to consider entailments that are caused by a conflict.
150 Chapter 7. Experimental Results
To only have the favored inferences in the deductive closure
of a TBox T that has unsatisfiable concepts, we redefine the de-
ductive closure on basis of the Diagnosis-∆-Operator. Let D be a
diagnosis for T . By definition, ∆(T ) = T \D and T \D 6|= C v ⊥
for any C in the signature of T . Hence ∆(T ) is a regular, coher-
ent TBox, and (∆(T ))+ can be computed in the usual way using
classical inference. We compute all diagnoses for T , compute the
finite deductive closure for each corresponding ∆(T ) and take
the union of these finite deductive closures as the preferred deduc-
tive closure (T )×.
Definition 25 (Preferred Deductive Closure). Let D0, . . . ,DD be
all possible diagnoses for a TBox T . Let ∆d be the Diagnosis-∆-Operators
for which ∆dT = T \ Dd for 0 ≤ d ≤ D. The preferred deductive
closure of T is defined as T × = ⋃Dd=0(∆d(T ))+.
Note that there can be exponentially many diagnoses in the
number of axioms in the root JUCs for T . Hence, computing
(T )× is possible only for small TBoxes. Table 7.3 shows the num-
ber of possible diagnoses for the ontologies used in the experi-
ments.
7.3 Comparison of Finite
Deductive Closures
In order to assess the quality of the Defaults-Splitting-∆-Oper-
ators, we evaluated the All-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator
(Section 5.1.1), the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator
(Section 5.1.2) and the Diagnosis-∆-Operator (Section 3.3.1) w.r.t.
ontologies from Table 7.1. The performance measure for this
experiment was the number of entailments that we loose w.r.t.
the approximated deductive closure when applying the corre-
sponding ∆-Operators. While the solution for the All-Defaults-
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Splitting-∆-Operator is unique, we present only the best result
for the Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-Operator.
Let T be a TBox and let (∆i(T ))+ be the deductive closure
when applying the operator ∆i. We measure the number of en-
tailments that we loose when applying ∆i to T by δi = |(T )+ \
(∆i(T ))+|. A ∆-Operator ∆i is considered better than a ∆-Oper-
ator ∆j , if δi > δj . In case δi = δj , they are considered to perform
equally well.
Ontology Repair is the most commonly used technique for
solving unsatisfiable concepts. We hence compare the results of
both Splitting-∆-Operators with the best Diagnosis-∆-Operator.4
Since we have to compute all Diagnosis-∆-Operators for the ap-
proximation of the deductive closure of the TBox anyway, we get
this result for free.
We computed the results for the All-Defaults-, the best Mini-
mal-Defaults- and the best Diagnosis-∆-Operator by δall, δsgl and
δr, respectively.
Results
We compare the finite deductive closures in two ways. First we
compute the size of the deductive closure for the best solution for
both the Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator and for the Diagnosis-∆-
Operator. Sine for the All-Defaults-∆-Operator there exists only
one solution, we take this solution as the reference. Second, we
compare the deductive closures of the optimal solutions for all
approaches to see whether the invalidated inferences differ. The
results are shown in Table 7.3.
When comparing the best diagnosis solution with the best
mini-mal-defaults solution, the number of entailments invalidated
is always lower using the latter approach, for all ontologies. The
4We should note that we performed a full repair, i.e. we removed whole ax-
ioms.
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number of invalidated entailments varies more for the single di-
agnoses and not so much for the Minimal-Defaults approach.
There exists a large number of possible diagnosis solutions
compared to only a few for the Minimal-Defaults approach.
We also compare the results of the different approaches w.r.t.
the inferences in which their finite deductive closures differ. The
Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator never invalidates any inference that
the All-Defaults-∆-Operator preserves.
The best Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator always performs bet-
ter than the best solution of the Diagnosis-∆-Operator.5 For all
solutions we found that the set of invalidated inferences and the
set of preserved inferences differ always. The Diagnosis-∆-Operator
outperforms the All-Defaults-∆-Operator in all cases but for the
the TERRORISM ontology.6
In most of the cases the Minimal-Defaults approach as well
as the Diagnosis Approach have a unique optimal solution re-
garding the number of inferences invalidated. This is, however,
not true for the Chemical ontology for which there exist several
solutions that are optimal in the aforementioned sense.7
7.4 Optimizing the Splitting-∆-Operator
In order to determine optimal solutions for the Minimal-De-faults-
Splitting-∆-Operator, we performed an empirical evaluation for
the entropy-based performance measure presented in Section 6.2.
We used the ontologies listed in Table 7.1. For the ontologies
present we could compute all possible solutions and did hence
not apply stochastic search.
For each ontology, we computed the entropy in two ways.
First, we defined an artificial ABox A˜ such that each concept in
the signature of the TBox was asserted a fresh individual. We did
5Row ”Min-Def./ Diag.”
6Row ”All-Def./ Diag.”
7Row ”Min.-Def. solutions”
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not require the individuals to be distinct. Second, for ontologies
for which an ABox was provided, we also computed the entropy
w.r.t. this real ABox.
Results
The results of these experiments are presented in Tables 7.4, and
7.5. Since the results for the experiments with the real ABoxes
provided constant values for the entropy while stating zero con-
flicts, we omit displaying them in detail. We found out that in-
deed the assertions made in the ontologies did only concern ax-
ioms that were not involved in root JUC.
As we can see, the only ontologies for which the number of
conflicts can be optimized w.r.t. the artificial ABox are the Sweet
and the Economy ontology. For all other ontologies, the number
of conflicts is the same w.r.t. all possible Default TBox solutions.
For the Sweet ontology lower entropy values correspond to
a lower number of conflicts but to more invalidated inferences.
There exist, however not a global optimal solution w.r.t. the min-
imal entropy nor w.r.t. the number of conflicts. While one of the
solutions with minimal conflicts is amongst those with minimal
entropy, the entropy for another solution with minimal conflicts
does not correspond to a minimal entropy. The solution that min-
imizes both, the entropy as well as the number of conflicts (no.
1) also refers to a minimal number of inferences in the finite de-
ductive closure. Yet, the other solution with minimal conflicts
preserves more inferences, but is also not optimal.
The results indicate a correlation between entropy and num-
ber of inferences in the finite deductive closure: The lower the
entropy the fewer the number of inferences that are preserved.
The solutions with maximal entropy preserve most inferences
but contain the maximal number of conflicts.
For the Economy ontology, however, the situation at hand is
quite different. Minimizing the entropy corresponds to maxi-
mizing the number of conflicts. On the other hand, the minimal
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number of conflicts corresponds to entropy values in the median
range, but not to maximal entropy values.
As was the case for the Sweet ontology, minimizing the en-
tropy refers to minimizing the number of inferences preserved.
The solutions with a maximal entropy correspond to the median
number of conflicts, but not, as was the case before, to a maximal
number of conflicts.
In both cases, minimizing the number of conflicts does not re-
sult in minimizing the number of inferences preserved. Accord-
ing to this measure, solutions with a minimal number of conflicts
range around the median.
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Ontology Chemical Economy MiniTambis SWEET
Expr. ALCHF(D) ALCH(D) ALCN ALCHOF(D)
TBox ax. 110 577 173 2’216
RBox ax. 4 3 0 10
root JUCs 4 x 9 1
Diag.
solutions 1’822 x 1’296 13
max. 907 x 499 13’697
med. 592 x 364 9’889
min. 339 x 351 7’211
All-Def.
max. 770 18’822 400 13’675
Compare
All-Def./
Diag.
pres. 88 x 88 1’578
lost 177 x 187 1’600
common 682 x 312 12’097
Min.-Def./
All.Def.
pres. 177 x 185 144
lost 0 x 0 0
common 770 x 400 13’675
Min.-Def./
Diag.
pres. 146 x 90 1’641
lost 58 x 4 1’519
common 801 x 495 12’178
Min.-Def.
solutions 5 41 2 22
max. 947 23’395 585 13’819
med. 947 23’179 584 13’762
min. 944 22’506 582 13’751
Table 7.3: Comparison of Deductive Closures of all pos-
sible Diagnosis- and all possible Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-
Operators applied to the ontologies from Table 7.1. Both ap-
proaches are compared w.r.t. the number of non-trivial inferences
for ∆(T ). For each approach, the number of possible solutions as
well as the results for the best (max), the worst (min) and the me-
dian are presented. For entries that are marked with an ”x”, no
results could be obtained, because the Java TMVirtual Machine
always ran out of memory.
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Ontology Terrorism Transp. Travel
Expr. ALCHI(D) ALCH(D) SOIN (D)
TBox ax. 449 926 73
RBox ax. 52 5 1
root JUCs 6 38 1
Diag.
solutions 32’835 x 2
max. 512 x 89
med. 476 x 87
min. 435 x 84
All-Def.
max. 497 8’621 127
Compare
All-Def./
Diag.
pres. 160 x 40
lost 175 x 2
common 337 x 87
Min.-Def./
All.Def.
pres. 74 x 2
lost 0 x 0
common 497 x 127
Min.-Def./
Diag.
pres. 185 x 42
lost 126 x 2
common 386 x 87
Min.-Def.
solutions 8 1
max. 571 x 129
med. 537 x 129
min. 511 x 129
Table 7.3: Comparison of Deductive Closures of all pos-
sible Diagnosis- and all possible Minimal-Defaults-Splitting-∆-
Operators applied to the ontologies from Table 7.1. Both ap-
proaches are compared w.r.t. the number of non-trivial inferences
for ∆(T ). For each approach, the number of possible solutions as
well as the results for the best (max), the worst (min) and the me-
dian are presented. For entries that are marked with an ”x”, no
results could be obtained, because the Java TMVirtual Machine
always ran out of memory.
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No. FDC H # Conflicts
1 947 18569 29
2 947 18569 29
3 947 18763 29
4 947 19084 29
5 944 19186 29
Median #Conflicts 29
(a) Chemical
No. FDC H # Conflicts
1 511 73473 14
2 511 73477 14
3 531 74267 14
4 517 74294 14
5 543 74432 14
6 553 74477 14
7 561 74524 14
8 571 74758 14
Median #Conflicts 14
(b) Terrorism
No. FDC H # Conflicts
1 582 5690 0
2 585 5702 0
Median #Conflicts 0
(c) MiniTambis
No. FDC H # Conflicts
1 129 2488 1
2 129 2488 1
Median #Conflicts 1
(d) Travel
No. FDC H # Confl.
1 13’751 1’891’029 1
2 13’752 1’891’029 2
3 13’753 1’891’029 3
4 13’756 1’891’068 5
5 13’757 1’891’068 6
6 13’757 1’891’068 6
7 13’757 1’891’068 6
8 13’760 1’891’102 7
9 13’760 1’891’340 1
10 13’761 1’891’386 2
11 13’764 1’891’386 5
No. FDC H # Confl.
12 13’763 1’891’386 4
13 13’762 1’891’386 3
14 13’764 1’891’386 5
15 13’764 1’891’386 5
16 13’775 1’891’580 6
17 13’783 1’891’731 8
18 13’795 1’891’953 9
19 13’808 1’892’053 8
20 13’817 1’892’240 9
21 13’816 1’892’268 10
22 13’819 1’892’275 10
Median #Conflicts 8
(e) Sweet
Table 7.4: Comparison of solutions for the Minimal-Defaults-∆-
Operator for the (a) Chemical, (b) Terrorism, (c) MiniTambis, (d)
Travel, and (e) Sweet ontologies. The list is sorted w.r.t. the en-
tropyH of the single solutions which is compared with the number
of axioms in the finite deductive closure (FDC) and the number
of conflicts for each solution
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No. FDC H # Confl.
1 22’523 548’309 69
2 22’527 548’397 68
3 22’604 550’262 68
4 22’675 551’541 69
5 22’679 552’216 69
6 22’748 553’413 69
7 22’810 553’426 69
8 22’818 553’513 68
9 22’787 553’518 68
10 22’824 553’601 67
11 22’800 553’894 58
12 22’752 554’059 69
13 22’824 554’210 59
14 22’883 555’347 69
15 22’898 555’957 59
16 22’898 555’957 59
17 22’907 556’977 56
18 22’915 557’039 55
19 22’915 557’039 55
20 22’954 557’269 69
21 22’962 557’598 59
No. FDC H # Confl.
22 22’970 557’673 58
23 22’970 557’705 59
24 22’985 558’691 55
25 23’016 558’703 58
26 23’040 559’422 58
27 23’040 559’422 58
28 23’040 559’422 58
29 23’061 559’861 59
30 23’069 559’955 59
31 23’069 559’955 59
32 23’053 560’344 55
33 23’084 560’724 58
34 23’090 561’431 60
35 23’129 561’611 59
36 23’129 561’611 59
37 23’129 561’611 59
38 23’129 561’611 59
39 23’129 561’611 59
40 23’165 561’922 58
41 23’155 563’157 60
Median #Conflicts 59
Table 7.5: Comparison of solutions for the Minimal-Defaults-∆-
Operator for the Economy ontology. The list is sorted w.r.t. the
entropyH of the single solutions which is compared with the num-
ber of axioms in the finite deductive closure (FDC) and the num-
ber of conflicts for each solution
Part IV
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8
Related Work
The work related to this thesis can be grouped into the following
categories:
1. Computing explanations and justifications.
2. Approaches to conflict solving.
3. Default Logics and its variants.
4. Ontology evaluation measures.
In the following we will give an overview over the most im-
portant works in these areas and give pointers for obtaining fur-
ther information.
Plan of This Chapter
We start with an literature overview for computing explanations
and justifications in Section 8.1 and continue with related work
w.r.t. conflict solving in Section 8.2. In the subsequent Section 8.3
we provide details on the different approaches to Default Logic,
in particular with extending DLs the handle default information.
We finish the chapter with pointers to work done in the area of
ontology evaluation in Section 8.4.
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8.1 Computing Explanations and
Justifications
In recent years, much progress has been made in the task to ex-
plain why a conclusion can be drawn from a DL knowledge base
by solely using axioms from the knowledge base itself. Schlobach
and Cornet [2003] came up with minimal unsatisfiable preserv-
ing sub-TBoxes (MUPS) which can explain the reason for unsat-
isfiability of concepts.
Kalyanpur et al. [2005] introduced justifications as a form of
minimal explanation for an arbitrary entailment. They presented
a glassbox-approach that extends the tableaux calculus forJustifications for
Ontology Repair SHOIN by a tracing mechanism to find a single justification
for an entailment η. Further justifications for this entailment are
computed by successively applying a blackbox-approach that sys-
tematically extends an empty TBox TU with axioms from the orig-
inal TBox T until TU satisfies the entailment η. Afterwards, ax-
ioms are removed from TU until the entailment is no longer in-
ferred. In turn, some of the removed axioms are re-added to TU
until η is again inferred. The process of adding and removing
axioms converges to a minimal TBox that explains η, i.e. a justi-
fication for η. It could be shown that computing all justifications
for an entailment is feasible even when using the tableaux calcu-
lus for drawing logical consequences [Kalyanpur et al., 2005]. It
was further shown that this task can be performed using the the-
ory of minimal hitting sets [Reiter, 1987b]. Finding justifications
is supported by the OWL API as well as many state-of-the-art DL
reasoners.
Recent approaches try to compute fine-grained [Lam et al.,
2008] or laconic justifications [Horridge et al., 2008] to considerWorking on parts
of axioms only only the conflict causing sub-parts of an axiom. A structural
transformation is performed on the original TBox T which re-
writes axioms into a shorter, i.e. simpler form. The transforma-
tion preserves all inferences from the original TBox T . Axioms
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from the transformed TBox T ′ refer to sub-parts of the original
axioms 1. Hence, removing axioms or inferences from T ′ results
in potentially less invalidated inferences in the deductive closure
of T ′.
Alternative approaches formulate the set of justifications as a
pinpointing formula [Baader and Pen˜aloza, 2008]. Justifications
are expressed as a monotone property on an axiomatized input. Justifications on
latticesThey are encoded by monotone Boolean formulas over a set of
propositional variables, one for each axiom in the TBox. The pin-
pointing formula is then a monotone Boolean formula over these
propositional variables such that a minimal valuation of this for-
mula corresponds to the axioms in the root JUCs.
Most available state-of-the-art OWL 2 reasoners justifications
provide with justifications rather than the pinpointing formula.
Therefore, the justifications based approach was used in the scope
of this thesis.
8.2 Approaches to Conflict Solving
Solving conflicts in formal logics has been a controversial research
subject ever-since antiquity. As we saw in Section 2.4, even the
definition of a conflict depends on the very logics used. Con-
sequently, the methods for solving conflicts for an ontology too
depend on the underlying logical formalism.
8.2.1 Reasoning with Inconsistent
Knowledge Bases
Huang et al proposed to perform reasoning on consistent sub-
parts of the ontology [Huang et al., 2005]. Similar to choosing
1They refer to whole axioms of the original TBox, if these were already in their
simple-most form
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the optimal partition solution by an ABox (Section 6.2), the sub-
parts are selected according to a specific query. We meet all of theReasoning on
consistent
sub-parts
desired properties. However, besides this approach allows for a
flexible reasoning process it is very expensive: for each query, a
number of consistency checks has to be performed that is polyno-
mial in the size of the ontology whereas the presented approach
answers to queries in a constant number of satisfiability checks.
Yet another approach aims at completing DL knowledge bases
[Sertkaya, 2008]. Similar to the case of Probabilistic Description
Logics, the TBox is separated into a Universal TBox (called static
there) and a part whose axioms can be refutable. Based on the
refutable axioms, questions are generated in a certain way and
presented to domain experts, i.e. human agents. By answering
the questions, more axioms and assertions can be added to the
knowledge base which becomes ”more complete”.
8.2.2 Ontology Repair
In the area of resolving conflicts in ontologies, the main focus
usually lies on resolving inconsistencies and hence changes mainly
occur on instance level or rather restricted TBoxes. Haase andRemoving axioms
Vo¨lker avoided contradictions by computing a confidence on ax-
ioms and assertions [Haase and Vo¨lker, 2009] where unsatisfia-
bility was restricted to disjoint- and subclass-axioms. Kalyanpur
et al. [2005] investigated how justifications can be used for resolv-
ing unsatisfiable concepts. Their aim was to semi-automatically
generate repair-plans to assist knowledge-engineers in resolving
unsatisfiable concepts. Repair, in turn, is seen as either axiom
removal or axiom rewriting. In either case original information
is lost, which violated the conservation of explicit information
(property P4 in Section 1). Indeed, the presented approach was
developed with the intention to use justifications but not to re-
move axioms for assuring that no concept is inferred unsatis-
fiable. Therefore, ontology repair is considered as the baseline
against which the presented approach is to be compared.
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We should not forget to note that not always a full repair has
to be performed. Approaches like fine-grained and/or laconic
and precise justifications, which were mentioned in Section 8.1,
allow for repair on parts of the axioms only.
8.2.3 Markov Logic
Markov Logic [Domingos, 2008] extend first-order logic formu-
las by specifying a weight for each formula. While reasoning,
those formulas with the higher score have precedence over those Relaxation of FOL
with lower scores. It is still possible to declare certain formulas
as pseudo-crisp by assigning them an infinite weight.
As such, Markov Logic provides a preference relation for free.
Conflicts do not exist, but the score for certain entailments may
be such that these may never become part of the deductive clo-
sure. In addition to that, the problem of estimating the scores
remains ambiguous and depends on the task.
Nevertheless, Markov Logic, with an appropriate and effi-
cient scoring procedure, could be a promising candidate for defin-
ing a ∆-Operator.
8.2.4 Repair Higher Order Logics
Repair can also be done using higher-order logics like in the On-
tology Repair System [Bundy, 2007; Chan and Bundy, 2008]. It is
assumed that some latent information is missing in the present
axiomatic description of the world. This missing information, in
turn, leads to contradictions. Since also higher-order repair as-
sumes a monotone logic, the repair effectively makes changes to
the structure of the ontology to resolve conflicts.
Besides that, Higher-order ontology repair, however,
makes changes to the knowledge representation and cannot be
applied to OWL ontologies in a straightforward way. It does,
consequently, not match the required properties from Section 1.
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8.2.5 Para-Consistent Logics
There have been made several proposals for a formal inconsis-
tent-tolerant or para-consistent logics. A common feature of these
is their ability to infer several types of conflicts, that would be
contradictions in classical logics, not as a conflict. We will discuss
those approaches that are most relevant to this work.
Jas´kowski’s Discussive Logic
One of the first formal approaches to para-consistent logics is
Jas´kowski’s discussive logic or discussive propositional calculus
[Jas´kowski, 1999]. The modal logics formula ♦p is introduced
which has the meaning ”it is possible that p” holds. This possi-
bility is defined on non-necessity ♦p = ¬¬p where p means
that ”it is necessary that p holds” or, in other words ”p occurs for
all the possible events”.
A discussive system cannot be based on ordinary two-valued logic,
because the elementary rule of modus ponens fails: If it is possi-Beyond
two-valued logic ble thatB → A and is possible thatB holds, then we cannot infer
that it is possible that A holds. According to da Costa and Du-
bikajtis [1977], who extended Jaskows´ki’s propositional calculus
to match higher-order logics, a discussive logic calculus
1. systematizes conceptions which contain contradictions,
2. handles theories containing contradictions caused by cer-
tain kinds of vagueness, and
3. treats directly some empirical disciplines whose main pos-
tulates are not consistent.
We consider the first property as resolving the unsatisfiable
concept of a TBox. These are, in accordance with the second
property, caused by the vagueness that occurs when ontologies
evolve or are mapped onto each other. Inconsistencies are intro-
duced when unsatisfiable concepts are instantiated. On the other
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hand, instances are ”real” data, and Collecting data is usually an
empirical process. Meeting also the third property, our approach
can be seen as a kind of discussive logic. Yet, the calculus used
is supposed to be different from that of Jas´kowski’s Discussive
Logic.
Multi-Valued Logics
Multi-Valued logics may assign a logical formula more than two
states. Based on Belnap’s four-valued logic [Belnap Jr., 1977],
for example, Ma et al. [2004] introduced a four-valued variant of
SHOIN (D) which they call SHOIN (D)4. Each formula is as-
signed one of the four truth values true, false,>,⊥. They extend
SHOIN (D) by three additional types of concept inclusion ax-
ioms. Two of these allow to model exceptions from strict concept
inclusion.
Multi-valued logics change the knowledge representation.
Thereby, the preservation of expressive power (property P1 in
Section 1) is violated which causes multivalued logics not to be
considered suitable candidates for defining a ∆-Operator.
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8.3 Default Logics
Default Logics were first introduced by Reiter [1980]. Because
of issues with semi-normal defaults Lehmann [1995] provided
a simpler perspective on Default Logics. It is based on condi-Lehmann vs
Reiter tional knowledge bases Lehmann and Magidor [1992] and intro-
duced the concept of partitions for normal defaults. A similar
approach was proposed independently at the same time by Ben-
ferhat et al. [1993]. An approach for extending DLs by default
rules that aimed into the same direction as the Defaults inter-
preted by Lehmann was proposed by Padgham et al. [1993] and
further extended by Lambrix et al. [1998].
Lukasiewicz [2008] applied Lehmann’s approach to Descrip-
tion Logics and extended it by a separate TBox that contains all
the axioms which still model crisp and not default knowledge.Extending
Lehmann’s
Default Logics
He also enriched defaults by belief intervals resulting in a prob-
abilistic variant of the DL SHOIN (D) which is referred to as
P − SHOIN (D) or Probabilistic Description Logics. While in
this paper we make use of the partition approach enriched by a
TBox, we do not consider the possibility of assigning the axioms
belief intervals—although this should, in principle, be possible.
There have been made propositions of how to incorporate de-
fault knowledge in DL knowledge bases. The earliest approach
was proposed by Baader and Hollunder [1995] and is based onDefaults for
Description
Logics
Reiter’s Default Logics. It defines a preference relation on prereq-
uisites of defaults and hence deals with non-normal defaults (in
contrast to Lehmann’s approach which is based on normal de-
faults). Based on approach of Baader and Hollunder several pro-
posals have been made how to extend DLs with default knowl-
edge like Dao-Tran et al. [2009] and Navarro et al. [2007].
To the best of our knowledge, P-SHOIN (D) [Lukasiewicz,
2008] is currently the only formalism providing default entail-
ment w.r.t. Lehmann’s lexicographical entailment for OWL DL
knowledge bases. An implementation is available [Klinov, 2008].
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The idea of reasoning on different DL knowledge bases sep-
arately is also subject to so-called Distributed Description Logics
(DDL) [Borgida and Serafini, 2002]. A Default extension to DDL
was proposed by Ma and Wei [2004] that also refers to Baader’s
approach, and hence non-normal defaults.
8.4 Ontology Evaluation
Most approaches to ontology evaluation do not aim for reducing
the number of conflicts for choosing from two similar ontologies.
In fact there is a variety of approaches that define evaluation pro-
cedures for ontologies for different purposes:
Ontology evaluation can be used to measure the similarity be-
tween ontologies [Maedche and Staab, 2002]. This is useful, for
example, when one is missing information in the currently used Similarity
measuresontology and wants to look for the missing bits in similar ontolo-
gies. Similarity could, in principle, be applied for assessing the
quality of solutions to different ∆-Operators by comparing the
original TBox T with ∆i(T ), a potential solution. However, how
to reduce the number of conflicts is not quite obvious.
Gangemi et al. [2006] introduced a general procedure for on-
tology evaluation regarding certain pre-defined aspects. In con-
trast to that, task-based ontology evaluation [Sabou et al., 2007] Aspect and
task-based
evaluation
makes use of specialized and hence task-specific algorithms for
assessing the quality of different ontologies for this special task.
Yet, both approaches aim towards comparing different ontolo-
gies rather than to assess two different versions of the same on-
tology.
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A first entropy-based approach for evaluating ontologies was
defined by Calmet and Daemi [2004]. It was refined by Doran
et al. [2009] and remains to the best of our knowledge the onlyEntropy based
measures approach that is based on an information-theoretic approach to-
wards assessing the quality of different ontologies. For a more
detailed overview over information-theoretic measures, the in-
terested reader is referred to the book of Cover and Thomas [1991].
9
Discussion
We will now discuss the findings we made in the scope of this
thesis. Looking back at our propositions we will study the pros
and the cons that come along assuming they hold. We will see
which goals could be achieved and provide possible solutions
for those that could not. Furthermore, we will see that the ex-
periments support two of our hypotheses while a third must be
rejected. Again, we will discuss the problems and give conclu-
sions for looking for alternatives.
Plan of this Chapter
We start the discussion with a reflecting the theoretical properties
of the investigated approach for solving contradictions in Section
9.1. In addition, we discuss the findings of the experiments in
Section 9.2. We close the discussion by pointing out the possibil-
ities our approach enables for practical applications but also the
limiting factors in Section 9.3.
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9.1 Theoretical Aspects
We investigated several theoretical aspects to solving contradic-
tions. We introduced a general ∆-Operator and defined sev-
eral approaches in terms of this operator. We investigated how
the different ∆-Operators meet the required properties, whether
they are consistency and what their complexity is.
Required Properties
We required the ∆-Operator to meet the following requirements:Requirements
Proposition 5 (Repetition). Any formalism for ontology repair has to
fulfill the following properties:
P1 Preservation of expressive power: The formalism for knowledge rep-
resentation is not changed.
P2 Coherency: No concept is inferred unsatisfiable1.
P3 Autonomy: The procedure shall work automatically.
P4 Conservation of explicit information: The original explicitly stated
information should be kept.
P5 Conservation of implicit information: As little inferred information
as possible shall be lost.
To cover the non-determinism of the approaches we formulate this
as an additional property:
P6 Determinism: The procedure shall work deterministically.
1For the current work we concentrate on resolving unsatisfiable concepts. The
procedure may, in principle, be extended to resolve unsatisfiable roles and—to a
certain extent—assertions.
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Please note that we assume that these properties are desirable
for a formalism that solves conflicts. It is, of course, arguable
whether, for example, property P4 shall be preferred over prop-
erty P5. For the use-case of where non-experts in knowledge en-
gineering throw in all their knowledge into a knowledge base
where also reasoning shall be possible, we are convinced that
deleting the users’ information is a potential threat to the users’
motivation.
A summary of the investigated approaches according to ful-
filling these properties is shown in Table 9.1.
All of these approaches fulfill the strict properties P1-P3
whereas the related approaches fail in doing so. It is clear that How the
approaches meet
the requirements
these properties depend on the task. For manual ontology re-
pair, for example, preserving original information might not be
an important issue. Nevertheless these properties reflect the au-
thor’s personal experience with people editing ontologies who
are non-experts in knowledge engineering. We also learned that
people are not good at expressing knowledge in a logical con-
sistent way. While we did not perform any user experiments to
show the handiness of our approach, we still believe that users,
in particular non-experts in knowledge engineering, can benefit
from this approach.
We also learned that for fulfilling the soft properties P4-P6
there does not exist a solution that is optimal w.r.t all of them. Ev-
ery solution turned out to be indeed a compromise. We should
note that, although using our Defaults-∆-Operators all axioms
are preserved (P4), we weaken the original information by con-
sidering axioms separately during reasoning. If we, for example,
want to minimize the number of invalidated inferences (P5), we
need to make a non-deterministic choice (P6) which, in turn, re-
quires optimization procedures.
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Approach P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
Minimal
Defaults
yes yes yes yes yes no
All-Defaults yes yes yes yes no yes
Diagnosis yes yes yes no yes no
All-Repair yes yes yes no no yes
Null yes yes yes yes no no
Rewriting
Axioms
yes yes no no yes no
Multi-valued
Logics
no yes yes — — —
Markov
Logic
yes yes yes yes — —
Higher-Order
Logics
no yes yes no — —
Table 9.1: Comparison of approaches for defining a ∆-Operator
w.r.t. to the desired properties defined in Section 1. The upper
part of the table denotes the investigated approaches, the lower
part denotes related approaches (cf Section 8.2). Properties P1-
P3 have to be strictly met whereas properties P4-P5 are subject
to optimization. Property P6 states whether the ∆-operator is
deterministic.
Consistency
We proved that, under certain requirements, the resulting
Multi-View TBoxes are coherent. We require that contradictionsRestrictions that
can be weakened are not stated explicitly. Some of these restrictions can be weak-
ened. For example, we may resolve direct contradictions by re-
writing axioms without having to invalidate the original axiom.
Note that none of the investigated ontologies contained neither
logical nor direct contradictions. Indeed there were always some
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inference steps involved for concluding contradictions from the
JUCs.
Direct contradictions are obvious contradictions. Small-scale
ontologies are usually manufactured by only a few persons. Due
to their explicitness we assume that direct contradictions are de-
tected easily. There are fewer chances that they survive in the
ontology until the moment the ontology is published.
Consistency is achieved by considering certain axioms sepa-
rately when drawing logical consequences. Default Logics as de-
fined by Lehmann [1995] and Lukasiewicz [2008] work exactly
like this and especially the latter method was designed to work
for Description Logics. In accordance with that, we defined a
data structure that can deal with separate TBoxes, i.e. the Multi-
View TBoxes. We showed how the partition process of Leh-
mann’s Default Logics provides a way how this separation can
be achieved, and that this process leads to a consistent Multi-
View TBox that meets the properties that a method for solving
contradictions should have.
Furthermore, we introduced a splitting scheme that allows
computing a consistent Multi-View TBox without the need for Splitting
scheme saves
satisfiability-
checks
satisfiability checks. The splitting works on the JUCs. Together
with a dependency graph that maintains the dependencies be-
tween the JUCs, solutions can be constructed by only performing
set operations.
The splitting scheme allows to improve the process of finding
partitions for the Multi-View TBox such that fewer entailments
become invalidated. We showed that only a subset of the pos-
sible choices for the axioms of the root JUCs suffices to preserve
consistency. Yet, this choice is non-deterministic and the possi-
ble solutions result in different Multi-View TBoxes. These can
invalidate a different number of entailments and contain a dif-
ferent number of conflicts whereby this choice requires further
optimization. This optimization is discussed along with the com-
plexity of the problem below.
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The improvement results in potentially invalidating fewer in-
ferences, but the resulting Multi-View TBox can still contain con-
flicts. These conflicts were shown not to cause problems for draw-
ing logical consequences. Still, the presence of conflicts is not
desired, because they may confuse agents that work with the on-
tology.
We showed that finding these conflicts requires reasoning on
the Multi-View TBox. On the other hand, the conflicts corre-Finding conflicts
requires
reasoning.
spond to the solved contradictions. We hence know what are
the candidates we have to check and do not have to perform a
blind search for conflicts, as a result.
We can possibly achieve absence of conflicts at the price of
invalidating more entailments. We saw that putting all axioms
from the Γ-sets (and not just a single axiom as in the optimal case)
leads to a Multi-View-TBox that does not contain conflicts. Yet,
it remains for future work to see whether this solution can still
outperform full Ontology Repair in the number of invalidated
entailments.
Complexity
The complexity of the problem of finding a single solution is
dominated by the problem of finding JUCs. This, in turn, de-
pends on the complexity of the satisfiability problem for the ac-
tual DL. In case of a very expressive DL like SROIQ, the satisfia-
bility problem is 2 NEXPTIME complete in the number of axioms
in the TBox.
Once the JUCs are known the problem of computing a sin-
gle solution requires a quadratic number of set operations in theComputing JUCs
dominates the
complexity.
number of axioms in the root JUCs. As we saw in the experi-
ments, this number is relatively small compared to the number
of axioms in the TBox.
Actually, the computation of all JUCs is not desired, because
we only need the root JUCs for the procedure to work. We de-
fined a basic algorithm for computing solutions iteratively. This
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algorithm might, on the one hand, benefit from not having to
compute all JUCs. On the other hand, it might suffer from having
to recompute solutions, because of dependencies between JUCs
that are discovered on the fly. This solution was not implemented
in the scope of this thesis and its further investigation is left for
future work.
Finding optimal solutions can be of high complexity. If the
axiom choice is non-deterministic, then the problem of finding an Finding optimal
solutionsoptimal solution is not straightforward. Optimal solutions may
still contain conflicts, and detecting these and/or assessing the
quality of a Multi-View TBox w.r.t. the number of conflicts re-
quires reasoning.
If the number of possible solutions is large, then the detec-
tion and/or assessment of conflicts can become infeasible. We
showed that, once the root JUCs are known the process of finding
solutions can be defined in terms of a stochastic search. Chang-
ing single axioms in the choices is not too complicated. Because
of that we gave a proposal how Simulated Annealing can be
applied for finding optimal solutions. Since the ontologies that
were available for the experiments were small enough to com-
pute and assess all possible solutions, we did not implement this
optimization strategy.
To sum up, finding single solutions is feasible. Finding opti-
mal solutions may be subject to a (stochastic) search process.
Complex vs Atomic Unsatisfiable Concepts
As is done in Lukasiewicz’ Probabilistic Description Logics
[Lukasiewicz, 2008], we focus on solving unsatisfiable concepts Complex
concepts
require
more effort.
in the extended signature of a TBox. We do so for the same rea-
sons as is done in Probabilistic Description Logics: we are able
to solve atomic as well as complex unsatisfiable concepts and we
can more easy apply Lehmann’s Lexicographical Entailment, if
desired. The drawback is that we have to potentially perform
more satisfiability checks, since we have to perform the satisfia-
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bility checks for the atomic concepts anyhow. On the other hand,
we reduce the risk for asserting individuals to an unsatisfiable
complex concept. While we do not provide a formal proof, it is
presumable that the approach can be changed without too much
effort to ”just” ensure that no atomic concept is inferred unsatis-
fiable.
9.2 Empirical Evaluation
Before we start the discussion on the experimental part of this
work, we repeat the two hypotheses from Section 1.1:
Hypothesis 1. Using our approach fewer inferences are invalidated
than in the case of axiom removal.
Hypothesis 2. Minimizing the number of conflicts does not result in
maximizing the number of invalidated inferences.
Hypothesis 3. The entropy-based measure minimizes the number of
conflicts and the number of invalidated inferences.
Number of Solutions
We saw that the number of possible solutions to the Minimal-
Defaults-∆-Operator is relatively low w.r.t. the number of pos-
sible solutions to diagnosis. We were hence able to compute re-
sults for all ontologies that we investigated. This result is not
quite unexpected, since the possible choices are quite limited. We
learned in Section 5.1 that, in the worst case, we have at most
2 · K · maxk=0,...K |Θk| possible solutions, where K is the total
number of root JUCs. In practice, it turns out that the actual num-
ber of possible solutions is lower than that boundary.
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Optimization
Optimization techniques can be applied to finding solutions. While
we were able to compute results for all possible solutions for
the Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator, this might not be feasible for
larger ontologies—particularly in the presence of large ABoxes.
A stochastic search scheme like Simulated annealing still seems
to best address the optimization problem. Mutating solutions
in the manner of genetic algorithms requires to check whether
a solution is possible. Changes for the partitions with a low in-
dex can have severe consequences for the subsequent partitions.
It is hence easy to compute a new neighboring solution when
we make a different choice. We consider it more straightforward
than mutating solutions until we found one that is admissible.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 1
The experimental results support our claim that our approach in-
validates fewer inferences than the classical approach of remov-
ing axioms for ontology repair. The sets of invalidated inferences No definite
statement
possible
differ for all combinations of possible Default TBoxes and ax-
iom removals. None of these sets is a strict superset of the other.
Hence, the overall performance using our approach is better than
axiom removal, but there may exist cases where we may have in-
validated more important inferences than axiom removal does.
This can be overcome by making important implicit entailments
explicit by adding these axioms to the original TBox (and, conse-
quently, toDT )—as long as they do not introduce cycles or direct
contradictions.
Our approach is restricted to solving conflicts for unsatisfi-
able concepts. In an OWL 2 knowledge base, however, roles
may become unsatisfiable and inconsistencies (i.e. assertions that
cause the ABox not to be a model of the TBox) may occur. Since
OWL 2, the treatment of roles has become similar to the treatment
of concepts. Hence, the approach of splitting sets of axioms that
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support a role conflict in the TBox may also be applied to unsat-
isfiable roles. To address inconsistencies we may use abduction
to add a new concept for assertions causing an inconsistency. Al-
ternatively, we could treat instances like concepts and apply our
approach directly.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 2
In the simple cases, the number of conflicts is the same for all
possible solutions for the Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator. These
can neither validate nor falsify our working hypothesis. For sim-Evidence for
accepting
hypothesis
ple ontologies, we can only try to apply the compromise solution
presented in Section 6.2.5, i.e. always choosing all Γ-axioms for
all partitions. Yet, we have to accept that we potentially invali-
date more inferences, but since minimizing the number of con-
flicts did not necessarily correspond to minimizing the number
of inferences preserved, this seems a promising option. The com-
promise solution, however, was not implemented and its inves-
tigation is left for future work.
The only ontologies that are suitable for making a statement
about Hypothesis 2 are the Sweet and the Economy ontology. For
the first we saw that minimizing the number of conflicts bears
the risk of minimizing the number of invalidated inferences. Yet
there is no indication that this holds in the general case. On the
contrary most of the best solutions w.r.t. a minimal number of
conflicts are distributed around the median of the number of in-
validated inferences. We hence decide to accept the hypothesis.
For ontologies that are significantly more complex than those
investigated in the experiments, computing the conflicts might
become infeasible w.r.t. the number of possible solutions. Since
the entropy measure may not be suitable we would have to find
other optimization strategies to assess the quality of a Multi-View-
TBox.
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Evaluation of Hypothesis 3
The results for the entropy-based measure were ambivalent. In
the simple cases, the number of conflicts is the same for all pos- Evidence for
rejecting
hypothesis
sible solutions for the Minimal-Defaults-∆-Operator. Hence, the
entropy cannot give any improvement. For complex ontologies
we observed both cases: (1) the entropy-based measure could
help minimizing the number of conflicts but (2) using the entropy-
based measure also resulted in maximizing them. In any case,
minimizing the entropy came along with minimizing the num-
ber of inferences preserved. Hence, we do not consider it useful
in its present form for minimizing the number of conflicts nor
the number of inferences preserved. As a result, we have to re-
ject Hypothesis 3. Yet, we have to note that we worked on very
small ABoxes and a very small number of conflicts.
Complexity
We only tested our approach on a few rather small knowledge
bases. The complexity of the whole procedure we presented is
dominated by the computation of all root JUCs for all unsatis-
fiable concepts. However, when we evolve a knowledge base,
incremental reasoning [Parsia et al., 2005] may significantly re-
duce the computation time. If there was a way how to maintain
the root JUCs for a TBox, our procedure, and ontology-repair in
general, computing all root JUCs becomes feasible even for large
Semantic Web knowledge bases.
9.3 Possibilities and Limits
One possible application from which our approach can benefit
was ontology evolution for people that are not experts in knowl- No solution for
ABox, but for
TBox for
non-experts
edge engineering. We allow for a coherent TBox while people can
throw in all their information into the knowledge base. While
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we are not able to ensure (ABox) consistency in all cases, we ex-
cluded one important case therefore: We never entail any concept
unsatisfiable, and it is hence safe to assert individuals to the con-
cepts in the extended signature.
If, for example, the axiom D v ¬C is included in the knowl-
edge base, it is still possible to generate an inconsistency by as-
serting an individual i to both C and D. We can, however solve
such inconsistencies by adding the concept D u C to the knowl-
edge base explicitly.
We can force the knowledge base not to entail any concept
unsatisfiable by applying our approach. Yet, this should be onlyAllow for
intermediate
solutions.
an intermediate solution and not a permanent one. We do not
assume that all the contradictions we are able to solve (or better
ignore) refer to exceptional knowledge—we use Default Logics
just as a tool. It can be expected that the more contradictions
are introduced and to be solved the more the information in the
knowledge base gets weakened. It would be interesting to find
out to what extend the knowledge base still provides meaningful
answers when the number of contradictions increases.
In the same context we have to limit the number of contra-
dictions for complexity reasons. If the number of contradictions
gets too large the number of JUCs can grow exponentially. Even
though our approach is not based on satisfiability checks (besides
finding the JUCs which we have to find out for repair, anyhow),
finding solutions can become an intractable problem.
The present approaches targets towards solving all conflictsIncremental
solution may
overcome
complexity
limitations.
in a single step. We could overcome the limitation on the num-
ber of contradictions by performing an incremental repair. Such
an approach was semi-automatic and involves users to actually
choose the next solving step from a number of alternatives.
10
Conclusion and
Outlook
We presented an approach for automatic contradiction-free on-
tology evolution. We proposed a set of properties that a method
for solving contradictions should meet. These properties were
defined on the basis of reports in the literature but also on per-
sonal experience. In essence, we want to keep everything as
much as possible of the original knowledge base (knowledge rep-
resentation, ability to reason, explicit and implicit information),
but want to be able to deal with contradictions.
Conclusions
Solving contradictions requires invalidating entailments. We gave
a formal definition for a general operator whose purpose is to in-
validate certain entailments such that contradictions are solved.
This ∆-Operator allows to compare several approaches regard-
ing the properties we defined.
Ontology Repair is the state-of-the-art technique for solving
contradictions in DL knowledge bases. We showed how differ-
ent variants of Ontology Repair can be formalized in terms of the
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∆-Operator and what impact these have on the properties we de-
fined. The major drawback of Ontology Repair is that we have
to delete explicitly stated information. This gave us the motiva-
tion for constructing a method that can deal with contradictions
without the need to delete information that an agent has stated
explicitly and the deletion of which is not desirable.
Based on Lehmann’s Default Logics and Lukasiewicz Proba-
bilistic Description Logics we constructed an approach that can
handle contradictions automatically under certain requirements.
We argued that these restrictions are not very special and hence
do not limit the application of our approach. We showed that
this approach produces a consistent knowledge base without the
need to delete explicit information.
We have to invalidate certain implicit information, but canLimit invalidation
limit this to a minimum. We experimentally verified our claim
that our approach performs better in terms of invalidated entail-
ments than axiom removal on several ontologies.
The complexity of finding a solution is dominated by the prob-
lem of finding the causes for contradictions, i.e. the justifications
for unsatisfiable concepts. Since it was shown in the literature
that this problem is tractable for real-world ontologies that con-
tain several thousands of axioms, we conclude that our approach
is applicable. Furthermore, we provided the basic definition for
an iterative version that might benefit from not having to com-
pute all of the justifications for unsatisfiable concepts.
Optimal solutions require non-deterministic choices. Find-
ing optimal solutions may hence increase the complexity of the
problem, depending on the size of the knowledge base and theOptimal solutions
optimality criterion. Optimal solutions can still contain conflicts.
These are—unlike in classical DL—not a problem for drawing
logical consequences. Yet they may confuse agents working with
the knowledge base. We saw that optimal solutions w.r.t. a min-
imal number of invalidated inferences may not correspond to a
minimal number of conflicts. We concluded that we need a more
sophisticated measure for assessing the quality of solutions. Such
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a method should minimize both the number of conflicts and the
number of invalidated inferences.
We proposed an entropy-based measure that assesses the qual-
ity of a possible solution in the presence of an ABox. The ra-
tionale behind using entropy was that conflicts refer to higher Entropy measure
did not minimize
conflicts.
values in the entropy. While working in theory, the empirical
evaluation, however, showed that the entropy method may lead
to both optimal as well as sub-optimal solutions w.r.t the num-
ber of conflicts. Regarding the number of invalidated inferences,
the entropy measure showed to usually refer to sub-optimal re-
sults. We hence conclude that the entropy based measure in its
presented form is not adequate to obtain optimal solutions w.r.t.
minimizing the number of conflicts as well as the number of in-
validated inferences.
The experiments showed that minimizing the number of con-
flicts does not minimize the number of inferences invalidated.
This makes us confident that minimal conflicts is a desirable prop-
erty.
Outlook
The ontologies that we used are rather small and old. Never-
theless, they are still used in state-of-the-art literature on error
handling in DL and OWL 2 ontologies. In order to know up to
what extent our approach scales, we need larger ontologies that
contain unsatisfiable concepts and complex (and hence interest-
ing) JUCs. Published ontologies are usually coherent, i.e. they
do not contain contradictions. We hence propose to launch an in-
terest group that collects large-scale ontologies with unsatisfiable
concepts.
The entropy-based measure was not able to minimize the num-
ber of conflicts. We therefore provided a re-formulation of our
procedure that can minimizes the number of conflicts but risks
increasing the number of invalidated inferences. This approach
was not yet implemented and remains for future work.
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Ontology mapping (i.e. aligning one ontology to another) is
another task that has to deal with contradictions. Hence, we be-
lieve that our approach is a promising candidate for dealing with
contradictions in ontology mapping.
General Conclusion
Ontology evolution for non-experts in knowledge engineering is
the application that can benefit massively from applying our ap-Non-experts may
benefit most. proach. On the one hand, we do not have to expose the com-
plexity of performing repair to the users. On the other hand, we
are able to keep the specified information—a factor that we con-
sider important for the users’ motivation. As sketched above, our
approach provides a method for handling contradictions with-
out the need to remove explicit information. Considering the
amount of information (explicit and implicit axioms) that is in-
validated, our approach can outperform full Ontology Repair
while its limiting factors do not prevent its applicability. Indeed
we believe that using the presented approach has the potential to
enable automatic conflict-free ontology evolution in practice—a
central need for long living ontologies and, hence, for the Seman-
tic Web.
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AGlossary
Abbreviations
DL Description Logic
FOL first-order logics
JUC justification for unsatisfiable concept
Description Logics
DL set of all Description Logics
L a certain Description Logic
≤DL partial order on Description Logics w.r.t. expres-
sive power
L maximal expressive power of the ontology O
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Concepts and Individuals
Concepts and Roles are denoted by uppercase Latin
letters.
Individuals are denoted by lowercase Latin letters.
> the top concept
⊥ the bottom concept
A,B atomic concepts
C,D complex concepts
R simple roles
S complex roles
a, b, c, d individuals, instances
¬C complex concept: negation/complement of C
∀R.C complex concept: value restriction for role R to
concept C
∃R.> complex concept: limited existential quantifica-
tion for role R
∃R.C complex concept: full existential quantification
for role R to concept C
≤ nR.C complex concept: (qualified) cardinality restric-
tion for role R (to concept C), also for ≥
{a, b, c} complex concept: nominals, closed finite set of
individuals
U unsatisfiable concept for a TBox T |= U v ⊥
Satisfiability
∆I (non-empty) interpretation domain
I interpretation, model
aI , CI , RI interpretation of a, C, and R
|= logical consequence relation
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Axioms and Assertions
Axioms and assertions are denoted by lower-case
Greek letters.
D v C subclass-inclusion axiom, D is subsumed by C
or C subsumes D
D ≡ C equivalence axiom, D is equivalent to C (and
vice versa)
S v R role-inclusion axiom, S is subsumed by R or R
subsumes S
Prop(R) role assertion, R has property Prop
C(d) assertion of individual d to concept C.
R(c, d) assertion of individuals c and d to role R.
α, β ABox assertions C(d) or R(c, d)
τ, ρ subclass inclusion axioms C v D, equivalence
axioms C ≡ D,
role inclusion axioms R v S, or role assertions
like Irr(R), Trans(R)
η inference, entailment
Sets of Axioms and Assertions
Sets of axioms and assertions are denoted by calli-
graphic uppercase letters.
T TBox, set of subclass inclusion axioms and con-
cept equivalence axioms
R RBox, set of role inclusion axioms and role asser-
tions
A ABox, set of individual assertions
O Ontology, pair of TBox and RBox O = 〈T ,R〉
K Knowledge base, pair of ontology and ABox
K = 〈O,A〉
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Deductive Closures
X is one of K, O, T ,R A, and ∆(T )
(X )? infinite deductive closure for X
(X )+ finite deductive closure for X
(X )× preferred deductive closure for X
Justifications
Justifications and parts thereof are sets of axioms and
denoted similarly.
JkT ,η k-th Justification for T |= η
ΓkUv⊥ splitting set for justification J
k
Uv⊥ containing all
axioms with U on left-hand-side
ΘkUv⊥ splitting set for justification J
k
Uv⊥ containing all
axioms without U on left-hand-side
Multi-View TBoxes
Multi-View TBoxes and parts thereof are sets of ax-
ioms and denoted similarly.
DT Multi-View-TBox
T∆ TBox that holds universal information for a
Multi-View TBox
Un n-th Aspect TBox of a Multi-View TBox
T∆ ∪ Un n-th View of a Multi-View TBox
∆(T ) ∆-Operator applied to T
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Lattices
Lattices and their operators.
L Lattice
⊕ meet-operator
⊗ join-operator
L⊕ sub-lattice induced by the meet-operator
L⊗ sub-lattice induced by the join-operator
pn propositional variable
P a finite set of propositional variables
P = {p0. . . . , pN}
ψ, φ (monotone) Boolean formulas over P
V valuation of P
Choices
ck, dk local choice function for the transformation of
DT w.r.t. JkT ,Uv⊥
c¯k inverse local choice
(c)Kk global choice for DT

B
Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For a TBox T which does not contain any logical contra-
diction, let JT ,Uv⊥ be an arbitrary JUC that contains less than
two axioms. Since justifications cannot be empty, let U v C be
the only axiom in JT ,Uv⊥. Assume the superclass C was unsat-
isfiable. Then there would have to exist JT ,Cv⊥ and JT ,Uv⊥ ⊃
JT ,Cv⊥. Since JUCs cannot be empty, JT ,Uv⊥ ≥ 2. Consequently,
we have to assume that C is satisfiable.
By definition, an JUC must infer the unsatisfiable concept un-
satisfiable by solely using the justification’s axioms:
JT ,Uv⊥ |= U v ⊥. Since C was satisfiable w.r.t. T , this concept
must—due to monotonicity—also be satisfiable for any subset of
T , i.e. JT ,Uv⊥ 6|= C v ⊥. Since any interpretation domain is
defined as a non-empty set, and there are no constraints on the
interpretation of U , we will always be able to find a non-empty
interpretationUI . As a result, U is satisfiable w.r.t. JT ,Uv⊥which
contradicts the definition of justifications.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Assume that none of the root JUCs for the unsatisfiable
concepts of a TBox T contains a direct contradiction. Let JkUv⊥
be an arbitrary root JUC for a concept U in the signature of T .
Let U be a (possibly complex) concept. Assume that ΓkUv⊥ is
empty. In that case, none of the axioms in JkUv⊥ has U on the left-
hand-side. Since U must occur in some axiom of JkUv⊥ (we could
not make any statement about the satisfiability of U otherwise), it
must occur on the right-hand-side of at least one axiom in JkUv⊥.
To make a conclusion about the satisfiability ofU , the axiom must
have the>-concept (or a concept equivalent to the>-concept) on
the left-hand-side. This, in turn, requires that ¬U occurs as a
disjunct on the right-hand-side of one of the axioms in JkUv⊥. We
hence have a direct contradiction which violates our assumption.
Assume that ΘkUv⊥ is empty. Hence, all axioms from J
k
Uv⊥
have U on the left-hand-side. In that case ΘkUv⊥ either contains a
direct contradiction or ΘkUv⊥ consists of more than two axioms.
Assume that, without loss of generality, this root JUC consists of
the three axioms U v C1, U v C2, and U v C3. To have JkUv⊥
entail U v ⊥ we have that JkUv⊥ entails C1 u C2 u C3 v ⊥ for all
three axioms, but not pairwise (we just excluded this case).
Considering the concept C = (C1 u C2 u C3) to be equal to the
complex concept C˜ = (C1 u C2) u C3. We can hence rewrite the
three axioms as the two axioms U v (C1uC2) and U v C3 which
is a direct contradiction.
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 (Repetition from Section 4.4.7). The Default TBox pro-
duced by Algorithm 1 is consistent, if
∣∣ chooseThetaAxiom(Un, T∆,ΘkU v ⊥)∣∣ ≥ 1 if n = 0.∣∣ chooseGammaAxiom(Un, T∆,ΓkU v ⊥)∣∣ ≥ 1 if n > 0.
updateIndex(n) = n+ 1
We proof Theorem 6 by induction. Assume that all root JUCs
JkT ,Uv⊥ for the unsatisfiable concepts of a TBox T are acyclic and
do not contain direct contradictions.
It should be noted that T∆ may grow dynamically, because in
each processing step, and hence in each step of the induction, we
potentially add further axioms to T∆. This requires to show for
each step that the condition given by Default Logics, i.e. B v A ∈
Un ⇐⇒ T \
⋃n−1
m=0 Um |= A u B is still fulfilled for every of the
already computed partitions U0, . . . ,Un−1. This becomes clearer,
since the condition can be rewritten as T∆ ∪
⋃N
m=n Um |= A u B
and has to hold for all n = 0, . . . , N .
Induction Assumption
As induction assumption we define that either all axioms have
been processed—in that case the algorithm terminates—or a new
partition Un can be constructed such that for each axiomB v A ∈
Un the condition T \ T∆ ∪
⋃n−1
m=0 Um |= A u B is fulfilled. In the
following we assume there are still axioms left to process.
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Induction Start
For the first processing step, all those axioms from T are added
to T∆ that are not part of any root JUC, i.e. T∆ = T \
⋃K
k=0 J
k
Uv⊥.
As we know from Lemma 3, for each root JUC JkUv⊥ the corre-
sponding splitting sets ΘkUv⊥,Γ
k
Uv⊥ are non-empty. By assump-
tion, the JkUv⊥ are acyclic. Hence, we can always find some Θ-set
whose axioms are not contained in any Γ-set. In other words:
There exists ΘkUv⊥ such that Θ
k
Uv⊥ ∩ ΓlVv⊥ = ∅ for all l, V . For
each such ΘkUv⊥ we choose at least one of its axioms for U0 and
add the rest to T∆. Please note that only those axioms that are
added to the first partition U0 are treated as Defaults.1 Those ax-
ioms added to T∆, in contrast, have regular DL semantics.
After the first processing step, T∆∪U0 does not infer any con-
cept unsatisfiable, i.e. for each axiom B v A ∈ U0 it holds that
T∆ ∪ U0 |= A u B. Hence the induction assumption is shown to
be true for n = 0.
Induction Step
According to the induction assumption, in the n-th processing
step, a new partition Un can be constructed such that for each ax-
iom
B v A ∈ Un the condition T \ T∆ ∪
⋃n−1
m=0 Um |= A u B is ful-
filled.
When choosing axioms from Γ-sets of root JUCs, we always
choose at least one axiom for the current partition and add the
rest to T∆—in any case, the corresponding Γ-set is empty after-
wards. According to Algorithm 1, in each processing step, we
1Treating an axiom as Default is to be interpreted in the same way as Lehmann
does in Lehmann [1995]. It just means that the Default axioms are put into dif-
ferent partitions and only the axioms within a single partition are considered to-
gether when drawing logical consequences. Treating axioms as Defaults does,
however, not necessarily mean that they have Default semantics as defined by
lex-minimal entailment.
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only choose those axioms B v A from Θ-sets of root JUCs in case
B v A is not member of any Γ-set of any JUC. To sum up, after
each processing step any Γ-set of a root JUC is either empty or no
axioms have been removed from it at all.
Emptiness of Γ-sets: In case all Γ-sets of the root JUCs are
empty, so must be the corresponding Θ-sets. If this was not the
case, there must exist an axiom B v A that is contained in some
Θk0U0v⊥ but not in any Γ
k
Uv⊥. Since we already added all the ax-
ioms of that kind to either U0 or T∆ in the first step (induction
start), all root unsat Θ-sets must be empty when all root unsat
Γ-sets are empty. In that case the procedure terminates.
Assume now that not all Γ-sets of the root JUCs are empty.
To be able to find axioms for the next partition Un+1 we must
show that in step n for at least one Θk0U0v⊥ of a root JUC all its
remaining axioms were added to Un, i.e. there exists U0, k0 such
that ΘU0v⊥ = ∅ after step n.
At least one Θ-set that was resolved in step n: Since we per-
formed step n, we resolved some root unsat Γ-sets in that step.
According to Algorithm 1, for n > 0, each axiom in a Θ-set is
contained in a Γ-set at the start of a processing step. By adding
some Γ-axioms to Un and T∆, we thereby add some Θ-axioms to
Un and T∆, as well. Let ΘkiUj be the Θ-sets for which we effectively
added axioms to Un and T∆. Since we remove these axioms from
all splitting sets, we remove them from ΘkiUj . Hence, after step n
each ΘkiUj is either empty or still contains some axioms. We have
to show that at least one ΘkiUj is empty.
Assume that none of the ΘkiUj was empty. Because we added
all Θ-axioms that are at step n not in any Γ-set already to either
Um (m = 0, . . . , n) or T∆, all axioms in
⋃
j,i Θ
ki
Uj
are contained in
some Γ-set. These Γ-sets either belong to a root JUC or at least
depend on root a JUC. Let us refer to these root JUCs by JkpUlv⊥.
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These, obviously have not yet been solved (otherwise, their Γ-
sets had already been processed). As a consequence, their Θ-
sets ΘkpUlv⊥ cannot be empty. As a consequence, the induction
assumption that we started with above holds for the sets ΘkiUj . We
hence showed by induction: If none of the ΘkiUj is empty, then we
can find root justifications JkpUlv⊥ whose Θ-sets are non-empty.
By assumption the number of root JUCs is finite and acyclic.
We found a contradiction, as a consequence. Hence, we proved
that after step n there exists at least one ΘkiUj that is indeed empty.
According to Lemma 3 the corresponding splitting sets ΓkiUj are
not empty. From ΓkiUj we can construct partition Un+1 according
to Algorithm 1.
Default Logics constraint on axioms in Un+1: Each axiom
B v A ∈ Un+1 was contained in some splitting set of a root JUC:
Either B v A ∈ Γk0U0 or B v A ∈ Θk1U1 such that B v A 6∈ ΓkiUj .
In the first case, at least one axiom from Θk0U0 is contained in the
previous partition Un. Hence, B is satisfiable w.r.t. T \
⋃n
m=0 Um
whereas A was satisfiable before. As a result T \ ⋃nm=0 Um |=
B uA.
In the second case B was unsatisfiable in step n w.r.t. a JUC
Jk2U2v⊥ that depended on a root JUC J
k3
U3v⊥ which was solved in
step n+ 12. Since B v A does not belong to a Γ-set anymore, the
concept B is satisfiable w.r.t. T \ ⋃nm=0 Um. The concept A was
already satisfiable before, and T \⋃nm=0 Um |= AuB, as a result.
2In step n the axiomB v Awas still part of a Γ-set. Since it was not solved by
solving a Γ-set of a root JUC in any step including n + 1, it must have been part
of a derived JUC. Since it, by definition, does not belong to any Γ-set anymore,
the corresponding derived JUC must have been solved in the n+ 1-th step.
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B.3.1 Example
Assume the TBox
T =

B v A, C v B, C v ¬H,
H v A, D v C, D v ¬E,
E v B F v D F v ¬C
G v B
.
There exist the following root JUCs:
1. J0Cv⊥ = {B v A,H v A︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
, C v B,C v ¬H︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
}
2. J1Dv⊥ = {C v B,E v B︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
, D v C,D v ¬E︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
}.
3. J2Fv⊥ = {D v C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
, F v ¬C,F v D︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
}.
Induction start and first partition
For the induction start we initialize T∆ = {G v B}. For the first
partition U0 we have to at least one axiom from {B v A,H v A}.
Since E v B ∈ Θ1Dv⊥ but not in any Γ-set, we may also choose
this axiom for the first partition. This possible choice causes the
number of partitions to be not unique—if we choose E v B for
the first partition, we may end up with three partitions, if we
do not choose it for the first partition, we may end up with four
partitions.
Induction step with ϑ-axioms
Assume that we do not choose E v B for the first partition. For
the second partition U1, we may choose one or both axioms from
{C v B,C v ¬H}. If we chose C v B, we may put C v ¬H into
T∆, because C v ¬H 6∈ Θ1Dv⊥. If we chose C v ¬H , in contrast,
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we should not put C v B into T∆, because C v B is one of the
axioms in Θ1Dv⊥—putting C v B into T∆ we risk not to be able
to resolve Θ1Dv⊥. Assume we chose C v B for U1. Since C v B is
not the only axiom in Θ1Dv⊥ we have not yet resolved Θ
1
Dv⊥ by
removing T∆ ∪ U0 ∪ U1 from the splitting sets. Indeed, there still
exists some ϑ-axiom, because Θ1Dv⊥ \ (T∆ ∪U0 ∪U1) = {E v B}.
We may add E v B either to T∆ or to U1 and remove it from the
splitting sets.
Induction step without ϑ-axioms
By removing E v B from the splitting sets, we resolved Θ1Dv⊥.
For the next partition U2, we therefore can only choose from the
corresponding Γ-set, i.e. Γ1Dv⊥ = {D v C,D v ¬E}. Assume
we chose D v C for U2 and D v ¬E for T∆. We remove both
axioms from the splitting sets and can now indeed not find any
ϑ-axioms: Θ2Fv⊥ \ (T∆ ∪ U0 ∪ U1) = ∅.
Convergence
We resolved Θ2Fv⊥. As a result, we may choose one or both ax-
ioms from Γ2Ev⊥ for U3 in the last step. Since there are no more
axioms to process, the procedure stops.
Possible Partitions
The choice of axioms at each step determines a tree. The number
of axiom within the partitions may vary as may vary the actual
number of partitions. The following Table B.1 provides two pos-
sible solutions. Please note that there may exist further solutions.
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T∆ U0 U1 U2 U3
B v A,C v ¬H
D v ¬E,F v D, H v A,E v B C v B D v C F v ¬C
B v A,C v B,
F v D,D v ¬E H v A,E v B C v ¬H,D v C F v ¬C
Table B.1: Possible partitions for the example in Section B.3.1.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 8
Theorem 8 (Repetition from Section 5.2). Let T be a TBox that
contains unsatisfiable concepts. There exists a splitting-∆-operator for
two aspect TBoxes U0, U1 such that the resulting Multi-View-TBox is
consistent.
We proof Theorem 8 by induction. Assume that all root JUCs
for the unsatisfiable concepts of a TBox T are acyclic and do not
contain direct contradictions.
Induction Assumption
The induction assumption is that we can always find some set
ΘkUv⊥ such that Θ
k
Uv⊥ ∩ Γk
′
U ′v⊥ = ∅. We choose one of these
axioms for U0 and add the rest to T∆. We remove T∆ ∪ U0 from
the splitting sets.
Let ΓkUv⊥ be the corresponding sets for which we just solved
their counterpart ΘkUv⊥. Because the root JUCs are acyclic, one
axiom γk0 of each ΓkUv⊥ is not contained in any Θ
k′
U ′v⊥. We add
all these γk0 to the second TBox U1. If a ΓkUv⊥ contains a second
axiom γk1 which is not contained in any Θk
′
U ′v⊥, we add these
axioms γk1 to T∆. Again, we remove T∆ ∪ U1 from the splitting
sets and start again with the Θ-sets. Neither T∆ ∪ U0 nor T∆ ∪ U1
infers any of its concepts unsatisfiable.
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Induction Start
In a first step, we add all axioms from T that are not contained in
any root JUC to T∆. As we know from Lemma 3, the splitting sets
of the root JUCs are non-empty. Because the JkUv⊥ are acyclic, we
can always find some Θ-set whose axioms are not contained in
any Γ-set. In other words: There exists ΘkUv⊥ such that Θ
k
Uv⊥ ∩
Γk
′
U ′v⊥ = ∅ for all k′, U ′. For each such ΘkUv⊥ we choose one of
its axioms for U0 and add the rest to T∆. We remove T∆ from the
splitting sets afterwards.
Neither axiom B v A in T∆ was part of any root JUC or
contained in a Θ-set but not in a Γ-set. For each Θ-set that con-
tributed axioms for T∆ and U0 one axiom of the whole root JUC
JkUv⊥ is not contained in T∆∪U0. As such, T∆∪U0 does not have
unsatisfiable concepts. In this first step, U1 = ∅ which causes all
concepts in T∆ ∪ U1 = T∆ also to be inferred satisfiable.
Induction Step
In the n-th step we added one or two axioms from some ΓkUv⊥
to U1. After removing the added axioms from the splitting sets,
either ΓkUv⊥ = ∅ or there exists Θk
′
U ′v⊥ such that we have Γ
k
Uv⊥ ∩
Θk
′
U ′v⊥ 6= ∅. In case all ΓkUv⊥ = ∅, then also all ΘkUv⊥ = ∅, by
induction assumption. In particular: the procedure terminates.
Assume now there existed Θk
′
U ′v⊥ such that we have that
ΓkUv⊥ ∩ Θk
′
U ′v⊥ 6= ∅. Since the root JUCs are acyclic, we know
Θk
′
U ′v⊥ ∩ Γk
′′
U ′′v⊥ = ∅ for all Γk
′′
U ′′v⊥ 6= ΓkUv⊥. We can now pro-
ceed as in the induction start and continue until all splitting sets
are empty. Since the number of axioms is finite, the procedure
terminates eventually.
According to Lemma 3 the splitting sets were non-empty in
the beginning. At least one axiom from each Θ-set is contained
in U0 whereas at least one axiom from each Γ-set is contained in
U1. Hence, none of the corresponding root JUCs is completely
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contained neither in T∆ ∪ U0 nor in T∆ ∪ U1. As a result, neither
T∆ ∪ U0 nor T∆ ∪ U1 infers any of its concepts unsatisfiable.
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